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PART 1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction 
Housing and land distribution are contested issues in Africa partly because of the uneven 
distribution of resources dating back to the colonial era. A century later and years after 
decolonisation, it is now a question of efficient and effective housing land delivery, the 
working of the state and its administrative apparatus. Service provision in Africa, though 
fraught with many problems, is structured on the basis of formalised rules and regulations 
as in developed countries. This thesis addresses the question of how housing delivery takes 
place in different political regimes. The fundamental objective is to understand who gets 
housing when, how and why in post liberation war countries through a comparative 
approach involving two case studies of two housing regimes in two urban settings: Harare 
Municipality in Zimbabwe and the Cape Town Metropolitan Council (CTMC) in the 
Western Cape Province in South Africa. Central to this process is the identification of key 
factors that help in explaining how housing delivery takes place in these political regimes. 
 
The colonial legacy, coupled with the new values adopted by the liberating regimes, has 
had a profound effect on the administrative systems that evolved in most of Africa. Most 
liberators in Africa openly aligned themselves with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and this 
strongly influenced state organisations that later emerged when these countries attained 
their independence. Whilst Migdal (1987) acknowledges that it is possible to come up with 
typologies of administrative systems in developing countries, he encounters limitations in 
doing so because what he terms peasant traditional culture dominates the populations of 
these countries and this complicates the task of comprehending administrative behaviour.1 
However, this argument fails to take into account the highly bureaucratised set up of all 
African governments, and restricting the scrutiny to structural and cultural analysis without 
taking cognisance of the historical evolution of these states cripples the debate. 
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The study does not claim to be the first to explain service delivery (Blau I963; Lipsky 
1980; Bleklie 1996) but it makes further strides in analysing the impact of liberation wars2 
on service delivery in post-colonial societies. Literature on administrative behaviour has 
argued that African states are neo-patrimonial states that largely serve the ego of the ruling 
elite and several distributional systems have been studied using this approach (Callaghy 
1984; Sandbrook 1985; Joseph 1987; Medard 1991; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Most 
of the literature in the field has sought to explain why bureaucracies in Africa do not work 
efficiently and most answers recognise African tradition as a strong influential variable 
(Hyden 1983; Moyo 1991). Within these explanations, the influence of the governing 
experience in exile that was generated by the liberation wars has not been paid attention. 
The central theme of this study is thus to critically analyse the nature of service delivery in 
post-liberation war states in Africa, that is, what informs on these public officials’ action 
orientations? 
 
The issues considered in the study are: a critical analysis of the role played by what I call 
the “liberation culture” 3 in the decision-making process in housing resource allocation. The 
“liberation culture”  manifests itself as a distinct type of organisational culture4 that gives 
rise to administrative behaviour that is essentially party driven. The ‘liberation 
organisational culture’ deli vers its services selectively to segments of the polity that 
identify with the prevailing political leadership’s ideology. It defines who its clients are in 
the population according to their political affiliation above all other identities (see 
elaborated definition in chapter two). Its role is viewed partly through an analysis of the 
relationship amongst housing delivery organisations (agents), the political leadership, and 
the clients (the house seekers). Such an analysis demands answers to the following 
questions: How does this relationship define the citizens in each country? Which identities 
get prominence in accessing public services and how are these developed? Who gets 
defined in this way? And what conceptions of citizenship are implied in these resource 
allocation processes? 
 
This chapter introduces the background on housing service delivery and discusses some of 
the approaches used in housing delivery in developing countries. It also discusses the 
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rationale for comparing the two cities, Harare in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in South 
Africa as well as the methodology used in this study. Finally, it lays out the structure of the 
thesis. The central aim of this study is therefore to analyse and explain how the “liberation 
culture”  influences housing distribution in post-liberation war states. To do this implies 
first developing the “liberation culture”  theory from its origins and identifying its 
constituent elements that are based on four variables: ‘liberation logistics’ , state autonomy, 
Africanisation and civic organisation. At the empirical level, this involves analysing the 
impact of the “liberation culture”  on housing distribution. 
 
The Nature of Service Delivery in Africa 
Service delivery has long been recognised as the centre of control and steering for the 
public servants who ultimately allocate the resources (Lipsky 1980; Bleklie 1996) but in 
developing countries, these services are largely delivered by partisan political systems. 
Lemarchand (1988:151) describes these political systems as short lived since they rely on a 
quid pro quo for votes. In the classical bureaucracy, Self (1972) and Peters (1984) explain 
this process as being dominated by the career conflict between the official actors and the 
public servants. The locus of this conflict is in the organisationally based careers of public 
servants and in the partisan orientations of politicians (Barlow 1984). Thus for the public 
servants to act their part in service delivery, they have to constantly play politics (Gautam 
1993:113). The conflict extends further to clients as they increasingly feel alienated in the 
resource allocation process. Barlow (1984) points out that many African states are trapped 
in obsolete law and order rather than development oriented structures. They have public 
servants that are domineering rather than service oriented and they use coercive rather than 
persuasive rhetoric. How then does service delivery take place in law and order 
administrative systems? 
 
Service delivery in post colonial regimes has taken different forms which all have a 
common manifestation of inequity and unfairness. For instance, there has been a 
perpetuation of skewing general services (e.g. health and education) in favour of urban 
areas. The historical background, the nature of the political system and the mode of 
governance determine to a large extent, the way housing resources are distributed in these 
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transitioning societies that also have the unenviable task of redressing historical 
imbalances and they perpetually claim to do so.5 Some of the postcolonial countries came 
about as a result of violent struggles that were fought in exile where a new and different 
type of organisational culture, the “liberation culture” , emerged. I am arguing that the 
“liberation culture”  orients service delivery in favour of party loyalists. This culture was a 
fusion of the military nature of the liberators (political parties) fighting the war and the 
service delivery structures (military organs) that handled the logistical arrangements for the 
exiles. These exile time structures later transformed themselves in order to deliver services 
democratically in the new political dispensation. It therefore becomes important to ask, 
How does service delivery take place against such backgrounds and what influences the 
decision-making processes? 
 
This fete can partly be accomplished through a critical analysis of the evolution of this 
“liberation culture”  (which has its roots in the liberation struggles) and its infusion into the 
normal bureaucratic ranks involved in the housing delivery process. Thus the political and 
administrative history of the service delivery structures in the post liberation war post-
colonial societies are an important part of the study for as Shaw and Martin (2000) point 
out, understanding the causes of the disadvantaged requires analysis of both agency and 
structure. “ Liberation culture”  alone does not inform on the housing/service delivery 
process in Zimbabwe and South Africa as the process of delivery takes place in the face of 
several constraints amongst them endemic poverty, lack of land in urban areas, 
uncontrolled inflation and increasing prices and the lack of good leadership in most 
government organizations. There are many other factors that require analytic scrutiny but 
the “liberation culture”  does appear to have an upper hand in that policy considerations that 
have to do with redistributive justice are more or less always tied to the suffering people 
experienced under colonial regimes and during the liberation wars.6 The aim is therefore 
partly to explain the contribution of the “liberation culture”  to the erratic housing service 
delivery patterns in the two countries. 
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Giving or Aiding? State Provision of Housing 
The last decade has seen developing countries embrace the notion of housing provision as 
an industry7 that has local linkages and a massive potential for generating income for the 
owners.8 This is substantiated by the paradigmatic shift from perceiving a house as a 
product of economic development to tie in with the reality in developing countries of a 
house as part (tool) and parcel (benefit) of economic development. In all African countries, 
a greater part of the economies9 run informally with private houses serving as operational 
bases in one form or another for the diverse informal economic activities of the occupants. 
What a house is has thus clearly not remained static over time and space. First of all, it still 
provides not just shelter but security. However, this security is also in the form of wealth 
that creates opportunities for income generation through informal trading and lodging.10 
Low-income groups in particular regard housing as an investment for old age as well as the 
assured future accommodation of children and their families (Rakodi and Withers 
1995:381; Miles 2001). It is an asset on which they can rely on when other sources of 
income are inadequate or non-existant (Miles 2001). For women in particular, it aides in 
reducing their vulnerability by making them urban residents who can create and extend 
avenues of accessing social capital.11 This locates housing at the crossroads of employment 
creation in two ways, providing the house itself (infrastructural provision) which in turn 
provides space for economic activities. An urban based house has therefore evolved into a 
status symbol that gives a sense of belonging and worth that also facilitates access to other 
state resources. 
 
This perspective has led to a general shift from the commodification of a house to 
recognizing its value as a lifetime “project” that serves future generations . The result is less 
emphasis on the resale value of a house during the construction phase (Smit 1995). For the 
low income categories, this fits in with the traditional concept of “housing as a process 
which starts from a minimum package and grows overtime, under the user’s control and 
within their means” (Uche 1999:183). There is therefore a commitment  by the poor to 
sacrifice their meager resources in order to get a house in this approach. On the other hand, 
the commodification of housing emphasises the exchange value of the house and 
(artificial) standards are upheld to maintain and increase the resale value as with middle 
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and high-income categories. Consequently, a house is perceived as something that has to 
be finished according to specific standards before it can be used (ibid:183). This puts 
housing out of reach for the poor and the scarcity of essential services in general in Africa 
has forced the poor to look inward into their communities for solutions to their problems.12 
 
Housing provision has been politicised in modern societies and even more so in developing 
countries as it is recognised as a basic and social good,13 a human right and more 
importantly, as a political good14 in itself. Governments are thus always involved though 
this varies from direct to indirect involvement. And even though institutionalised rules and 
regulations standardise the housing programmes, housing processes are open to various 
influences amongst them general market tends, the policy environment as well as design 
and construction (Rakodi and Withers 1995:371). Uche (1999:178) has criticized the 
tendency by many governments in the developing world to introduce housing policies 
without adequate knowledge of the nature, scope and dimensions of the housing problems 
in their urban and rural areas. For instance, evidence from much of South Africa shows the 
unsustainability of public housing delivery due to high delivery costs and that this would 
only benefit a limited target group (Smit 1995). Where capacity is low and political 
contestation is difficult, housing resources are always the most affected as governments 
openly go round in circles discussing housing problems without providing workable 
solutions. And in situations where ruling elites have to house themselves and their ‘others’ 
first, the problem is exacerbated by the corresponding stifling red tape that inevitably 
pushes up the costs of organising to access housing resources. Previously, the lack of a 
house disenfranschised people in post colonial urban settings but this has ceased to be so as 
elections in these areas are no longer determined by one’s rate paying status .15 Still, social 
and economic marginalisation occurs in the types of resources the poor can access. For as 
Holton and Turner (1989) pointed out in their classical study on race, community and 
conflict, the allocation of housing represents a major determinant of life chances. 
 
The state has traditionally been viewed as having two main options in housing provision 
for the poor. One is welfarism, where it actually provides the houses itself and the other is 
the support approach, which is when it supports the popular self-housing provision efforts. 
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The welfare approach views all social services as ‘social goods’ resulting in a top -down 
non-participatory system of provision that tends to treat all home seekers as a 
homogeneous group (Smit 1995). The engineering techniques utilised in the latter 
approach have resulted in poor quality housing in developing countries and have further 
stratified society and until recently, it was the only option for the lowest urban based 
income groups (ibid). In this approach, the state perceives its role as that of balancing and 
stabilizing people’s lives by intervening in both civil society and in the operations of the 
markets. 
 
Though the intervention is justified as being based on the principles of social rights, social 
justice, social equality and redistribution, Kenny (2002:289), criticizes welfarism as a one 
sided approach to solving problems as professionals only get to define and determine 
intervention strategies for the poors’ needs they would have articulated. Her argument is 
that the needy are reduced to subjects who are screened for specific solutions. The 
paternalistic authority relations implicit in the approach eventually undermine active 
citizenship,16 as professionals only get to speak and act on behalf of the welfare recipients. 
One of the main criticisms against welfarism is that it does not empower17 people to look 
inward in terms of problem identification and trying out solutions. The second one is that it 
fragments societies as it views the individual as the root of the problem. As Kenny points 
out, the solution to improve the individual without paying due attention to the societal 
structure is doomed to fail (ibid:289). And lastly, the approach constricts political space as 
the opportunity to engage and debate problems is curtailed. Most of its energy is spent on 
drawing boundaries on who qualifies for state aid and who does not. 
 
The support approach, a response to the failures of welfarism, urges the state to facilitate 
and aid community-based initiatives (Smit 1995:28). And community self-help approaches 
are partly a counter to the failed welfarism attempted at independence by the various 
African states. Some analysts have perceived them as a reaction by the local level to the 
sense of loss of economic control at the national level (Craig et al 2000:326). In this 
approach, the state, in addition to providing most of the infrastructure and services, 
prescribes laws defining the parameters on what individuals and communities can do, and 
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most importantly, it ensures access to affordable well located land and technical assistance 
even though the major role of constructing the house falls on the end-users (Smit 1995:28). 
The approach has been tried successfully in Sri Lanka in the Million Houses Programme 
but it is not without its demerits. Both South Africa and Zimbabwe are currently trying this 
approach with the poor. As this study shows later, states very often fail to respond 
appropriately to community initiatives (that is, social capital at work) and neither do they 
have the institutional capacity to manage the communication processes that determine the 
success or failure of participatory projects. Smit (1995) locates the problematic of the 
support approach on its core reliance on the social capital found within specific 
communities and yet its success also depends on a host of other factors such as technical 
skills, financial saving potential and community cohesiveness. 
 
A third approach, the market approach, preferred by the World Bank,18 does not address 
the housing needs of poor communities since this is a profit driven exercise. All the 
housing development projects are expected to benefit contractors who establish the 
physical structures.19 For instance, in South Africa, private contractors do not find it 
profitable to build houses for less than 20 000 rands and this excludes at least 65 percent of 
the population (Smit 1995:29). In Zimbabwe, only a small pre-determined low-income 
category qualified for houses under the market approach (Rakodi and Withers, 1995). The 
poor did not stand a chance with housing where minimum wages20 determined access. 
Also under this market housing provision, the contractual obligations, especially those 
requiring collateral, exclude many aspiring house-seekers as the process is cumbersome 
and often humiliating. With its emphasis on individualism and instrumentalism, the market 
approach structures social relations differently in societies (Kenny 2002: 294). 
 
Much of the current dominant discourse on housing delivery in developing countries has 
been shaped by Habitat International’s 21 ideals. The activist approach favoured by the 
institution has carved itself a niche and woven its strategies around the support approach. 
The activist framework advocates structural or collective solutions to vulnerabilities 
triggered by marginalisation, social justice and inequality (ibid:287). Kenny (2002:292) 
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points to the space occupied by this activist arena as extending beyond the realm of 
politics, governments, political parties and experts: 
It defines politics as a process which stretches from the level of micro politics such 
as the daily experience of ordinary life, to wider questions of resource allocation 
and the self determination of communities. 
 
She gives the activist approach credit for offering a global platform where housing 
interests and community development of the poor can be articulated. Within the approach, 
community22 organizations organize around the discourse of affinity, compassion, trust, 
cohesion and social mobility.23 It also feeds into the rights-based approaches that also falls 
within the enabling approach that advocates a supportive regulatory framework. Power 
(2003) notes its embodiment of key concepts such as partnerships and decentralization 
which refer to the contributions of all actors (public, private and community) that spell out 
the rights and entitlements which the poor can get from the state. The state’s role and 
responsibilities towards the citizens are defined directly or indirectly which implies using 
other facilitating agents to realize human rights through housing rights. This implies the 
presence of a transparent communication process and space for citizens to express their 
demands. Within the approach, there is a general assumption that the poor require 
solidarity networks and collective representativeness to achieve their goals and more 
importantly, to guard against encroachments by other groups -boundary establishment- 
(Conway et al 2002). Participation24 by the poor in particular, is thus secured and 
underpinned by a commitment to mutuality, and political mobilization provides a way of 
giving organized expression to solidarity, advocacy and self-determination as well as 
seeking to alleviate suffering through the deliberate establishment of patronage ties (Kenny 
2002:291). However because of this tactic, the strategy builds in contradictions into the 
task of creating confident citizens. 
 
Kenny (2002:291) applauds the social change that occurs in communities built as a result 
of the activist approach. This occurs at three levels with structural change as the first one. 
Here political and alternative mobilisation strategies provide the material resources and 
decision-making processes that define the house-seekers’ self -determination. The second 
change occurs at the ideational level whereby participants embrace the value of the 
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synergy created by interdependence and the corresponding values of mutuality, reciprocity 
and compassion. The last change takes place at a technical level where they apply 
knowledge in mapping out their problems and ultimately develop the craft competence to 
propose workable solutions and implement blue prints. Even in the presence of evidentiary 
support for the activist approach, some skeptics have cynically recommended that 
community development “shouldn’t be taken too seriously” (Jackson 2001 , cited in Martin 
and Shaw 2000:405). However, community development has scored some successes in 
establishing social cohesion through the self-provision of services such that many 
international agencies have utilized this avenue to reach marginalized communities. 
 
An integrated approach, inclusive of the support/activist, welfarist and market, is probably 
the best solution for recognising heterogeneity within society as it is a holistic approach on 
all development related issues and above all, it emphasizes social inclusion (Majale 2004). 
In this approach, housing is provided at three levels: the national level, the local 
government level and the grassroots-community level through a combination of the various 
approaches discussed earlier. Variations in the roles each level plays are found in different 
countries and these are to a large extent, determined by the historical background of 
housing delivery in that country. For instance, in the absence of strong local government as 
in South Africa before 1994, the national government usually took the responsibility for 
delivery with the local government level providing support services only. This study 
analyses housing delivery through the activist/support approach as it recognises the role of 
communities in the self-provision of housing and creates opportunities for them to be 
partners in the development process. The approach requires that the poor be organised into 
groups in order to access housing resources and this is one of the reasons why the study 
focuses on housing delivery to housing cooperatives in both Harare and Cape Town. It also 
gives an understanding of how social capital amongst the poor can increase its worth and 
how local knowledge can be utilised when engaging with the state. 
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Comparative Analysis in Transitioning Societies 
“Comparability is not an inherent characteristic of every given series of objects. It is 
rather a quality which is attributed by the point of view of the observer.” (Rustow cited in 
Doggan and Pelassy 1990:152). 
 
Many studies on African political regimes have generally used wholesale explanations that 
presumed the phenomena under study to be a generic feature of every regime. Concepts 
explaining bureaucratic behaviour such as neo-patrimonialism and authoritarianism25 are 
often applied indiscriminately to all African bureaucracies without detailed attempts to 
account for the historical differences contributing to such perceptions and generalisations. 
Such homogenising concepts that do not capture diversity,26 have partly led to the failure 
to prescribe relevant solutions for the perceived development crisis in Africa. To avoid 
this, Ragin (2000:5) advocates looking for heterogeneity rather than homogeneity between 
and amongst the cases as this enhances the dialogue between ideas and evidence. However, 
framing operational concepts large enough to encompass slightly differing situations 
remains a challenge in the comparative exercise (Doggan and Pelassy 1990). 
 
The comparative approach enhances the understanding of the historical processes 
underlying the public officials' action orientations and the institutional struggles involved 
in the resource allocation27 processes between the two case studies, the housing regime in 
Harare in Zimbabwe and Cape Town in the Western Cape province in South Africa and the 
two are further compared to the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic theory which has been in 
vogue for some time in explaining resource allocation in African regimes. As with most 
comparativists who do qualitative analysis, the aim is also to develop theory in order to 
contribute to interpretations on organisational culture and administrative behaviour in 
Africa (Ragin 1987:11). 
 
The comparative framework for the study emanates from the attempt to contribute to the 
development of a theory of organisational culture and its effects on administrative 
behaviour in the allocation of state housing resources in environments where new values, 
norms and new knowledge emanating from the experiences of the liberation wars operate. 
During the war, another comrade’s life, needs and survival all depended on the next 
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comrade. Hence trust was crucial as a comrade was expected to sacrifice everything for 
another comrade and ultimately, for the struggle. However, some of the practices 
inculcated a habit of sanctioning unethical behaviour, a norm that later became difficult to 
drop. For instance, if a comrade ‘organised’ illegally to ac quire something that was not 
available in the camp (e.g. soap, sugar and meat), and was not caught- then it was 
acceptable to do wrong things as it demonstrated a certain capacity in outwitting the 
system. Common statements like “Longa (ronga) wakachenjera ” - meaning ‘organise for 
what you need, just don’t get caught’ - became part of the war lingo and this was perceived 
as demonstrating exceptional organisational skills (in the negative sense).28 Likewise, 
many ethically wrong acts that supported the cause of the struggle were equally sanctioned. 
The struggle was clearly supreme irrespective of the repercussions. These patterns were 
internalised by a generation of people who were involved in the war as fighters, refugees 
and villagers. 
 
The specification, liberation wars in postcolonial states, delimits the boundary of the study. 
Liberation wars were part of the anti-colonial/liberation struggles that took place all over 
the African continent in the second half of the 20th century. They are different from the 
liberation struggles in that they included a violent war and the notion of a government in 
waiting in exile. New knowledge emerged partly as a result of the governing experience in 
exile and the internal struggles to dismantle colonialism. The study details how the new 
logic, the “liberation culture”, influences allocative decisions in the allocation of land for 
housing and how it shapes the identities that facilitate access to housing resources.29 The 
analytic framework therefore centres on the intersection of several concepts: 'liberation 
logistics', state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation. These concepts are linked 
to the “liberation culture”  concept in that they combine differently to define its quality and 
intensity in the different countries and the mode of organisation to access this resource 
generates additional explanatory concepts, political identity and ‘liberationist citizenship’ 
that are also part of the outcome of the resource allocation process. I argue that the 
“liberation cultur e”  has an exclusivist orientation in service delivery and that it engenders 
the formation of new political identities and constructs a new conception of citizenship 
through the allocation of housing resources.30 I endeavour to demonstrate how this 
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perception was shaped through a comparative approach that is heavily influenced by 
Charles Ragin (1987) in his book, The Comparative Method. 
 
A comparison of the two countries raises critical questions: How does one develop a 
comparative framework for countries that differ on a number, if not on almost all the 
variables? And how does one move from within-comparison to between comparison31 
when one country has had over twenty years to shape the bureaucracy and the other has 
only had just over eight years? This time difference implies the use of extreme caution in 
doing the comparison itself as within variation may sometimes be greater than between 
variation (Oyen 1990:7; Sheuch 1990:30) but the time dimension here would indicate that 
even between variation may be great.32 Within variation here refers to the two time periods 
in each country as well as similarities and differences in how different organisations access 
housing resources. Between variation refers to the comparison between the two countries 
across all the dimensions. And an important question (initially posed by Ragin 1992) is, 
What is this study a case of? At the macro level, it is a case of the “liberation culture”  in 
two countries but administrative behaviour is found within organisational settings and this 
denotes another layer of what the case is. Units of observation are implied in the framing 
of concepts used in this study and they are the national system and the organisational (also 
called the group levels in this study) since the service seekers under scrutiny are organised 
as groups around the resource they seek. 
 
African countries all attained their independence through nationalist struggles marked by 
differences pertaining to each’s specific situation. After the power hand -over, political 
organisation differed widely as did the regime changes that occurred later on. Such events 
require capturing the uniqueness of each country as the same causes never produce the 
same results because they could never be combined in the same way (Doggan and Pelassy 
1990; Ragin 1987). It is this combinatorial causation that demands the use of the 
comparative approach as it is better equipped to address heterogeneity in a non-reductionist 
way. More importantly, as Ragin emphasizes, it incorporates historical analysis, a key 
strategy in addressing diversity which acknowledges that historical facts emerge from a 
combination of factors that is unique. Doggan and Pelassy (1990:127) concur that making 
 22 
use of the historical method enables finding out the uniqueness of each nation. The 
historical approach thus makes it possible to address the question; Could there be unique 
system specific variables that would lead to predictions of different outcomes for the two 
countries? 
 
Macridis (cited in Doggan and Pelassy 1990:151) provides a comprehensive explanation of 
what comparing achieves: 
Comparison involves abstractions, concrete situations or processes can never be 
compared as such. Every phenomenon is unique, every manifestation is unique, 
every process, every nation like every individual is in a sense, unique. To compare 
them means to select certain types or concepts, and in so doing we have to distort 
the unique and the concrete. 
 
Macridis’s perception encapsulates the entire research process in that it caters for the 
movement between theory and the empirical. Moreover it stresses that comparison is both 
a subjective and an objective exercise meaning that in studying one phenomenon, no two 
researchers are likely to study the same processes in the same way even though they may 
apply similar concepts. Bendix (cited in Skocpol 1984:370) captured the essence of 
comparing best when he pointed out that comparative analysis; 
increases the visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another…. By means 
of comparative analysis… I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as 
far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim at broader 
generalisations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar questions of 
divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers. 
 
Many comparative studies proceed along the approach advocated by Mill's (1967 [1843]) 
‘method of agreement’, which makes it possible for comparative historical analysis to 
identify cases that share the phenomenon to be explained. The hypothesised causal factors 
are present in the cases even though variation in other elements that have alternative 
hypotheses can also be present. The other approach, ‘the method of difference’ allows 
comparative historical analysis to contrast cases in which the phenomenon to be explained 
and the hypothesised causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the 
causes are absent even though these negative cases are as similar as possible to the positive 
cases in other respects. A combination of the two approaches is also popular as juxtaposing 
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positive cases alongside negative ones highlights the contrasts.33 However both approaches 
appear to favour multi-case studies as opposed to binary comparison. The latter also gives 
more room for innovation and swiftness in movement from one level to another during the 
analysis. 
 
This study proceeds by way of establishing concepts that capture the particular features of 
each case and the case patterns are then contrasted. As Skocpol (1984) argues, this calls for 
the use of explicit concepts to define topical concerns thus guiding the selection and 
presentation of patterns from the cases. Comparison here also sharpens particularistic 
descriptions as opposed to merely exploring causal generalities. Housing delivery and the 
influence of the “liberation culture”  is compared between the two countries, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa and then it is also compared at a theoretical level to the neo-patrimonial 
model, the negative case in this study as it does not have “l iberation culture”  
manifestations. The use of the two-country comparison is to emphasise similarities and 
contrasts in the distributional processes. This takes place in two stages, first distinguishing 
the operational networks in each model and then analysing the distributional patterns of 
each model. 
 
In the “liberation culture” , the ruling party's network shapes, prioritises and determines 
who gets state resources. The party network, by this I mean the party candidates 
controlling different networks in society, penetrate the state and act to orient resource 
allocation in favour of party loyalists. Where ethnic cleavages determine resource 
allocation, the “liberation culture”  would therefore supersede this as it cuts across ethnic 
lines and affinities even though liberation struggles were very often affected by ethnic 
factions.34 The attributes of the party network, the distributional pattern that requires 
individual service seekers to render loyalty to the party and that collectively organised 
groups must align themselves to the party in order to access some resources, shows a 
marked contrast to the all embracing neo-patrimonial theory. The concept neo-
partimonial35 state may well be used to explain the distributional patterns in the two cases. 
In the neo-patrimonial model, the society penetrates the state from below. The 
beneficiaries of the allocation system are defined by their relationship to the dispenser of 
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the service, usually the president. The pattern then develops in what I visualise as a 
'vacuum cleaner' effect in that it sucks up everyone in some direct loyalty relationship to 
the next one in the hierarchy. This, however, fails to take into account the power of 
collectively organised groups. In this study, I use both country cases in the endeavour to 
explain the party penetration of the state and society. 
 
Why Compare Harare and Cape Town? 
In order to compare something across systems, it is necessary to be confident that the 
components and their properties are the same or indicate something equivalent (Sheuch 
1990:53). Halevy-Etzioni (1990:118) concurs that comparison aims at analysis of the 
genus and differentia specifica of a social system hence minimisation must lie in the 
comparison of countries in which the cultural contexts surrounding the something to be 
compared are as similar as possible. I concur with him that comparing wholly identical 
phenomena makes little sense as do totally dissimilar ones. The interesting range lies in 
between and what is important is to highlight the contrasts and single out differentiating 
factors. Halevy-Etzioni recognises the limitations in identifying contexts that are similar 
hence he proposes placing boundaries around the phenomenon to be compared. 
 
In this study, I draw the boundaries as follows: [a] The two countries in this study are a 
result of long violent exile-style liberation struggles and wars36 and [b] The wars all had 
the same aim but they differed in magnitude and impact and neither was a military victory 
as negotiations paved the way for the transition to democracy. Zimbabwe’s struggle was 
rural based and yet peasants were later marginalized in the new political order whereas 
South Africa’s struggle was waged by the working class and the urban poor. The two 
groups were less marginalized leaving them with the potential later on to act dynamically 
on the national political stage (Cronin 2001). The histories and the economies of the two 
countries developed similarities that were shaped to a large extent by the need to resist the 
liberation war as well as to attain majority rule. Although their political paths diverged 
after the attainment of independence, the ruling parties in both countries maintained similar 
populist ideologies (Nzimande 1994; Phimister 1994). Ideological shifts in Zimbabwe 
make it essential to note the point of divergence in the organisational cultures that 
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developed in the post independence bureaucracies as the “liberation culture”  prevailed 
throughout these periods. There was emphasis in the early eighties by the state on 
collective organisation as a preferred mode of societal development. However, it is 
important to remember that Zimbabwe’s socialist policies were later affected by the 
dominant global liberal economic environment. 
 
In adherence to Halevy-Etzioni’s (1990:116) prescriptions,  the two cases also allow 
interesting contrasts along numerous dimensions. This avoids the pitfalls of the most 
similar systems design as propounded by Mills. Przeworski (1987 cited in Dogan and 
Kazancigil: 1994) have strongly criticised the approach: 
I do not know one single study which has successfully applied Mills cannon of only 
differences [most similar systems design in the Przeworski-Teune, 1970 
terminology] I continue to be persuaded indeed, that the ‘most similar design’ is 
just a bad idea.  The assumption is that we can find a pair (or more) of countries 
which will differ in all but two characteristics and that we will be able to confirm a 
hypotheses that x is a cause of y under a natural experiment in which ceteris 
paribus holds. There are no two countries in the world, however, which differ in 
only two characteristics and in practice there are always numerous competing 
hypotheses. 
 
Zimbabwe is a former settler state (1890-1980) whereas South Africa experienced 
colonisation much earlier (17th century) and more intensely as the Dutch came to consider 
themselves as indigenous inhabitants. This colonial history has had important implications 
for both organisational and societal development. There are key similarities stemming 
from this legacy that have had a significant effect on the development of organisational 
culture in the postcolonial bureaucracy. For instance, organisational design was largely in 
favour of delivering services to the white race. Such experiences have significant 
implications for the present day behaviour of the bureaucracy. 
 
However, important differences do exist and these affect the intensity of the “liberation 
culture”  in each country. For instance, Zimbabwe gravitated towards authoritarianism by 
choice due to efforts by the ruling elite to consolidate its hegemonic status, and yet it can 
be argued that South Africa was forced by the political circumstances of a negotiated 
victory and a commitment to lure foreign investors to remain authoritarian since the 
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maintenance of law and order was essential (Nzimande 1994).37 The countries differ with 
regard to their levels of economic development that is, their major exports and revenue 
sources. Zimbabwe’s mainly agrarian economy generates nearly half of its export revenues 
from cash crops.38 On the other hand, South Africa has a diversified economy. This 
financial strength opens up the system and broadens knowledge networks in all areas. 
Efficient and effective decision-making is thus a sine qua non for keeping the South 
African economic system in order. The question here is: How does one account for the 
competence extended to the public service sectors especially when dealing with low-
income significantly diverse black groups? 
 
This reference to the economic differences has important implications on two issues; the 
continuing struggle in both countries over the redistribution of land and the dominance of 
ownership of this resource by one racial group, the whites. And secondly, the level of 
organisational skills required to keep each system functional also differs. Africans seeking 
housing have over the years forced themselves (squatted) on both government and 
privately owned land in a bid to locate themselves closer to modern resources and other 
opportunities. How the two governments have responded to this spectre is an issue 
requiring close analysis as the responses varied. However, since the strongest common 
denominators for both countries is the history of a liberation struggle and the presence of 
inherited law and order administrative systems, bureaucratic action would be best analysed 
in each setting through using the same variables. An important fact is that South Africa 
shares a similar history and the same socio political dynamics that are similar to those 
found elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. On this Mamdani (1996) cautions, “South Africa 
is not an aberration, but very much part of the experience that has shaped contemporary 
Africa.”  
 
Horowitz (1985:17) cautions that, "Comparability does not imply perfect identity or even 
close similarity, but rather a restricted range of differences." Both countries waged long 
protracted struggles against the white minority regimes, Zimbabwe until 1980 and South 
Africa until 1994.  New values, norms and knowledge shaped by the war experiences can 
thus be said to be present in both countries after the wartime experiences even though there 
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were differences in some respects. A major difference was that South Africa's struggle was 
trifurcated. First, there was the exile group that accumulated a new governing experience 
in liberation camps that were scattered in several African countries. Then there was the 
prison group that was incarcerated mainly on Robben Island and finally, the civic groups 
that played a crucial role in dismantling apartheid through civic disobedience.39 Merging 
the three groups of experiences of these groups required bargaining and compromising on 
strategies for change thus mediating on any ideological extremism. 
 
Zimbabwe's war was led by the two separate exile groups in the Mao style of peasant 
society penetration. Mediating influences were largely absent leaving the knowledge 
generated through the war process almost intact. By the time South Africa achieved 
majority rule, the socialist tempo had changed tremendously due to the responses to the 
globalisation discourse of which respect for human rights and safeguarding property is a 
main feature. The differences thus imply seeking for continuities and discontinuities within 
this global realm when analysing policies. Thus for Zimbabwe, its socialist flirtations in 
the early eighties demanded going back to relate housing policies to the socialist agenda 
over time and space. 
 
Even though Zimbabwe started off as a multi-party democracy in 1980, it has steadily 
experienced the erosion of democracy (Sithole 1987). The country is nominally 
democratic, one party holds a complete monopoly on political power and economic 
resources and executive authority is rarely challenged.40 Contestation and participation by 
opposition movements and civic organisations is severely constrained. South Africa began 
its independence with a rather precarious transition to democracy. The rift between the 
'haves' and the 'have-nots' has continued to widen as the inherited bureaucracy has yet to 
orient itself to the equitable delivery of services.41 In social services delivery, housing in 
particular, both countries have fallen in line with the World Bank’s recommendations and 
have taken what Bond (2000) calls a rather disturbing back seat. However, with 
governments largely facilitating access to the key resource in housing land, both countries 
have encouraged low-income earners to organise collectively in order to facilitate access to 
resources. That South Africa allows civic organisations political space in the decision-
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making arena makes it a challenge to explain how the “liberation culture”  manifests itself, 
where the value carriers are located and how it is contained when the political space is 
open. 
 
Though governance styles in the two countries differ, the two countries were selected 
because of the need to explain the influence of the liberation war knowledge and 
experiences on public officials’ behaviour in service delivery. What needs to be underlined 
is that the countries were selected for specific analytic requirements and not on the basis of 
their geographical proximity even though important analytic issues tend to present 
themselves in countries that cluster together in a region42 (Rustow and Erickson 1991:17). 
 
Methodology 
The Data Collection Process 
The section presents the research experience, the nature of the data collected and where it 
was collected from. Asking questions on accessing housing land in two countries where 
land43 has been a controversial issue for over a century evoked a lot of concealed emotions 
in both the researcher and the researched. Dealing with the patronising tendencies of those 
hanging on to the land and of those speaking on ‘behalf of those needing the land’, 
unmasked the fears of the speakers more than it helped to explain the frustrations endured 
by the house seekers. This confirms that many of the assumptions that we make when we 
plan to do fieldwork turn out to be very much ‘off the mark’ as very often, a different 
picture emerges. 
 
To understand the dynamics and trajectories in low-income housing provision, I first 
identify two time periods for the development of African housing; the colonial era and the 
contemporary majority rule period. Empirically, analysing variability in how the 
“ liberation culture”  regimes orient housing provision in favour of party loyalists required 
delving into all aspects of housing delivery. This ranged from the formulation to the 
implementation of housing policies [watching out for continuities and discontinuities] 
across regimes; the arrangement and relationships amongst housing institutions (as well as 
structures), power relationships and reforms over time; actors in these institutions (that is, 
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who they are, politically) their attitudes towards transformation and clients or the 
beneficiaries of housing services. This involved identifying low-income housing schemes 
from 1994 for South Africa and 1980 for Zimbabwe. Service seekers in developing 
countries have been increasingly compelled to organise collectively for public services 
hence housing co-operatives as opposed to individuals were used as the unit of observation 
even though data was collected from individuals. It was in this regard that I visited the sites 
and interviewed members of the ‘community’.  
 
Unravelling the complexities of resource allocation in Cape Town kicked off with a 
document search composed of: [a] Policy documents and official records of the 
government; [b] Academic reports including commission of enquiries that represent the ad-
hoc nature of policy making processes in much of Africa and these provided guidance and 
clarifications in key policy areas and issues; [c] Literature, both theoretical and practical 
literature on resource allocation in sub-Saharan Africa and [d] Anecdotal evidence from 
media reports and official records and evaluation reports of civic organisations. Perusal of 
these documents formed the basis on which the housing co-operatives were selected. In 
Cape Town, the Development Action Group (DAG) and People’s Dialogue (PD) , the 
technical wing of the South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF),  were the 
dominant technical Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in housing delivery 
assistance and the research started off by scrutinising their work with housing co-
operatives and I soon caught hold of some of their 'success' stories. Successful in the sense 
that they had managed to accumulate enough financial resources and secured land for 
building their houses. Many others were relying on these as 'role models' and were still in 
the formative stages. In Zimbabwe, their equivalents were  Dialogue on Shelter, the 
technical arm of the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) and the Housing 
People of Zimbabwe (HPZ). 
 
In both countries, the Homeless People’s Federation organises and mobilises the poor in 
self–help housing initiatives. The federations are made up of hundreds of autonomous 
housing co-operatives called Housing Savings Schemes (HSS) that have strong networks 
that organise for housing resources. The housing savings schemes are vertically linked to 
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the federation with the latter doing all the lobbying for all the cooperatives at all levels of 
government and it incorporates the individual co-operatives in organising to get land which 
is the most difficult resource to access. The dynamics between these co-operatives, the 
civics and the state are the focus of the analysis as it is in these relations that the “liberation 
culture”  manifests itself. Two cooperatives were selected: One co-operative in each 
federation was selected for in-depth study in each country, and another co-operative or 
housing delivery scheme outside the federation was also chosen and analysed to highlight 
the differences. The SAHPF’s Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme in Phillipi and the 
DAG’s Salt River City Housing Project in Lost City were chosen for the  study in Cape 
Town. A Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) housing scheme, Mavambo, 
and one from those organised by the HPZ, Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative 
(KKHC), were also part of the study. 
 
The disruption of public service provision to Africans in Cape Town in the early nineties 
left me unsure of what to expect. Sorting out the complex maze of public institutions 
tasked with housing delivery proved to be a daunting task as the old apartheid housing 
delivery institutions for African services still existed on paper albeit with unspecified 
functions. On the ground, some other institutions had emerged but without resources and 
specified functions with regard to housing service delivery. After making sense of this and 
of the burgeoning ‘democratic’ local government structures, I made the decision to focus 
on the former Cape Town City Council (CTCC now the CTMC). Mainly because it had a 
large population of the poor African community in need of housing and also most of the 
former (apartheid) black local authorities fell within its jurisdiction. 
 
The Housing Departments were my focal point and as I was studying the poor’ s self-help 
initiatives in housing provision, it was essential for me to identify officials at the local 
level in collective housing delivery schemes. In comparison to Harare (Zimbabwe in 
general), Cape Town (South Africa) is a very research friendly environment (perhaps it is 
the exhilaration of finally being open to the public?). Public officials readily granted 
interviews to students as part of the public relations dimension of their jobs and the few 
that considered themselves too busy would always refer me to some other official at more 
 31 
or less the same level as themselves. Interviewees were thus selected on the basis of prior 
information and knowledge I had on the operations of the departments and their roles in 
the delivery process. This warm reception eased my tension in the initial stages that I went 
through as I tried to schedule appointments for interviews. 
 
In Zimbabwe, getting access to information from government departments was 
complicated by heightened suspicions arising from the emergence of a new political party, 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), that posed the first real threat to the ruling 
party/government since 1980. Cooperative members that had acquired land were uneasy 
about being interviewed at a time when tensions were high in the townships on who was 
supporting the new party. The ruling party youth went on a path of terror from February 
2000 after the government’s draft constitution was rejected by the public. Interviews with 
members had to be arranged secretly and they took place in very neutral territory such as 
the shopping complexes in the suburbs. Bureaucrats were not spared of this terror as they 
too were on uneasy about who had sent me to do this research. An unexpected question 
threw me off balance, “Surely, why would the Norwegians want to know about low -
income housing in Zimbabwe?” The point was that the statement echoed the mistrust that 
now characterises public institutions in Zimbabwe. Persuading interviewees to tell their 
experiences turned into an art and once they were in charge of selecting the venue and the 
time, cooperative members in particular readily agreed to share their stories. 
 
Gender and Research in a Divided Society 
That I am a woman and a black person had never caused me problems since joining the 
academic profession in 1996. My research experience in Cape Town left me more aware of 
who and what I am. Being patronised was the least of my expectations but my experiences 
showed the danger female researchers can be subjected to.44 In at least six of the interviews 
I held with white male public officials, their first statement after I had introduced myself 
was, "The first thing you must know is that our blacks are not like you, they are 
unambitious and do not want to work hard." I had learnt quickly from the first two 
interviews not to disagree with this but to simply ignore this stated ‘fact’ and hastily 
change the subject in the direction of my enquiry. The effect of this stereotyping directed 
 32 
me to focus more on the way the housing plight of the low-income community was 
perceived by the bureaucrats who were mostly white. Their dismissive gestures and the 
unsympathetic (prejudicial) words conveyed a lot to me that I had not anticipated. It 
therefore made sense for me to listen to their stories, anecdotes and experiences in their 
seemingly ‘half-hearted’ attempts to deliver housing to the poor.  
 
However, in a period of three months, I conducted twenty-three formal interviews in Cape 
Town that averaged two and half-hours each. Initially, a questionnaire was used as a way 
of focusing the discussion, but during the very first interview, the benefits in allowing my 
respondents to tell the ‘housing story’ as they had experienced it became evident. In this 
way, more information than originally expected just poured out. The bureaucrats portrayed 
images of a betrayed group that was struggling to maintain its dignity in the face of the 
challenges confronting it. On the other hand, the service seekers were determined to win at 
whatever cost. The determination was clear in their voices and actions. I could not help but 
empathise with them as I listened to their stories of their never-ending struggle for the 
restoration of dignity their generation had not experienced. As I toured their new 
communities and went inside some of the houses, the enormity of their task overwhelmed 
me since the houses were just completed shells on the outside, with all the interior work 
yet to be done four years after the building process had started. Even though, I had sensed 
the uneasiness in the beginning when I had first explained my nationality during the 
introduction. Their main fear was that the South African government was sponsoring my 
studies (at their expense) and once I had shown proof of where I was studying and the 
name of the sponsor, they became very friendly and cooperative.45 All the bureaucrats I 
interviewed were also very interested in knowing the sponsor for my studies. 
 
The most puzzling aspect of this interviewing process was the distorted truth or simply 
‘misrepresentations’ told by both the public officials and the housing co -operative leaders. 
As I went through the process of backing up the interview data with documentary 
evidence, I quickly realised that both parties, the bureaucrats and the cooperative members, 
had yet to learn the value of truth telling during interviews. The question was why? My 
interpretation was that the bureaucrats lied46 to justify their prejudices that the African 
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community was simply a migrant group with homes elsewhere47 and the co-operative 
leaders were equally keen to disassociate their political affiliation from their struggle for 
housing resources. The cooperatives’  leadership clearly wanted more disadvantaged voices 
on their side as the Western Cape provincial government was the only province that 
remained in the former apartheid hands and the ANC was in a campaign mood to win over 
the provincial leadership. It was therefore essential for them to mobilise their fellow 
disadvantaged, mostly African, communities. Politicians were the only group that admitted 
that civic group leaders in the cooperatives had knowledge of working the system as they 
were ANC cadres on a ‘mission’. Det ailed informal conversations held with many more 
informants (ten detailed), most of them blacks from the informal townships, helped to 
verify the facts. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the actual facts were revealed at the end when I moved from one type of 
cooperative to the other type. For example, the ZHPF were unaware that I had already been 
to the HPZ and went on to expose all their housing networks with the ruling party and how 
they were the favoured group in collective housing land provision. On going back to the 
HPZ, to verify these relationships, officers were only willing to discuss this dark side of 
their organisation outside their offices. I could not help but conclude that development 
organisations tend to rehearse the stories they tell researchers and outsiders. In this way, 
only their capabilities and professionalism are positively projected. Unravelling such 
complexities called for extreme caution in verifying all the information from the 
interviews. This background sets the scene for the rest of the study. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into four parts. The first part, composed of chapters one and two, 
introduces the problematic of housing delivery. The literature review and the argument of 
the “liberation culture”  are developed in chapter two where the latter is positioned in 
relation to two other resource allocation models: the neo-patrimonial and the classical 
Weberian bureaucratic cultures. The processes of resource seeking and allocation to the 
beneficiaries is the main focus. Whereas the “ liberation culture”  favours ruling party 
loyalists, the neo-patrimonial bureaucratic culture dispenses services to family, cronies and 
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network clients who sustain the system and the Weberian bureaucratic culture services 
those deserving of the service when it is their turn to be recipients. Clientelism is found in 
both the neo-patrimonial and “liberation culture”  bureaucracies but the organisational 
patterns differ. My argument is that the “liberation culture” , which orients service delivery 
in favour of party loyalists, contributes to the explanation of the pattern of housing 
provision in post liberation war countries. The party affiliation dimension stressed in the 
study highlights the dynamics in service provision to collectively organised groups seeking 
services that are ultimately consumed at the individual level. The other five key variables, 
‘liberation logistics’ , state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation as well as that 
of political identity that form the comparative framework utilised in the study, are also 
developed in this chapter. The intersection and interaction of these variables is explored 
and their influence on the “liberation culture”  is assessed. 
 
Chapters three, four and five make up the second part and they analyse housing delivery in 
Harare, Zimbabwe. Chapter three sets the stage through a historical journey into the 
provision of housing for Africans during colonial rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe since 
1980). This historical journey through a political economy approach sheds light on the 
current housing scenario in terms of physical layout and problems of access. The racial 
allocation of services is particularly important in that it established an avenue for 
discrimination by the new independent government to justify its actions as looking after its 
own. At the same time, it could use the same avenue to mobilise for support in its power 
consolidation exercise. Insight into the housing regime for Africans during the colonial 
period allows us to find answers to the questions on the character of the colonial state and 
how African housing allocation contributed to the consolidation and maintenance of its 
hegemonic position. 
 
The move to the contemporary period in Zimbabwe takes place in Chapters four and five 
where housing delivery under the ZANU-PF era since 1980 is discussed. The early heavy 
socialist emphasis had not prepared the government for citizens who might want to make 
their own initiatives to provide housing for themselves outside its channels. This 
unexpected and unwelcome initiative was very much a response to the global discourse on 
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housing provision by the poor for themselves and it threatened the state’ s position on 
resource allocation. The goal of creating citizens with a socialist identity stalled service 
delivery and thus encouraged the emergence of other powerful ideas that challenged the 
socialist project. 
 
In part three, the case of Cape Town Metropolitan Council unfolds through three chapters: 
six, seven and eight. Chapter six discusses housing delivery approaches for Africans in 
Cape Town before the new democratic dispensation in 1994. Through the concept of 
space, I explain how the resolve of Africans to ‘hang in there’ in urban communities in 
South Africa is expressed in their defiance of the apartheid state’s p olicies. This laid the 
platform for the community organising that later surfaced to challenge and engage with the 
state in demanding housing services. The chapter also discusses the citizenship status of 
Africans as defined by resource allocation. It also shows the capacities and ingenuity the 
poor people have in solving their own problems. Chapters seven and eight focus on the 
current housing delivery regime under the ANC national government and the New 
Nationalist Party (NNP) provincial government of the Western Cape. This chapter 
demonstrates the use of knowledge gained in the struggle to defeat bureaucratic hurdles 
and institutional arrangements that did not result in complete liberation of all people as 
illustrated by improved and equal access to services. Transforming the attitudes of the 
Afrikaner bureaucrats to ‘include’ housing provision for the African community as a 
national agenda proved to be a challenge that required the house seeking communities to 
be more daring and confrontational at times in their dealings with officials. The dynamics 
in land seeking highlight the problems of state capacity faced by unrepresentative 
bureaucracies. 
 
The comparison between the two cases takes place in part four, chapters nine and ten. Here 
I compare housing regimes between the different time periods in each country, white 
minority rule and majority rule, between the Harare municipality and the CTMC, across 
the NGOs, as well as across the four housing cooperatives. Through an analysis of the 
legal and institutional continuities and discontinuities, the presence and intensity of the 
“liberation culture”  is compared alongside other variables that influence housing delivery. 
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The differences and similarities between the strategies utilized by home-seekers in the two 
countries give indicators on the trajectories likely to emerge in the countries with regard to 
service provision. They also show the shouldering of responsibility for self-provision by 
citizens in capacity starved states. 
 
In the conclusion in chapter ten, I discuss the theoretical implications of the empirical 
findings and relate them to the neo-patrimonial theory. The strengths and weaknesses of 
the “liberation culture”  theory are also discussed here as well as the implications for further 
research. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Hyden, G. (1983) No Shortcuts to Progress, University of California Press Berkeley, in which he 
explains how Africa’s bureaucracies are dominated by the economy of affection and how this orients service 
provision in favour of kinship ties. 
2 Liberation wars are a variation of liberation struggles since some countries experienced non-violent 
struggles for independence. Whilst many countries only experienced mass riots and some violent acts of civil 
disobedience, some actually went through long protracted struggles. This variation undoubtedly influenced 
governance in the new independent countries. 
3 The study adheres to the idea of culture as an ‘us’ and ‘them’ claim, an identification, a boundary 
construction that suggests that differentiation amongst citizens. See Parker, M. (2000) Organisational 
Culture and Identity, Sage Publications, London, p3. 
4 This study recognises the existence of conflicting organisational cultures. However, organisational culture 
here is viewed as the negotiated outcome of social interaction from shared symbols and meanings. It thus 
affirms itself as sets of beliefs, values and norms that shape relations and behaviour.    
5 It has become increasingly difficult to separate actions that redress historical imbalances and those that 
benefit ruling elites. For instance, the elites benefit first and most from economic liberalisation programmes 
and yet these are packaged and presented as creating space for black entrepreneurs. The Black Economic 
Empowerment policy in South Africa has benefited many of the ANC top leadership just as much as all other 
policies have benefited the same group in Zimbabwe and even Zambia too. 
6An analysis of the President of Zimbabwe's Opening of Parliament Statements show the party’s heavy 
reliance on support generated from promises to redistribute resources equitably. The land issue is a good 
example of one such resource that has been promised to the public every year since during the war. 
7 The process of housing delivery qualifies it as an industry that has both backward and forward linkages 
with other sectors of the economy. The industry contributes at least 2-8 percent to the GNP in developing 
economies and in some countries between 20-50percent of reproducible wealth. At the local level, low 
income groups build a house and rent out rooms which generate income for reinvesting in housing again and 
the business sustains itself. See The Community Action Group on Housing Report, (2002) on a Study on the 
Contribution of Urban Housing to National Economic Development in Zimbabwe, Harare, December Issue. 
See also Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1995) “Sites and Services: Home Ownership for the Poor?”  Habitat 
International, vol.19 no.3, (pp371-389) p382.  
8 A Habitat International conference devoted a significant amount of time to developing policy documents 
around this discourse that could be used to lobby governments. See Erguden, S. (2002), “Low Cost Housing: 
Policies and Constraints in Developing Countries, Conference Paper for the International Spatial Information 
for Sustainable Development, Nairobi, Kenya 2-5 October. 
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9 In 1999, President Thabo Mbeki made a famous and controversial remark to the effect that South Africa is 
divided economically as it is politically. He described the South African economy as having two parallel 
economies, one formal (and white) and one the other informal (and black). 
10 In 1982, 40 percent of low-income households were lodgers in Harare. See Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. 
(1995), “Sites and Services: Home Ownership for the Poor?”  Habitat International, vol.19  no.3, (pp371-
389) p382. 
11 This is even more so in dual economies, where women were traditionally rural citizens with the men being 
urban based for employment reasons. See Miles, M. (2001) “Women’s Groups and Urban Poverty: The 
Swaziland Experience” in A. Tostensen , I. Tvedten and V. Mariken (eds.) Associational Life in African 
Cities-Popular Response to the Urban Crisis, Nordiska Africainstitutet. 
12 See D. Dewar’s , (1982) Alternative Strategies for Housing: The Case of South Africa, Working Paper 
no26, November, in which he blames the application of western ‘paper planning approaches’ that have 
pushed housing out of the poor’s reach.   
13 Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys has shown that many Africans, 22 percent in the 2002-2004 
surveys, define poverty in terms of lack of shelter. Again 28 percent say that it is one of the most important 
problems. See Bratton, M., Logan, C and Machado, F. (2001), Compendium of Comparative Data From a 
Twelve Nation Survey, Afrobarometer Working Paper no11, www.afrobarometer.org. 
 14 Uche (1999) discusses how a house is used as a ready made political tool in Nigeria and some other 
African countries. See Uche, I. (1999) “The God That Failed: A Critique of Public Housing in Nigeria , 1975-
1995”  Habitat International, vol.23 no.2, pp177-188. 
15 In Zimbabwe, the Local Authorities Amalgamation Act of 1993 removed the voting restrictions placed on 
citizens who did not own property in urban areas. 
16 Citizenship here is used to show that people are not only concerned with gaining the political rights to vote 
but also wanted to be involved and given the space to take part in the social sphere to have economic rights, 
human rights and the chance to participate freely in the decision making structures. See Taylor, V. (1997) 
Social Mobilisation Lessons From the Mass Democratic Movement, South African Development Education 
and Policy Research Unit, School of Government, University of the Western Cape.  
17 There is much debate on what the term empowerment means. I use it to refer to the capacity to provide for 
one’s basic needs, taking on the task and sharing the responsibility in engaging with housing authorities, 
knowing how to work the system and fighting it too. 
18 The idea of self-help housing (site and services schemes) originated in the Housing and Finance agency in 
the United States of America well before the World Bank packaged it in the seventies. It was first promoted 
by the United States’  development agencies, then by the United Nations for the British Colonial Office as it 
made sense as an element of indigenous economic and cultural development as well as meeting the grounds 
of financial expediency. However, the World Bank has been blamed for ignoring the problems encountered 
in the earlier initiatives such as failing to consider existent housing provision systems in some countries. See 
Richard Harris (1998) “The Silence of the Experts: Aided Self -help Housing 1939-1954” , Habitat 
International, vol. 22 no.2, (pp165-189), pp165-167. 
19 New services are always part of a housing package and many development projects are part of housing 
projects, hence in the market approach, private businesses have the chance to benefit from both the houses 
and the services projects. 
20 All World Bank housing projects were financed through local building societies and to safeguard the 
domestic banks’ investments,  there was an agreement with local authorities on a minimum income cut-off 
point for aspiring house owners. 
21 Habitat International is a non profit housing organisation which has been coordinating housing provision 
for the poor in over one hundred countries since 1976. The organisation does not discriminate against home 
seekers but emphasizes that participation of groups is on a willingness to work according to the principles of 
the organisation and the ability to pay on the non profit enterprise.    
22 In the rhetoric of housing, the symbolic meaning of community requires both control and avoidance 
through the production and maintenance of boundaries. First, community is about setting up social and 
physical boundaries- who is in and who is out. Anthony Cohen (1993) described community as a ‘boundary 
expressing symbol’ . See Cohen, A.P. (1993) The Symbolic Construction of Community, Routledge, London.  
The symbol can evoke a sense of shared experience and identity without actually sharing a common meaning 
among all those who use it because it allows adherents to attach their own meanings to it. Young (1995 cited 
in Kenny 2000) argues that it is social mobility that produces community, meaning it is the ability to mediate 
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the experiences of life. On this he concurs with Kenny, who states that “ community is identified as the site 
for the forming of identities and fulfilling social needs. Community reinforces the social ontology of 
individuals being constituted and defined by their social attachment.” See Sue Kenny (2002) Tensions and 
Dilemmas in Community Development: New Discourses, New Trojans?”   Community Development Journal, 
( pp284-299) p291. Selznick (1996:2 cited in Smith 1998) alerts us to the elusiveness of the concept of 
community in the study of society. This is because it is difficult to pin down as it takes on many different 
meanings. In general, community is conceptualised as being a group that either shares a physical space, a 
trait, or a common culture (Cohen 1993). The image of community conveyed in the rhetoric of public 
provision presumes that sharing a physical space produces a common culture, implying that when only poor 
people live together (as in housing projects for the poor), a culture of poverty is produced. This makes 
Ferdinand Tonnies (1887) remarks on community formation essential. He stated that human relationships are 
underlined by the differences between the unity and community found in pre-capitalist societies 
(Gemeinschaft) and Capitalist societies (Gesellchaft). Gemeinschaft occurs in small social settings where 
solidarity is produced by “exclusive living together” while ( Gesellchaft) is attributed to large-scale 
impersonal settings that produce an ‘artificial construction of an aggregate’  (Smith 1998:50). A number of 
views have been presented on why people are drawn to community. One is the desire for an imagined better 
world that finds comfort in numbers as Sennett (1970) argues for its positive value in “The image of purity it 
portrays and how it is a collapsing of the experiential frame, a condensing of all the messy experiences in 
social life, in order to create vision of unified community identity”.  See Sennett, R. (1970) The Uses of 
Disorder Personal Identity and City Life, Alfred Knopf, New York. And Smith, goes further and posits that it 
requires the absence of a community in order to justify the creation of one. See Smith, J.L. (1998), Cleaning 
up Public Housing by Sweeping Out the Poor” , Habitat International, vol.23 Issue 1, March (pp49-62) p50.  
23 Also see Holton, R.J. and Turner, B. S.  (1970) Max Weber on Economy and Society, Routledge, NY. 
24 Power (2003) points out that the terms central to participatory development which came into use through 
colonial anthropology like community, village, local people and so on, are elements in colonial and post-
colonial discourses which depict the world in terms of a distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’.  In the 
contemporary era, participation and partnership are thus ways for development agencies to counter 
accusations of neo-colonialism as reflected in the language of partnership used in post-colonial times. See 
Power, M. (2003) “Re-Imaging Postcolonial Africa: A Commentary on Michael Watts’ s “Development and 
Governmentality”,  Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24(1), pp49-60. 
25 See Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. (1997) Democratic Experiments in Africa, Cambridge University 
Press and Medard, J.F.  (1982)  “The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neo -
Patrimonialism” in C. Clapham  (ed.) Patronage and Public Power, Frances Pinter: London on the concept of 
neo-patrimonialism. Per Nordlund in his 1996 PhD thesis, “ Organising the Political Agora: Domination and 
Democratisation in Zambia and Zimbabwe”, Uppsala University, Sweden, criticises the use of the concept as 
the single explanatory concept for African regimes yet the variations he detects in the systems remain 
unexplained.  
26 See J.F. Bayart’s (1993) The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, Longman, writings on the state in 
Africa in which he called for the need to recognise the diversity of situations in Africa, ppxii.  
27 The study will focus on housing delivery as the contested resource. 
28 This evidence was part of my experiences during the liberation war in exile. 
29 It is important to point out that the “liberation culture”  exists alongside other organisational cultures such 
as those found within the Weberian bureaucracy and those to do with ethnic loyalty. These would naturally 
prove to be pockets of resistance to the threatening dominance of the “liberation culture” . 
30 The main resource under discussion is land but in South Africa, state financial resources are also part of the 
housing resources. 
31 These concepts are used to explain the movement between and across cases in comparing phenomena by 
Sheuch, E.K. (1990) The Development of Comparative Research: Towards Causal Explanations, in Øyen, E. 
(ed.) Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Research, Sage Publications 
and Ragin, C. (1987), The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, 
University of California Press.  
32 A logical assumption would be because that one case is ahead of the other by fourteen years. 
33 See Barrington Moore's, (1967) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World, Penguin, and Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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34 In Zimbabwe, the dominant ethnic group was the Zezuru but tensions were noticeable in the leadership 
amongst all the major groups- the Kalangas and Manyika who complained about the heavy presence of 
Zezurus in the party hierarchy.  In South Africa, ANC leadership was dominated by the Xhosas and a mix of 
the many other groups. However, the Zulus, who make a significant proportion of the African community, 
formed their own party, the Inkhata Freedom Party, and political tension has always been high in KwaZulu 
Natal province where that party dominates. 
35 I am grateful to Jan Froestad for suggesting this concept to me. 
36 Questions have been raised on the nature of South Africa’s liberation wars, but the fact is that by the early 
eighties, the ANC’s external presence had grown tremendously. Apart from the thousands of Umkhonto 
Wesizwe cadres in camps around the region, the organisation had a large educational complex in Tanzania- 
The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom Centre, an administrative headquarters in Lusaka, a diplomatic presence in 
over 30 countries and several hundred students in foreign universities. See McKinley, D.T. (1997) The ANC 
and the Liberation Struggle, Pluto Press, London, p51. 
37 Emphasis added. 
38 See Dashwood, H. (2000), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation, University of Toronto 
Press Inc. 
39 The ANC warns that it is a fallacy to treat these as distinct categories since the truth is that the majority of 
individuals were in two or more categories such that the ANC is a unity of various political strands. See ANC 
Document, (1996) “Challenges of Leadership-the Current Phase”.  
40 The first serious challenge emerged in the June 2000 parliamentary elections that saw a new opposition 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) winning 62 percent of the 150 seats. However, the 
constitution allows the president to appoint 30 non-constituent members and this effectively reduced the 
opposition’s seats.  
41 This widening gap between the rich and the poor has been blamed for the increased crime, which has 
resulted in opposition parties calling for tougher measures against criminals which the ruling party resists as 
it would make the state more authoritarian. In any case, justice for the black community might not be realised 
considering the dominance of white officials in the judiciary system. Transformation has been slow. For 
instance, in 1994, 94 percent of the judiciary was white and in 2003 there were still 66 percent white judges 
and a few blacks, 23 Africans, 6 Indians and 4 coloureds. 
42 Note the bureaucratic authoritarian states of Latin America that Juan Linz has studies over the years and 
the Asian Tigers. 
43 Dispossession of the indigenous people’s land was institutionalised and legalised by the 1913 Natives Land 
Act which reserved 13 percent of largely infertile land for Native Reserves for Africans and 85 percent for 
white development in South Africa. Zimbabwe too had equivalent laws. 
44 In one interview, the respondent, a senior coloured official, after inquiring into my marital background, 
began to play the song Secret Lovers that was sung by Atlantic Star. The song was programmed to replay 
itself throughout the interview and as my anxiety for my safety mounted, I decided to cut the scheduled two 
and half hour interview to just one hour since I was failing to concentrate on the interview and kept watching 
the interviewee's every move. In three other interviews with white males, the offers to provide me with real 
juicy documents were tempting but as this could only be done after five at specific venues, I politely declined 
and lost out on the opportunity of getting what they categorised as first grade information. Perhaps these 
‘valuable’ documents could have provided more insights into the housing delivery dynamics?  
45 Many foreigners have become victims of the xenophobia that characterises the social relations between 
foreign and local blacks in South Africa. Hostilities are fuelled by the paranoia that relatively better educated 
foreigners crowd the job market. 
46 Or perhaps they simply told the housing story as it should be told? 
47 There is bureaucratic consensus that Africans have their homes in the former homelands of the Ciskei and 
Transkei. They just come to the Western Cape to work.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Towards A Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
The concern of this chapter is to critically analyse the nature of the organisational cultures 
in post liberation war bureaucracies in Southern Africa. The aim is to develop and locate 
the “li beration culture”  that contributes to explaining administrative behaviour in these 
states. The literature review therefore concentrates principally on demonstrating the 
differences and convergences between neo-patrimonialism and “liberation culture”  as well 
as other concepts that denote gift giving practices. This thesis takes the position that 
because the “liberation culture”  tends to group its clientele, it has divisive and devastating 
resource allocation consequences on the poor as it skews resource distribution amongst 
them. For them, the vote is the only asset (political resource) they have to trade for material 
basic necessities that should be respected as a basic human right and desperation for these 
votes by the dominant and often liberating parties, has affected trust relations (Lemarchand 
1988). 
 
Peters (1984) made a distinction between rationalist/deductive cultures and inductive 
cultures in his attempt to explain administrative behaviour. The former is associated with 
the bureaucratic concepts of universality and impersonality and these cultures emphasize 
the deduction of specific statements and action from general statements of principles. 
Decisions made in such a milieu are difficult to query because of their impersonality and 
the fact that they are made in a legal environment that minimises personal discretion. On 
the other hand, in the inductive culture, administrative and legal decisions are almost 
inherently individualised and each case is always treated differently. Generalisations are 
not the norm and decisions cease to be impersonal. Each case has different criteria and the 
decision-making environment is filled with uncertainty. Conflicts naturally emanate from 
the formal rules resulting in informal practices. This cultural system is conducive for the 
development of the “liberation culture” , as each client’s proximity to the party has to be 
continuously assessed.  
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This informality is what allows the “liberation culture”  to manifest itself strongly and to 
spread like a wild fire. For example, the many new (black) bureaucrats who came into 
public administration after independence empathized with other blacks and they naturally 
preferred to make them first in service provision, the comrades empathized with other 
comrades and collaborators and they treated them likewise, and because of the upper hand 
they had as victors in the struggle equation, they instilled fear into most other functionaries 
who feared being labeled anti-revolutionaries (Weiss 1994)1. The rigidity of the 
professional bureaucracy also made it possible to justify altering decision-making criteria 
in the mobilization process to fulfill ideologies of the new ruling parties. Insight into the 
service delivery process in different service areas as well as on the key actors studied in 
housing delivery in Harare and Cape Town aides in the development of the argument. The 
chapter starts off with an explanation of the process of service delivery. After this comes a 
discussion of the role and quality of leadership in service delivery. This is then followed by 
a brief presentation and a critique of the neo-patrimonial theory and finally, a discussion of 
the analytic framework for this study which is organised around the concept “liberation 
culture” . 
 
The Process of Service Delivery 
Public servants help to define one’s citizenship status as they control who has access to 
which goods (Lipsky 1980). The same process provides parameters for self-definition and 
identity imaging by service seekers (Holston 1998). The identity that allows the accessing 
of desired goods get prominence and tends to be pushed to the fore when necessary. The 
process of service delivery is thus important in shaping the various forms in which 
identities are developed. Service delivery is a process that consists of, and is shaped by 
several processes depending on the nature of the required service. The two examples below 
show the differences in the process in different service delivery agencies: 
 
A. Service delivery process in a maternal health unit 
In a maternal health unit, a woman requiring either pre or post-natal health care presents 
her body and the experienced symptoms for examination. In this situation, the service is 
consumed immediately in the presence of the service provider2 and the quality of the 
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service is therefore largely shaped by the discretion of the agent and the perceived needs of 
the client. The one person attending to her makes the most appropriate decision to address 
the issue and the treatment, if any, is applied more or less instantly. Consideration of other 
factors is done by the one attendant. Even if the case is eventually referred to a specialist, 
only the individual’s medical history as well as the current position are taken into account.  
 
Figure 1 Direct interface between service provider and client 
 
Need identification        assessment of need         Service allocation 
Source: Adapted from Bleklie 1996. 
 
 
B. Service Delivery in a Housing Unit 
Figure 2 Service delivery process in a housing unit 
 
Internal factors 
Criteria for service qualification 
Regulation-policy environment 
Equity considerations 
Intra bureaucratic politics3 
 
 
 
Interface with client                  consideration of felt need                    Allocation of  
            service 
 
 
 
Extraneous factors 
Political 
Financial 
Social 
Source: Constructed from Barlow (1984), Gautum (1993), Bleklie (1996) and Prottas (1979) 
 
In the case of a housing service where consumption occurs much later, the process is 
influenced by many factors and variables and at the individual level, several studies have 
illustrated the discriminatory tendencies of bureaucracies as being in favour of those that 
are relatively well off financially and politically (Ostrom 1976; Peters 1984; Sjoberg 1986; 
Bleklie 1996:16). These internal factors emanate largely from the institutional 
arrangements for service delivery while extraneous factors arise from the operational 
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environment of the concerned agency. The challenge that arises here is to identify the key 
factors in the environment that contribute significantly to shaping the behaviour of those 
who dispense the public services. This implies answering the question: How do housing 
delivery institutions mediate between environmental processes and housing decisions? 
This brings in the question of leadership, a key ingredient in efficient delivery. 
 
Leadership and the Bureaucracy in Service Delivery 
Success in service delivery depends to a large extent on the capacity to mobilise, manage 
and optimise the available resources and this requires visionary leadership and managerial 
excellence. Whereas African politicians have come up with grand visions, the managerial 
excellence dimension is yet to be achieved. It is therefore necessary to focus on the concept 
of leadership so as to be able to demarcate the boundaries of politicking, efficient and 
effective service delivery since African leaders are judged more on their ability to deliver 
rather than their means of selection (Chabal 1992). The “liberation culture”  values are 
inculcated into the decision making process by the leadership which plays the value 
articulation role whilst management translates these into tangible services. In most of 
Africa, effective control over the bureaucracy is largely exercised by individuals, 
politicians-(especially the top leadership) and at times ministers who have both the 
president’s ear as well as some administrative capability. The political leadership has the 
upper hand in this relationship hence their ideology, preferences and values largely shape 
the service delivery process. The leadership has the entire state machinery at its disposal to 
utilise in its pursuit of a hegemonic position and this has very often been used to signal to 
the bureaucracy that the leadership’s continuation in office is always in the public interest 
(Migdal 1987:235). 
 
Zimbabwe has experienced such an approach to power consolidation since independence 
in 1980. For example, projects initiated by other groups in society outside the party 
structures were denied both recognition and access to state resources.4 Likewise, those who 
voted for the only other party that had won two seats in the 1985 national elections, ZANU 
Ndonga, were also denied food aid in times of drought and no new physical developments 
took place in their areas.5 They were constantly accused of being opposition members and 
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demands were that they had to toe the party line if they wanted state aid and recognition. 
This of course contributed to the stifling of any initiatives emanating from civil society. In 
1999, an ANC leader in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Sbu Ndebele, made similar threats that public 
goods would be denied to those who chose to place their loyalty anywhere else other than 
with the ANC. 
 
The relationship between the public servants (professionals) and the political leadership 
(harbouring the “liber ation culture”  mindset in this case) results in what Barlow (1984) 
calls a confidence gap.  This ‘confidence gap’ is a result of the tension between politicians 
and public servants who constantly blame the other when service delivery does not take 
place according to expectations. This is evidenced in politicians who tend to view 
bureaucrats as lacking expertise, loyalty and competence in resource allocation. The two 
sides mistrust and suspect each other of furthering their own ambitions at the expense of 
socio-economic development. This same ‘confidence gap’ also exists between the public 
servants and the citizens especially in domineering and authoritarian administrative 
systems. Public servants are accused of being obsessed with getting respect they believe 
they deserve such that they overly assert their authority to make up for administrative 
deficiencies they may have (ibid). Barlow emphasises the result as the alienation of the 
general public. The root cause of this ‘confidence gap’ is the quality of pol itical leadership 
at both the political and civil service level in the public service. It is further exacerbated by 
the operational environments of the two conflictual power centres that are supposed to 
harmonise their goals for the good of service provision. This study attempts to explain how 
collectives of the poor take advantage of this gap to get favourable outcomes from the 
housing delivery process. 
 
Ayoude (1988) criticises African political leaders as behaving in a naive manner when they 
promise to meet infinite wants with finite resources. This action, which he refers to as 
‘deficit promising’, has largely contributed to the low morale among the African populace 
with regard to service delivery. For instance, before and after independence, the liberating 
parties, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the ANC in South Africa, emphasized the 
redistribution of land in particular. This drummed up expectations that have slowly faded 
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into oblivion for the majority (Kriger 1992; Alexander 1995; Ranger 1995). At the same 
time, the political changes in Africa have altered the requirements and relative values of 
different types of leadership. This has made it more important to build and maintain 
political coalitions to dominate and subordinate which implies the use of conservative 
skills of statecraft (Rossberg & Jackson 1982:187). For instance, both ruling parties have 
shown a tendency to appoint leaders on the basis of their demonstrated loyalty and or 
length of service to the party. Again, both the ANC and ZANU-PF have openly 
demonstrated their power by imposing leaders on the electorate. This makes it imperative 
to explore and explain how service delivery takes place in transforming societies. 
 
Ayoude (1988) also blames the leadership crisis in Africa on culture since many  
communities sanction authoritarian styles of leadership since the belief is that this yields 
results. He concludes his analysis of leadership traits in Africa by prescribing the following 
as good state leadership traits: the organised and continuous flow of information; 
information dissemination to public servants; information to the media and more 
importantly to the public; consultative policy making; efficient management practices and 
commitment. The question to be answered then is, to what extent do these attributes exist 
amongst Zimbabwe's and South Africa’s political leadership and housing delivery agents? 
 
Neo-patrimonial Bureaucracies 
That African states have largely failed to approximate the rational-legal mode of operation 
cannot be disputed. With Weber’s patrimonialism at the centre, political and administrative 
institutions acquire their legitimacy from organising according to a legal-rational logic 
(Medard 1991; Bratton & van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2001). And it is in this 
legitimation attempt that professional bureaucratic practices get undermined. An important 
observation is that neo-patrimonialism takes different forms in different countries and to 
some extent, according to the Anglophone and Francophone divide.6 On the one hand, 
there is convergence between the two traditions in the reasons for its proliferation and 
sustenance, as well as in the outcomes: an anti-developmental state in which resource 
allocation is determined by some calculated gift giving practices. On the other hand, the 
French approach appears to be apologetic of the consequences of neo-patrimonialism as 
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they credit it with a functional role of reconciling traditionalism with modernism in the 
quest to deal with citizens’ expectations from the state (Medard 1991).  
 
Neo-patrimonial institutions are hierarchical organisations with impersonal spheres of 
competence, but are occupied by bound officials who function in a formally bureaucratic 
manner. The form of recruitment does not matter because officials enter into a relation of 
personal loyalty to the ruler. Literature on neo-patrimonialism points out that the main 
distinguishing characteristic of neo-patrimonial bureaucracies is the location in a 
patrimonial power structure (Medard 1991, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
Patrimonialism can take many forms that are all associated with gift giving thereby 
developing a level of trust among the clientele.7 These many forms are what makes it 
necessary to distinguish neo-patrimonialism from the “liberation culture”  and the other 
forms such as prebendalism and other gift giving practices that are associated more with 
personal gain rather than amassing public support. Patronage, a major feature of the 
cultures mentioned above, involves the dispensing of state resources to third parties in 
return for political support of some kind, while prebendalism would involve the use of 
state resources for personal advantage by officials (Joseph 1987).8 Patronage includes 
manipulation, symbolic ambiguity and power accumulation and patrons and clients are 
both not interested in generality of equality and legal rules as they are only interested in 
persons. Patronage can thus be used as an informal means of persuasion and coercion 
through the selective allocation of resources (Lemarchand 1988). 
 
A key feature is that in neo-patrimonial bureaucracies, loyalty and kinship ties hold the 
system together. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that neo-patrimonial bureacratic 
logic is the main feature of African politics. They arrive at this observation after an 
analysis of  how the ruling class personalises the bureaucracy. This assertion is in 
concurence with other theorists such as (Zolberg 1966 and 1968; Clapham 1982; Callaghy 
1984,1987; Medard 1991 and van de Walle 2001). The two point out that neo-
patrimonialism takes three main forms: presidentialism, clientelism and the abuse of state 
resources and all three forms have enhanced the predatory nature of the African states. 
Both the state and society are characterised by the individual penetration of the party and 
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society through a subordinate interconnection of relationships that ensure loyalty and 
dependence on him. This successfully turns public office into a coveted price that 
encourages officials to concentrate on wealth accumulation before they fall out of favour. 
The subversion of the state’s administrative apparatus results from this systematic 
patronage and clientelist practices to maintain one’s hegemonic position .9 
 
Critique of the Neo-patrimonial Theory 
Whilst I concur with the application of neo-patrimonialism as an over-arching concept that 
explains administrative behaviour in Africa, this study proposes and discusses the role of 
the “liberation culture”  in influencing administrative behaviour. The quest is to prove that 
post liberation war African bureaucracies do have a different additional causal dimension 
that informs on their action orientations.10 As with the neo-patrimonial model, much of the 
effort is concentrated on survival of the ruling class and yet as mentioned earlier, some 
degree of democratic procedure is essential for legitimising governments’ actions. Equity 
laden procedures assure the stability and orderly continuity of any system. However, 
unlike neo-patrimonialim that has withstood the test of time and government change, the 
“liber ation culture”  is a recent phenomenon that emerged out of the exile style liberation 
struggles after the seventies in Southern Africa in particular. It therefore offers more in 
explaining the variation that requires attention in neo-patrimonial regimes as it addresses 
the historical specificities of these countries. This therefore becomes a departure from the 
validation of an apriori theory such as neo-patrimonialism (Chabal 1992). 
 
The “liberation culture”  is a distinct type of organisational culture that exists in post-
liberation war bureaucracies in Africa yet efficient and effective bureaucracies are a must 
for Africa as they have the attractive potential of eliminating the prejudice of personalism 
and replacing it with a system of accountability at both the technical and the moral level of 
responsibility (Moyo 1992). The historical development of African bureaucracies is laden 
with political rivalry, political and ethnical intolerance and managerial incompetence such 
that the organisational cultures that exist do not cultivate an atmosphere that allows for the 
characteristics of the professional normative oriented Weberian bureaucracy to guide and 
rationalise administrative behaviour (ibid). This study argues that the “liberation culture”  
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manifests itself as a distinct type of organisational culture that triggers administrative 
behaviour that is essentially partisan. With its origins located in the guerrilla liberation 
warfare logic, authoritarianism is tolerated just as much as loyalty and continuous 
mobilisation are valued. Idiosyncratic, institutional and cultural values all coalesce to build 
and reinforce it. Institutionally, the political leadership is the crucible in which the culture 
emerged and survives and the party is the dominant vehicle through which it operates. 
 
The “liberation culture”  has elitist tendencies when dealing with individuals but with the 
poor, they have to benefit as organised political groups. Differences arise in that the 
“liberation culture”  carefully selects its clientele from within the general public. It is not 
haphazard and it has a mobilising effect in those clients who are desperate for services. 
Also opportunists can get organised and benefit from the distributional process. This 
orientation of the “liberation culture”  raises some questions on the neo-patrimonial model 
as put forth by Bratton and van de Walle in their 1997 book, Democratic Experiments in 
Africa. 
 
As with other theorists from the French West African tradition (Medard and others), 
Bratton and van de Walle did not consider the party as pivotal in the resource allocation 
proccess and the ordering of patron and client networks. Considering that the theory had its 
origins in French West Africa where the party was not important in the resource 
transaction processes-the big man was, they may have overlooked its importance in their 
later studies in British Southern and Central Africa. In their model, benefits ultimately flow 
upwards to the strong man -at the helm of the party- and to other beneficiaries through the 
abuse of official resources. What they appear to miss is that whilst they flow upwards, they 
are also extended to the party thus strenghtening the party horizontally. The party gets 
recognition for its ability to deliver where the government fails. Secondly, the party itself 
abuses the national resources. Individuals in the system benefit and even more so does the 
party especially when goods can be denied to seekers until they acquiesce to some level of 
political correctness. At mass rallies and during election campagins, politicians in both the 
ANC and ZANU-PF tend to emphasize that the party has done ‘this’ and ‘that’ for the 
people. Hence the resourcefulness of the individual is ultimately extended to the party and 
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it is in turn sustained by the party. That capacity is only there as long as one works within 
the party. 
 
The “liberation culture” is clearly not a subset of neo -patrimonialism and an analysis of its 
character attempts to show these differences. It is an independent concept that contributes 
to the explanation of service delivery in post liberation war states. However, a question 
that requires an answer is: Is the “liberation culture”  peculiar to post liberation war states 
only? A bureaucracy with the “liberation culture”  exhibits similar characteristics to the 
neo-patrimonial bureaucratic culture but it takes a point of departure when it gets to 
identification of the client who benefits from the distributional process and to the 
penetration of state and society by the party. Whereas a neo-patrimonial organisational 
culture largely services its own members as the clients, the “ liberation organisational 
culture”  delivers its services selectively to segments of the polity that identify with the 
prevailing political leadership’s ideology. Decisions here  are essentially party driven. It 
defines who its clients are in the population according to their political affiliation above all 
other identities. Officials may enter the administrative system on merit but their actions are 
neither impartial nor neutral and they are also not the only beneficiaries of the system. 
Officials’ actions are not at all sanctioned by the formal ethical codes of a rational -legal 
institution. This implies that there are prospects of professionalising the “liberation 
culture”  bureaucracy once the carriers and socialising agents of the “liberation culture”  
values get out of office. The “liberation culture”  cannot therefore be a generic governance 
style or a transitional experience as socialisation agents can manouvre to sustain it beyond 
a generation as happened through the Ministry of Information and Publicity in the 
President’s Office in Zimbabwe that launched a campaign after 2000 to preserve the 
liberation mindset and culture intact by insulating locals from global experiences. 
 
Again, proving the existence of a “liberation culture”  as distinct from other organisational 
cultures required the study to focus on specific decisions taken in housing delivery and the 
criteria used to make those decisions.  This meant analysing whether the criteria used to 
allocate housing resources was informed by the “liberation culture”  and whether such 
allocative decisions could have been made otherwise. The “liberation culture”  is exhibited 
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in administrative behaviour that is consistent with the desire to maintain political 
hegemony and bureaucracies that are dominated by the “liberation culture”  distribute 
housing resources to loyal party members through extra legal criteria. The “liberation 
culture”  violates patterns of trust and reciprocity, which should be essential features of any 
society. Trust becomes party bound and it rests on the awareness of party rewards for 
loyalty. Party loyalists trust the resource allocation agents to provide them with a service 
not because they deserve it or because it is their turn in the queue, but because their 
dispositions and affiliations indicate that it shall be so. The nature of reciprocity that 
develops here is vertical patron-client oriented. 
 
The “liberation culture”  places the official agent in a three dimensional quandary as he has 
to conform to conflicting demands in the service delivery process. Ekeh (1975) made an 
observation that African public officials have one leg in the public sector and the other in 
the private sector in their permanent quest to augment their salaries. What Ekeh did not 
foresee was the development of another leg - the party, in the new independent states that 
proclaimed socialism as their official ideology. This party leg has grown to be the 
overriding leg in post-liberation war bureaucracies11 in terms of conformity and adherence 
to the party’s ideology and rewarding that loyalty. This implies that the public official is 
more like a tripod stand, which has to balance on all three legs with the party as the 
strongest leg. 
 
As in neo-patrimonial bureaucracies, patron-client relations become the central aspect of 
institutional patterns in the “liberation culture” . The party is the utmost patron with the 
president presiding over it of course. Public officials are clients at the top level because 
they are to a large extent, dependent on the patron (the party) for their offices and access to 
national resources and more importantly, the opportunity to distribute the goods available 
in their area of work. They in turn lengthen the chain by creating other clients and here 
they too become the patrons12 -all in the name of the party. Essential services become 
readily available in return for loyalty to the party. The relationship is based on loyalty and 
trust and each must honour the obligations of being patron and client. Inherited 
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administrative systems in Africa are also partly to blame for creating room for these 
tendencies to emerge and dominate the resource allocation process. 
 
During the years in exile, for ZANU, the Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Uni on13 and the 
ANC guerrillas, authoritarian rule was the norm. Decisions were made by the top military 
bodies and passed down the chain of command until they reached the guerrilla cells on the 
ground. The covert nature of operations meant there was little room for dissent and those 
who opposed the liberation army/party line were accused of being collaborators. Politics 
was about asserting authority and this stifled any alternative developments. A culture of 
denying services to the opposition and intimidating citizens for compliance emerged 
during the war. At independence, these traits were all infused into the state organs.14 With 
the position of the “liberation culture”  elaborated, I now turn to the analytic framework 
applied in this study. 
 
The Analytic Framework 
Analysing administrative behaviour in the two countries requires organising concepts into 
an analytic schema that allows for diversity. As Ferrari (1990:77) cautions: 
No theoretical comparison is possible in social science unless reference is made to 
concepts entailing a general status and that the only chance to make such concepts 
truly comparable consists of submitting them first of all to analytic scrutiny. 
 
Historical outcomes emanate from causes that combine differently over space and time and 
how this results in similar outcomes is underlined by different processes (Ragin, 1987). At 
the same time Ragin cautions against harbouring presuppositions that the same causal 
factors do result in the same way in the cases under scrutiny. The historical event of the 
liberation wars and its attendant 'liberation logistics' combines with different factors to 
determine a similar outcome (“ liberation culture” ) in different contexts. These factors 
combine to influence the development, intensity and influence of the “liberation culture”  in 
service delivery. As indicated earlier in the introduction, “liberation culture” is the focal 
organising concept in this study meaning that the rest of the analytic concepts are placed in 
relation to it. The following key concepts were used to distinguish the intensity of the 
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“liberation culture”  in the two countries: ‘liberation logistics’, Africanisation, state 
autonomy and civic organisation and they are the next subject of discussion. 
 
But first what do I mean by these concepts, liberation logistics, state autonomy, 
Africanisation and civic organisation? Secondly, how do they straddle time differences in 
the two countries and how does the analysis proceed? 
 
Addressing Causation 
“Liberation culture” 
In this study, “liberation cul ture”  is defined as a set of values and norms favouring those 
who identify with the liberation movement. The organisational culture it breeds aligns 
decision making to the party’s ideals. The “liberation culture”  is not client oriented in the 
sense prescribed by the Weberian bureaucracy. It is an exclusionary distributional system 
that selects its clientele distinctly by political orientation. It is inclusionary in that whoever 
joins the political grouping that is distributing the resources will also benefit. The 
country’s historical development, the liberation movements’ experiences and the 
administrative environment influence it. Decisions emanating from such a culture are 
justified as being politically correct and the dominant political party's priorities assume a 
superior status to the government departments. The organisations’ orientation, the 
employees’ loyalty and the perception of organisational goals are all geared towards 
enhancing the contemporary ideological disposition of the political leadership. A 
bureaucracy harbouring the “liberation culture”  does not allocate resources equitably, 
professionally, efficiently, effectively and competently. It works against the tenets of the 
ideal bureaucracy. 
 
This definition brings in the concepts of access and equity. According to Schaffer and 
Lamb (1981:1-4), access encapsulates the action involved in acquiring a service in terms of 
the disbursement arrangements that entail delivery. The action of acquiring a service brings 
in the issue of structural relationships that define the transactions. Thus 'prioritisation' in 
service delivery processes raises questions of equity in any distributional exercise. Being a 
social construct, equity can be either inclusionary or exclusionary in that very often, 
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different institutional mechanisms arise to address the same question. For Schaffer and 
Lamb, to understand the concept means comprehending political action and public action 
as a political fact that deals with public policy and state action that covers institutional, 
political and collective phenomena. Its advantage is that it provides a lens through which 
the encounters between the state and its citizens can be scrutinised. This interplay between 
social and political forces in addressing equity concerns what the two describe as the ‘irony 
of equity’  (ibid:1-4). This irony, to them, is most noticeable in public action that arises 
from the intention to correct inequities from the operation of institutions and rules in 
addressing colonial injustices.15 
 
The “liberation cult ure”  does not address issues of equity, economic and social justice in 
service delivery. Much of the effort is concentrated on activities that are disruptive of 
planned development. Anti-democratic and unprofessional behaviour is the norm in the 
“liberatio n culture”  and it condones non-accountability, inconsistency, concealment and 
parochialism in the decision making process. The “liberation culture”  has four main 
attributes. It is operational when there is (a) the open circumvention of laid down criteria 
for allocative decisions in favour of party loyalists, (b) when legal codes are universal but 
interpreted in a particularistic manner; (c) when individuals organise as groups to access 
services under party guidance or party steering and (d) when willingness to be compliant to 
party dictates is discerned. Particularism refers to a situation when bureaucratic action is 
ordered by something other than prescribed rules, e.g. the ruler’s preferences, kinship 
connections, political connections (Blomkvist 1995:299) and party preferences.16 This 
raises an important question, what sort of identities and notions of citizenship are implicit 
in the “liberation culture” ? 
 
March and Olsen (1995:64) view identities as taking different forms over time and space. 
They argue that, because political life is organised by conceptions of identity and the 
appropriate behaviour associated with that identity, individuals learn to evoke identities 
and rules by experiencing positive consequences of having done so in the past. Identity 
formation is thus a continuous exercise, which is continuously adjusted to match the 
survival dictates of the environment (Chabal 1992). Though the identity formation process 
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results more from shared history than from those who share experiences by virtue of a 
common social position (Giddens 1991:97), identity formation in Africa first cut across 
socio-economic positions and these later coalesced to form political identities (Mamdani 
1996; Ranger 1996). March and Olsen (1995) emphasize the importance of political 
identities which they note to be vehicles of political mobilisation. As new groups interact, 
they modify their own identities and build new ones through imitation and contradiction. 
The denial of political space for Africans shaped this development. By its nature, 
colonialism required a reconstruction of social and individual identities. And in many 
instances, these were identities that enabled access to state institutions and resources. 
 
Colonial governance subverted African individualism, independence, privacy, self-
determination and responsibilities creating subjects rather than citizens (Mamdani 1996). 
In white controlled space, as in employment, individual autonomy in identity formation 
was undermined and Africans were expected to assume and project identities of 
‘subservience’. However, many did put on their other hats when the situation permitted it. 
African identity thus evolved as a result of the pattern of colonialism and the subsequent 
imitation of beneficial identities it encouraged.17 A lot of literature notes that the post-
colonial state has assumed the paternalistic tendencies of the colonial state and has moved 
on to redefine political identities in terms of the power consolidation requirements of the 
new rulers. On this, Ranger (1996) warns against the danger of glorifying the colonial state 
and crediting it with shaping the behaviour of the current regimes.18 This would in this 
case, leave out the role played by the beneficiaries of the housing schemes in this study in 
reformulating and fixing their identities to suit pursuits of the new incumbents as well as 
their own interests. This means addressing the question of how political identities develop 
and relating them to political mobilisation strategies utilised in the two countries. 
 
By its orientations, the “liberation culture”  breeds and encourages the development of new 
political identities. And to speak of any identity requires an analysis of the processes of 
inclusion and exclusion at all levels including the internal and external definitions 
(Schlesinger 1991:173). The question here is what sort of political identities emerged as a 
result of collective action19  to access housing resources? Political identity here refers to 
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the part of identity that becomes dominant in the struggle for control over the allocation of 
resources and power residing in the state (Jung 2000:9). Mackenzie (cited in Schlesinger 
1991) cautions that rather than assume the existence of identities, it is necessary to discuss 
the conditions under which it is possible to realise "common purpose"' for it is in these 
actions that a definition of collective identities is constructed. The nature of clientelism in 
housing resource distribution very often requires that home-seekers have an identity that 
appeals to the ruling class or rather that benefits their mobilisation aims.20 Jung (2000) 
views political identity as existing at both the collective and individual level and further 
defines collective identity as “the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ 
common interests, experiences and shared solidarity” ( ibid:17). Who is in the group, why 
the collective exists and who the collective exists in opposition to, are fluid ways that 
renegotiate the political space and salience of the group over time. In this study the 
“liberation culture”  is located in the political leadership whereas appointed bureaucrats and 
house-seekers may not necessarily have it but realise the value of political facilitation. 
 
On the other hand, sharing a network for Mackenzie implies sharing an identity especially 
if the same 'social space' is also shared. Schlesinger (1991) concurs with both views when 
he concludes that, the activism of contemporary social movements entails a highly specific 
conception of collective identity. This presents a radical departure from given conceptions 
of identity consisting of a tradition with which individuals identify. Belonging to 
normatively regulated associations does not always confer identities, instead “ … groups 
through their action, participate in the formation of identity, which is the result of decisions 
and projects, rather than conditioning and bonds" (Melucci 1982 cited in Schlesinger). This 
perception of identity formation credits agency and not necessarily at the expense of other 
environmental factors. Political identity in this study is emerging as a result of the 
interaction of closed access to housing resources, political mobilisation, collective action, 
loyalty and allegiance. Collective action in the two cases explains the formation of political 
identities that result from the housing allocation process.21 
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‘Liberation logistics’ 
I use this concept to refer to the way resources were allocated during the war by the 
liberation movements and that was to supporters and loyalists of the liberation war. It 
formed the larger part of the basis of the “liberation culture”  that ultimately determined the 
nature of governance in exile that resurfaced after the war. The liberators’ mobilisation 
strategies ensured the sustenance of the war and provided radical challenges to existing 
power structures (Alexander 1995). This cultural trait was carried over through the 
adoption of ‘liberation logistics’22 as the unofficial guiding principle in resource 
allocation after the war. It is thus imperative to explain how 'liberation logistics' evolved 
and was sustained. The concept is both theoretical and practical in that it refers to the 
resource allocation process between the liberators and the civilians. It rotates around 
‘political mobilisation' in its effects in the carving out of identity boundaries on who is in 
and who is out (Longva 1995). Political mobilisation strategies ensuing from the 'liberation 
logistics' lead to bureaucratic action that tended to exclude some on the basis of political 
affiliation and select others on ostensibly neutral criteria for benefits. Unrestrained 
‘liberation logistics’  would therefore result in a high intensity of the “liberation culture”  
and consequently, a relatively unfair distributional model. 
 
In the analysis, it is therefore essential to study the results of mobilisation and not just the 
process since both can have different outcomes (Longva 1995). A central hypothesis is that 
the 'us' and 'them' nature of service delivery evolved as part of the ‘liberation logistics’ and 
that exit options were effectively sealed off by the categorisation as a sell-out if one chose 
neutrality. Use of the concept 'liberation logistics' requires one to move back in time to 
each struggle era and exercise judgment on the nature of transactions over resources. 
Within the countries, the actors (liberating forces) who made decisions are as important as 
the beneficiaries (loyal masses). At the national level, this focus is at an ideological level 
and in relation to the background of the leaders. In the housing delivery process, it is at the 
practical level and can be discerned in the nature of the interaction between house seekers 
(cooperatives) and the delivery agents. A second assumption is then that: After 
independence, the new political leadership harboured a mind set that was imbued with the 
'liberation logistics' as a guiding principle in resource allocation. Service s ekers organised 
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as collectives made it easier to select and give options for inclusion and exclusion by those 
controlling the resource. How then did this mindset permeate the bureaucracy? 
 
Africanisation 
The concept Africanisation, an indigenised version of affirmative action, is applied to 
administrative reforms that took place in the newly independent African states after the 
withdrawal of colonialism. The concept became universal to many of the countries on the 
continent in the early sixties. Here it is defined as the infusion of party loyalists to key and 
strategic positions in the bureaucracy. It therefore becomes a 'legitimating action' in that 
the process of transforming the bureaucracy was assumed to give it a representative face 
(Appiah 1995). Staffing the bureaucracy with indigenous officials was highly symbolic of 
the new assumption of power and in many cases, the white officials simply left the public 
offices and the countries altogether.23 The assumption was that it is always necessary for a 
new state to establish a basis for political support as the leaders needed to legitimise their 
own position and to maintain a certain basis and backing in their competition for political 
power (Peron 1994). In this sense then, 'legitimacy' is defined as a justification of a right to 
do specific and distinct things such as enforcing commands that cannot be countermanded, 
and to have a monopoly of such legitimate enforcement (Barker 1990:23). 
 
Whilst the concept refers to affirmative action in that it aims to address historical injustices 
and imbalances emanating from the colonial mode of governance, many African leaders 
emphasized the point that Africans (blacks to be precise) were the targeted beneficiaries of 
the policy. In this sense, Africanisation, is an exogenous act that explains institutional 
change that lies at the heart of populism (Appiah 1995; Masunungure 1998). It thus had an 
emblematic value as well as being populist (Ramphele 1996; Mamdani 1996). In 
Zimbabwe, it is thus problematic to apply the equally universal concept of affirmative 
action because equal opportunity to employment did not exactly extend to women and 
other minorities who were also nationals in those countries. The experience of colonialism 
is thus essential to the application of the Africanisation concept as it adequately makes 
reference to the presence of the influence of a previous minority and illegitimate element in 
public offices.24 
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The administrative reform policies subsumed under Africanisation simply emphasized the 
urgency and necessity of having Africans in public offices. By the time South Africa could 
also redress its imbalances, the catastrophes from the Africanisation processes were clearly 
written all over the wall. Hence the country has been cautious enough to encapsulate it as 
affirmative action for its previously disadvantaged who were mostly blacks (Jordan 
1994a). The implication of this for analysis is that searching for the influence of this 
variable occurs at virtually every level in the Zimbabwean bureaucracy where it started of 
in the usual pigmentation sense, then moved to Shona elements, then to ZANU-PF 
loyalists (Masunungure 1998). Whereas in South Africa, tact is essential to identify the 
beneficiaries of this policy wherever they exert influence from. Opposition to 
Africanisation would therefore lower the intensity of the “liberation culture”  as pockets of 
resistance can break the pace of unprocedural decisions and inequities. An important issue 
then becomes that of state autonomy that is critical in determining the bureaucrats’ extent 
of dominance. 
 
State autonomy 
Nordlinger (1981:10) identifies three levels of state autonomy; the highest level being the 
one in which the state exercises absolute autonomy in the face of opposition by enacting 
policies that suit its preferences. The middle level reflects the use of bargaining and 
negotiations to persuade differing preferences to go along with it implying some form of 
trade-off. The lowest level mirrors the presence of consensus or the absence of contestation 
in which the state acts unilaterally. This ordering projects the relativity of the concept of 
state autonomy as each level can encapsulate the different categories of autonomy over 
time and space. Gran (1987), drawing on Nordlinger's conceptualisation, defines state 
autonomy as a state-society relation where the state has the upper hand in unrestrained 
action towards the fulfilment of its goals. He thus concurs that state autonomy is always 
contextual in that whenever the state policies are uncontested on a specific policy, it has 
autonomy but this status of the state varies according to issues and more importantly, it 
depends on the organisational capabilities of those that are threatened by the state’s actions 
in its guardianship role over the public. This is reflected clearly by his quote of Nordlinger 
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(cited in Gran 1984) that “a state is autonomous to the extent that its own preferences 
coincide with its authoritative action”.  
 
This definition brings in the rest of the regime concerned with that ‘specific’ issue and 
indicates potential tension within the state on certain issues. When these intra-state 
wrangles occur and bureaucrats resist, Gran notes the absence of autonomy. The limiting 
of the absolute power of the state by other private interests is implied in this concept. For 
transitioning societies, state autonomy makes a significant contribution to the explanation 
of developmental successes and failures. State resources benefited one segment of every 
colonial community, the white community, and years later, the protection of property 
rights gives largely the same community a strong and loud voice in constraining the state 
in redistributive efforts. This is why Gran points out that autonomy is dependent on the 
actors in the system, their relations and what the whole system is going through at that 
point in time. 
 
Tripp (2001) views the major setback in governance in Africa as the absence of political 
space for societal actors to mobilize autonomously from both the state and the party in 
power. Even though he concurs with a wide range of literature that points to the question 
of either too much or too little state autonomy as the major constraint in politics, for him 
the absence of societal autonomy is responsible for the failure of society to affect public 
policy and demand transparency and accountability. This weakens the state by denying it 
the legitimacy it needs and yet its crucial role is to depersonalize the forms of governance 
prevalent on the continent. And contrary to Bratton’s (1989) argument that there is total 
disengagement between states and society, Tripp sees this as a matter of the degree to 
which the two sides have autonomy. One argument is that the engagement capacity for 
society is weakened by a state’s possession of coercive power. Associational autonomy is 
important for other reasons amongst them avoidance of state organised patronage networks 
as well as creating capacity to challenge distributional patterns that create inequities and 
expand organisational goals beyond the usual confines (ibid). The degree of state 
autonomy with regard to housing policy formulation explains the successes and failures in 
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housing delivery to the poor. Weak state autonomy would therefore result in a low 
intensity of the “liberation culture”  as unfairness gets checked by the other stakeholders. 
 
Civic organisation 
The concept of civil society is very fluid and assumes many meanings across time and 
space such that its utility in comparative analysis has become highly contestable (Bratton 
1989:52). However, the fact that it is always defined in relation to politics with the state 
gives it explanatory power (Chabal 1992). Its attraction lies in that it provides the essential 
formula to examine state society relations in Africa as it straddles the political activity 
realm (Bratton 1989; Chazan 1994; Nordlund 1996) and it is further laden with 
implications for strategies on making claims upon the state. Keane (1998:37) argues that 
the concept is used as an ideal type and so to make empirically analytic interpretations 
requires observing civic organisations in action. Hence deconstructing their methods to 
interpret their language and read meaning into their actions is critical (Chabal 1992). Their 
collective action dimension and interaction with institutions in the quest to make political 
claims are what makes them the focal point in public issues (Bratton 1989:57). 
 
Once they are in the public realm, power becomes a strategic issue for them. Power, the 
ability and capacity to coerce others to act in one’s favour,  is therefore central in the 
analysis of state society relations in this study. How then do state actors' exercise power in 
the capturing of self-help initiatives? and Is power simply used to control or exercise the 
state's hegemonic status?25 If power is conceived of as a disciplinary tool, then 
'marginalisation avoidance', itself a form of power, compels service seekers to conform to 
'liberation logistics' requirements. I am therefore arguing that what I call ‘manoeuvring 
capacity’, which refers to the power displayed in the strategic options pursued by civic 
groups to access resources, shows the relative power position of service seekers. 
Recollections of previous actions and current observations of exchange processes are 
utilised in designing organisations in a way that makes it possible for authorities to step in 
and steer civic organisations at times. This capacity is tied to the concept of autonomy in 
that political space open to the civics denotes the power and influence they can exert on the 
state. Organisational resources such as leadership skills, finance, horizontal and vertical 
 61 
alliances and the politically correct patron very much define the power base of resource 
seeking civic groups. The neutralisation of potentially explosive power centres becomes a 
state concern and co-optation26 of the ‘voice’ within the civics is often used to check the 
power of the civics (Bratton 1989). Where civic organisation and influence is relatively 
high, the intensity of the “liberation culture”  is mediated and its impact on housing 
distribution equally lessened. 
 
Combined Influence-High and Low Intensity 
Ragin (1987:25) views outcomes in their totality27 as he attributes this to the presence of 
'the right ingredients' mixed appropriately and so the absence of one ingredient would 
imply the absence of change. I differ with him on this observation as he views change in 
total terms only and ignores the magnitude of change. Both the presence and absence of a 
factor is largely a question of scale. How these conditions –‘liberation logistics’ , 
Africanisation, state autonomy and civic organisation combine- and the outcome itself, can 
be a matter of magnitude of the phenomenon under observation. Differences in the levels 
of change can be points of study as much as total change is usually the focus. In any case, 
change is very often a relative issue which removes the idea of 'absolute' change Ragin 
points at.  
 
Focusing on the multiplicity of causality can possibly blur the equal multiplicity of 
outcomes, meaning that variation exists in the outcomes in a way that requires studying 
processes intensely. It therefore makes sense to categorise both causes and outcomes 
bearing in mind the tendency of some factors to straddle boundaries of categories and also 
the complexity of assessing how much of what is less or more, or high or low. However, 
Ragin (2000:32), acknowledged thirteen years later that, "while outcomes may not be 
exactly identical, the researcher must show that the outcomes in selected cases are in fact 
enough alike to be treated as instances of the same thing". These later observations 
influence the development of my argument. Various combinations of the four factors 
would therefore imply varying degrees of intensity of the “liberation culture” . This would 
mean that whereas outcomes would be similar, the processes might differ as dictated by the 
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intensity of the culture and the tactics essential for organising successfully in making 
claims against the state in each case. 
 
Conclusion 
To investigate the validity and strength of this “liberation culture”  theory, I intend to 
compare two housing regimes, one in Harare and the other in Cape Town. This will be 
done through a historical scrutiny of the housing delivery institutional set up, the home-
seekers strategies in organizing for housing resources and the actual housing delivery 
experiences of the selected groups. Whereas it must be acknowledged that there are many 
other factors that skew housing delivery, the “liberation culture”  appears best poised to 
explain these processes especially when its about the poor, a constituency that dominant 
parties claim to represent and speak for. With gift giving as the convergence point between 
the various types of neo-patrimonialism, the cases go beyond the current era to tease out 
the nuances that contribute to the relevance and application of the “liberation culture”  
theory. The essence of the comparison is to highlight crucial differences and similarities in 
processes and behaviour in the two systems and in this way, the general applicability of the 
theory can be tested and validated. 
 
Through the “liberation culture”  concept, the aim is to critique as well as enhance the 
explanatory power of the 'neo-patrimonial' theory that has assumed dominance in academia 
in explaining postcolonial states' resource allocation orientations. It is in this comparison at 
an abstract level that the weaknesses and strength of the analytic framework can be found. 
Whilst the “liberation culture ’ s”  relevance becomes pronounced in the strength of the 
'party penetration of state and society', its major weakness is that it focuses on the 
allocation of goods to collectives. And yet it is mostly when goods are allocated to 
individuals that other tendencies that usually occur alongside discriminatory behaviour can 
be observed. 
 
This analytic framework allows for the use of an alternative lens to scrutinise and organise 
empirical materials on housing provision in a rather different way as shall be explored in 
the remaining chapters. The next chapter looks into housing delivery in a colonial regime 
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with the aim of identifying pointers to the accommodation of the “liberation culture” .  
Chapters five and eight focus on the application of the “liberation culture”  in the 
explanation of housing resource allocation. 
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PART II 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Housing Delivery in Colonial Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the housing delivery regime for Africans during the colonial 
period and it seeks to find answers to the following questions; How did the character of the 
colonial state map out the post-colonial state’s service delivery practices? What was the 
role of African housing allocation in the colonial state’s consolidation and maintenance of 
its hegemonic position? and How did the colonial state redefine the gift-giving tradition for 
Africans? Attempts to answer these questions make it possible to identify the path the 
colonial state mapped out for resource allocation. Focusing on relations between the 
colonial state, the municipal authorities, the police and different groups of the subjects 
(urban based Africans), the chapter demonstrates the struggle for control over people and 
space by an administrative system that was obsessed with maintaining law and order. In 
this section, I look into housing delivery in the colonial state with a view to finding 
indicators on how the “liberation culture”  fitted snugly into the inherited bureaucratic 
arrangements. Tait’s (1997) political economy approach to the analysis of urban 
development in Rhodesia and Southern Africa provides the most illuminating details on 
housing provision for Africans in the colonial state. 
 
The Colonial State 
Research into housing delivery in developing countries has tended to assume a neutral state 
which allocates resources in accordance with technical criteria such as efficiency and 
equity (Dewar 1982; Smit 1995; Rakodi and Withers 1995; Tait 1997). This, Rakodi and 
Withers 1995 argue, usually leads to managerialist explanations for analysing the 
outcomes of housing polices which leaves out historical institutional analysis that 
encompass state orientations over time. This makes the character of the colonial state the 
starting point for understanding the housing regime in Zimbabwe. For it was just as 
patrimonial –in terms of racial discrimination- as the post-colonial state has become. The 
colonial state evolved out of the conquest of different chiefdoms in Rhodesia, starting with 
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the establishment of a province in Bulawayo, then to Fort Victoria (now Masvingo) and 
finally to Harare. The chiefdoms were incorporated under one new authority through the 
use of a bureaucracy that reflected British institutional patterns for its colonies.1 Alongside 
this forced unification, there arose a “systematic distrust of power”  (Basil Davidson cited 
in Mamdani 1996:40). The state established separate structures for the conquerors with the 
vanquished natives being ruled through a system of indirect rule2 in which local traditional 
authorities were detached parts of the governance structures. The question is, how do we 
define a state to capture the unorthodox practices in colonial Africa? 
 
Several authors view the state as an organisation with structured authority relations, that 
co-opts people into its realm and that works towards the achievement of specific goals 
(Gran 1994:16). Gran views the state as embodying class interests even though it has a 
degree of autonomy from those interests and he rests all authority with it. Whereas this 
ideal definition may apply to both western and developing states, for the developing 
countries, this definition requires broadening because the nature of the state formation 
delegitimised the state in the people’s eyes  and whereas it may have had authority, it never 
had legitimacy3 for the Africans. The colonial state did not have autonomy from class 
interests (which were couched in racial terms) but it deliberately designed itself to fully 
represent white interests and to totally repress black interests as evidenced by the laws on 
physical segregation. Furthermore the colonial state deliberately ignored issues of social 
justice for the black race thus further reducing the legitimacy of the state. Whereas legal 
recognition by a remotely located monarchy might have lent the legal legitimacy required, 
the turn of events in Rhodesia from 1964-1979 when the settler government declared the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI),4 clearly eroded any legitimacy there might 
have been even for the British monarchy. How then is the state defined to reflect this 
context? 
 
The Marxist perception of the state as organisations servicing class interests and the 
capitalist mode of production offers more insight into the colonial state (Stoneman and 
Cliffe 1989). Though Marx puts this in the context of working class conflicts against other 
classes, the analysis works equally well for classes based on race as one race automatically 
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attains superiority over the other and fights constantly to maintain this self appointed 
priviledged position. Analysis of the class structure of a society at any point in time may 
thus provide useful insights into the relative balance of power as classes always attempt to 
advance their interests, inter alia, by means of influencing the actions of the state 
institutions (Rakodi and Withers 1993:17). However, Rakodi and Withers caution that it is 
important to be on guard not to neglect processes of class formation which produce change 
over time, and not to adopt rigid categorisations which may not be appropriate for the 
analysis at hand. The balance of power between economic and political class interest and 
their ability to influence government and wider state actions vary over time which makes it 
essential to make the colonial state and its service delivery policies the starting point for 
explaining contemporary housing policies in Zimbabwe. 
 
Another theoretical view is that the state is merely an instrument of the ruling class, used to 
maintain its dominant position and the subordination of other class groups. The colonial 
state in Africa reflects this perspective clearly. The state was an instrument of the colonial 
power and it was used to advance its political and economic interests. One perception is 
that it was a strong interventionist state which represented the interests of settler farmers, 
local mining, industrial and commercial capitalist interests, subsidiaries of multinational 
capital, white middle classes and white workers (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). All sections 
of the white controlled economy shared an interest in ensuring the availability of cheap 
black labour and this was the primary influence in the urbanisation policy especially 
housing development (Rakodi and Withers 1993:37). Mamdani (1996:19) points out that 
the colonial state was a double-sided affair primarily because of the divisions over race 
with one type of governance over the citizens (white) and the other over the subjects (all 
other races). This implied the politics of accommodation, (on the part of the settlers) with 
them directing colonial development as long as they had the upper hand. 
 
These state society relations redefined the concept of citizenship in a way that exalted 
white supremacy and hegemony. Citizenship came to be defined as ‘a priviledge for the 
civilised man’ who then could enjoy all his civil rights but for the so called uncivilised 
native, political rights in particular were seriously and systematically denied (ibid:17). This 
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categorisation and treatment as subjects was the root cause of all anti-colonial resistance 
and it made Africans defiant from the very beginning. The only advantage the African 
appreciated from the colonial state was its use for the pursuit of self-interest as it was 
authoritatively imposed and perpetuated racial differences. The colonial state became 
responsible for engendering social change that had repercussions for social structure, social 
status (Appiah 1995:77) and political mobilisation and these changes can be analysed 
partly through the concepts of identity and citizenship. 
 
The Colonial Religion 
After the colonisation of Zimbabwe in 1890 by the British South African Company, the 
colonisers immediately institutionalised a political economy that was anchored in the 
ideology of racism. Racism became the state ‘religion’ which overlapped or coincided with 
class differences (Masunungure 1997; Evans 1997). This made race the organising 
principle on which national resources were authoritatively allocated and authoritatively 
denied such that power and all socio-economic resources were skewed in favour of the 
minority ruling white race. Race was, in Masunungure’s words, the “inner iron law” of the 
settler political economy. Rhodesia’s own blend of apartheid consisted of firstly, defining 
people as belonging to distinct races, secondly, formulating laws which gave different 
races differential access to resources and thirdly, forcing a geographical or spatial 
separation of the races in terms of residential places, land ownership and work and lastly, 
adoption of the principle that services and other benefits for Africans should be financed 
by the Africans themselves in their respective residences (Musekiwa 1994:54). 
 
Colonial development policies for Africans were strictly anti-urban and the colonial 
powers clung to their policy that any kind of development for Africans should be confined 
to their ‘natural rural habitat’ (Tait 1997:153). Tait points out that in the British colonies, 
any encouragement of African urbanisation was considered detrimental to native 
development, because of the ‘detribalising’  effects of long-term exposure to town life 
(Mamdani 1996). The African worker was seen as an object of colonial urbanisation and in 
no way as an urban subject. He was merely tolerated as a temporary labourer and was in 
theory, expected to return to his home after the termination of his employment (Evans 
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1997)5. Influx was thus to be controlled, cultural differences were to be maintained and 
social control6 became even more important to the settler government (Rakodi and Withers 
1993:59). The housing conditions of Africans reflected the perception that colonialism was 
only interested in the physical maintenance of the African urban labour force, whilst 
denying them any human rights of habitat. 
 
Institutional design centred on keeping the public service in white hands as evidenced by 
the 1931 Public Services Act, Chapter II, Section 8 (I) which stated in very explicit terms 
who would serve in the public service: 
That Public Service shall consist of all persons in the employment of the 
government of the colony included in: 
(a) the administration and clerical divisions 
(b) the schools division 
(c) the professional and technical division 
(d) the general service 
but shall not include any native or coloured person. 
 
 
The need to uphold the racist ideology resulted in an extra ordinary emphasis on security 
by the colonial state and this resulted in the development of authoritarian administrative 
systems that were closely woven, centralised and hierarchical (Masunungure 1997). The 
excessive pre-occupation with maintaining law and order manifested itself explicitly in the 
designing of housing for the black population in urban areas. All colonial policies 
converged on the fundamental principles of strict ethnic and racial segregation between the 
whites and the various indigenous population groups. This segregationist principle was to 
become the decisive element in colonial town planning that translated the policy of divide 
and rule into spatial dimensions (Tait 1997:151; Evans 1997). As in the South African 
apartheid model, Africans were banned from the city altogether with the labour force 
contained in separate townships. In other countries, the basic pattern of racial zoning was 
employed and modified by the colonial powers in question. In some areas where the 
traditionally built-up towns were unsuitable for the colonial type of city layout, European 
cities were built on adjoining sites (ibid). 
 
 70 
The most prominent and systematic feature of colonial cities was the basic town planning 
structures and layouts that reflected the need for social and military control of the native 
quarters and hygienic protection of the European residential zones from these areas (Zain 
1989, Evans 1997 and Tait 1997:151-152). The creation of healthy environments with low 
housing densities and abundant surroundings became an obsession for the planners. 
European quarters were spaciously designed for the residence of colonial administrators 
and their families with ample leisure (clubs, parks, sports grounds) and other urban 
facilities with bungalow style houses with gardens (Tait 1997). Between these and the 
African quarters, buffer zones such as native markets, railways, industrial areas or other 
geographical barriers separated the races. The native quarters for housing the indigenous 
labour force were contained in townships built in village style, with provision for the 
control of influx and movement. Colonial cities were thus an attempt at creating ideal 
urban layouts that targeted the white community only as Dewar (1980:42) observed: 
 
God, Greed, Gold and the Flag motivated all settler activity. Amongst this strongly 
class-conscious imperialist group, the indigenous African was  generally 
considered a backward, illiterate heathen unworthy of social  intercourse as an 
equal, fit only for menial labour and the object of charitable works.... The distinct 
racial differences of colour and appearance served to emphasise ethnic cultural 
differences and to facilitate the creation of unsympathetic stereotypes...The 
apparent and obvious ‘differentness’ (sic) between the two groups progressively 
exacerbated inter-group relations, reinforced attitudes and justified planning polices 
of separate development. 
 
During the Federation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
and Nyasaland (Malawi), from 1953-1963, there were some half-hearted attempts at non-
racism under the ‘partnership’  racial policy but these were confined to service in the public 
service in Southern Rhodesia and they did not spill over into geographical issues and social 
contact (ibid). After the break up of the federation in 1963,7 the new white minority 
government under Ian Smith ushered in a new era, the UDI, which saw a tightening of the 
racial policies and an increase in the surveillance of white residential areas to keep blacks 
out permanently. The logic of UDI was to curtail any liberal racial tendencies with regard 
to the governance of the country. 
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Tait (1997:154) explains how the colonial powers were able to control mobilisation, 
movement, and utilisation of African workers by sheer political, military and 
administrative force. The degree of African involvement in the capitalist sector was 
regulated by taxation, resettlement programmes, or by destructive intervention into 
indigenous subsistence production systems so as to create a dependency on monetary 
income. These mechanisms were manipulated by legal means such as the terms of labour 
or by pass laws that forced migrant labour to return to the subsistence sector (Evans 1997). 
Colonial rule in the rural areas was contradictory as the traditional productive system had 
to be maintained because it served as the reproductive base for the circulatory labour 
migration to urban areas and yet its destruction was necessary to get the men to go to 
work.8 A complex and contradictory legal framework was established to sustain the 
colonial economy that backed the colonial religion. 
 
The Development of African Housing 
All the new urban settlements established after the 1890 conquest over the indigenous 
chiefs required African labour. The Africans were coerced into working for the settlers 
through the establishment of taxes (hut and cattle taxes), which required them to seek 
employment to raise the money (Devittie 1974). The African men were considered as 
single males which meant that single accommodation was provided but the influence of the 
cash economy caused some changes in the families’ lifestyle and some began to bring their 
families into urban areas.  Colonial era policies defined blacks as temporary citizens in 
urban areas and this was legally effected through laws such as the Land Apportionment 
Act (no 30 of 1930) which divided the country into African or black and European or 
white areas with all urban areas designated as white areas (ibid). Blacks were in urban 
areas for the sole purpose of employment after which they would retire to their rural 
homes. The provision of housing tied to employment safeguarded the government’s ability 
to prevent permanent urbanisation of the workforce and it kept wages low (Rakodi and 
Withers 1993:26). The diversification of the colonial economy required more African 
labour and this increased the African population in urban areas and Africans living 
illegally openly evaded restrictions to residence (Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999). 
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The mobility of African women was an unpredicted phenomenon (Barnes 1999; Muchena 
1980). How to deal with African women in urban areas became a problem for the colonial 
policy because the Native Commissioners were at a loss as to how to apply their 
regulations and rules such as the 1889 Vagrancy Act and the Pass Consolidation Act of 
1901 to women. The laws were applied to ‘natives’ who were defined as male and they 
also applied to urban areas only (Barnes 1999:97). Urban and rural men pleaded with the 
state to institute measures that would control female mobility into urban areas and in 1931, 
the Chief Native Commissioner took new initiatives to discourage women from entering 
town. Vagrancy laws were to be enforced strongly on women and lists of those ‘Native 
Females Alleged to be Prostitutes’ or those who earned a living by ‘doubtful means’ were 
compiled and the records were kept by the police (ibid:99). 
 
The women were often rounded up9 and sent back to their rural areas and the state believed 
it was working in the best interests of the native society as stated in one of its clauses in the 
1936 Natives Registration Act: “ To safeguard Native Society, especially its womankind” . 
Barnes (1999a) argues that this clause was used to maintain the patriarchal nature of the 
African society and to limit the influx of African women into urban areas by pretending to 
protect their morality in urban zones that were dominated by African men. This 
moratorium meant housing could only be allocated to males but the passing of new 
legislation much later made it possible for females who were assisted by their white 
employers to get tied housing too. This was frowned upon by the African community as 
traditionally, it was unacceptable for a woman to own a house on her own. Amazingly 
enough, the more controlling the system became, the more the women flooded the urban 
areas and resisted their deportation to rural areas by simply returning again (Barnes 1999a). 
The rounding up of illegal town dwellers also extended to males and even children such 
that many resorted to sleeping away from their homes at night to avoid detection. 
Therefore a house in town did not guarantee security, which eroded the little space that had 
been carved out for the urban Africans. The same defiance was to be experienced again 
after 1980 when squatters refused to vacate areas they would have occupied illegally. 
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Allowing a significant proportion of Africans to reside in urban areas proved to be 
economically beneficial to the white community as a surplus population of job-seekers 
sustained capitalistic productive efforts (Tait 1997:153). This was essential because in 
times of economic crises, workers could be dismissed and rehired afterwards directly from 
the townships without the need to re-launch recruitment schemes in the African rural 
homes.10  The 1930 depression affected the white working class badly and led to the 
passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1934 which formalised racial discrimination in 
urban jobs. In 1936, the Native Registration Act was passed which required all blacks to 
possess valid registration documents only obtainable if they were legitimately employed. 
This law was backed by the 1889 Vagrancy Act, which permitted authorities to evict 
unemployed blacks, and sent them back to the rural areas of origin (Devittie 1974). At the 
same time, the agricultural land for each African family was limited by the Land 
Husbandry Act (1951) such that the blacks had to search for employment to augment their 
depleted subsistence agricultural produce. 
 
These laws fuelled tension over space between the races as the blacks were legally denied 
the enjoyment of the fruits of their labour in towns. The Morris Carter Commission, 
established to examine the land issue, reported in 1925 that the municipal native locations 
and townships could never satisfy “ the requirements of all sections of the native urban 
population”  (Southern Rhodesia 1925). The report recommended that only those natives 
working for Europeans should live in urban locations and that native townships in native 
areas or reserves should be established to provide the necessary urban environment for 
‘detribalised’ Africans and a few of these were eventually established.  The inconsistencies 
and contradictions of colonial policies concerning African development reflected white 
uncertainty over the ideology of racism, and years down the line, the new Zimbabwe 
government experienced the same inconsistencies reflecting its doubts over the ideology of 
socialism against the competing capitalism pushed for by the International Monetary Fund 
from 1981. For instance, a major contradiction was that it wanted to uphold equality in 
housing allocation through a state controlled-market mechanism (Tait 1997). 
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In the British colonies, the London Colonial Office, in its traditional paternalistic fashion, 
began in the late twenties to raise queries on the social welfare of Africans and colonial 
administrators had to take into account development plans that involved investment in 
facilities for Africans in urban areas (Tait 1997:154). New town ordinances were passed in 
which the African worker was permitted to reunite with his family in urban residences and 
was granted a permanent stay for the duration of his working life (ibid).  Industrial 
developments after the Second World War triggered a heavy influx of Africans into town 
which led to the passing of the Native Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act 
(no.6 of 1946). The act limited the residents occupying any city space to labourers and 
their spouses and children. The Act also required employers either to provide free 
accommodation on approved private premises or to hire accommodation in the townships 
for their employees. If they hired accommodation, then the employer was responsible for 
the rent. Accommodation in town was thus tied to employment and had to be vacated when 
the occupier left his place of employment (Musekiwa 1994:51). Unemployment meant no 
recognition as a town’s person, therefore no accommodation could be accesse d without 
this status (Mutamiri 1991:2). 
 
The type of accommodation provided for those not accommodated on white property was 
thus single accommodation in native locations or townships adjoining European areas and 
did not cater for families. With time, this arrangement complicated the enforcement of the 
Land Apportionment Act and the consequent amendment resulted in the Land Tenure Act 
(no 55 of 1969), which allowed rigid control over the indigenous population in towns 
(ibid). This new law emphasized the necessity of establishing African townships with local 
authorities also required to provide adequate housing for urban based blacks who had 
families. Though this was an official Act, the municipalities were reluctant to provide 
decent accommodation for blacks to purchase hence developments were very slow, 
sporadic and frustrating (Musekiwa 1994:47). The opening of Kambuzuma township in 
1963 was the first step in the relaxation of the tenure legislation and from then on, half-
hearted attempts were made to create a permanent urban African population (Tobaiwa 
1990:2). 
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It was only in the mid-fifties that the government realised that most of the local authorities 
were failing to cope with the influx of Africans in urban areas and the increasing demand 
of accommodation for the married (ibid). In this period, the Todd government, a liberal 
government, erected thousands of houses in government owned townships in the larger 
centres (Butcher 1986). St. Mary’s in Chitungwiza was started in 1956 to cater for the 
airport workers. Dzivaresekwa, located thirteen kilometres west of Harare, was developed 
in 1961 to accommodate domestic workers in the north-western European suburbs. 
Mabvuku and Tafara were developed east of the city centre, Glen Norah was located in the 
south east and Mufakose in the west. All townships fell within a similar radius of the city 
centre reflecting the regime’s policy of locating Africans as far away as possible from 
European residential areas. 
 
Public sector urban development and housing policy response in Africa in general during 
the fifties and sixties were primarily concerned with providing a minimum standard of 
shelter and services for the African population in order to protect the public health of the 
whites (ibid). The era made use of standardized match-box type houses using technologies 
and materials suited for mass production (Smit 1995). Surveying and servicing costs were 
minimised by neatly laying out the houses. The ultimate aim was to ensure order and 
control. Policies of the period were primarily motivated by the desire to ensure the 
sustained reproduction of labour power in the cities (Evans 1995). This emphasis on single 
type accommodation contributed significantly to the current shortages in housing urban 
dwellers. 
 
Up to the sixties, urban African townships were the locus of the anti-colonial struggle and 
they provided the space for African associational life even though African organisational 
politics was marginalised after the locus was moved to the rural areas with the start of the 
liberation struggle (Raftopoulos and Yoshikuni 1999:1). Associational life for Africans 
was characterised by discontinuities as colonialism and settlers destroyed all old structures 
and created new ones thus effectively destroying the social space within which black 
organisations could contest white hegemony (Nordlund 1996:19). Private houses filled that 
gap by providing alternative space. Owning a house could elevate one amongst the 
 76 
Africans’ social circles and more importantly, it also provided the nationalists with venue s 
for political meetings, which were always rotated amongst different houses to avoid 
detection as one stood to lose the house if they got caught. Officially acceptable and 
tolerated African associational life was confined to savings schemes and to the sustenance 
of traditional life such as burial societies. But first and foremost, owning a house opened 
the door to many opportunities; it provided a means of earning an income and 
supplementing the income earned from either formal or informal employment. It was a 
base for engaging in informal trade and when pressure for accommodation increased after 
1939, house owners11 took in lodgers who would occupy one room and they would pay the 
owner of the house a monthly rental. Secondly, it provided access to public schools for 
one’s children. Overall, it gave hope to the Africans of mobility from their subject status to 
at least ‘second class citizens’. 12 
 
In 1961, the Land Apportionment Act was amended twice (nos. 37 and 66 of 1961) to 
regularise a number of anomalies in the legislation and to provide for the introduction of 
home-ownership schemes in the municipal townships (Tobaiwa 1990). However, limited 
financing of African housing militated against the mass transfer of urban houses to 
Africans and only a handful could afford the full cost of a house and land. Also Europeans 
objected strongly to having native locations near their residential areas. This resulted in 
their residences being located far from their work places and this increased costs for the 
Africans to commute to work. Amenities for the Africans such as clinics, recreational 
centres and their welfare services were financed by the Africans themselves through levies 
on the sale of beer in the townships (Musekiwa 1993). Europeans were clearly unwilling to 
subsidise African housing even though they required their labour. 
 
In 1971, the government relinquished all responsibility for the administration of all its peri-
urban high-density locations (African townships) to the municipality. By the mid-
seventies, the housing situation in the African townships had deteriorated considerably 
with demand for housing rising continuously and rural-urban migration triggered by the 
liberation war worsened the situation. This pressure saw the mushrooming of informal 
settlements to the south of the city and the government intervened to remove the squatters 
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(Tait 1997). The council was forced to initiate innovative low cost housing schemes. These 
consisted of a core house comprising of a washing area, cooking area and one tiny 
bedroom on a two hundred square metre stand. The rest of the house had to be completed 
by the owner within ten years and even though Africans scrambled for these houses, they 
criticised their cost and location which was right at the periphery of the city such that 
transport costs were high for the residents since most of them mostly worked in the city, 
twenty-two kilometres away (Mutamiri 1991). 
 
Analysis of the Colonial Housing Delivery Practices 
Service delivery in the colonial state departed from the Weberian model and factors other 
than race also came into play. As a collectively defined racial group, race determined the 
state’s priorities in housing provision and the quality, but there was equal treatment for the 
racial group. However, at the individual level, non-bureaucratic behaviour manifested itself 
in several ways. Whereas proof of employment was the only official criterion, ethnic 
affiliations tended to influence access to housing with migrant labourers usually being the 
most favoured. As aliens, their right to residence could be revoked at any time which made 
them vulnerable and forced them to be submissive at all times. They were the perfect 
image of subservience that the settlers wanted to promote. Also, if one belonged to a tribe 
favoured by the District Superintendent allocating houses, then chances of accessing a 
house sooner increased. When Africans were in charge of allocation, they tended to give 
preference to their tribesmen such that a pattern could be seen in where the Zezurus were 
accommodated, the Malawians13 and the Manyikas.14 Deference was another extra-legal 
criterion. How a house-seeker presented himself to the decision makers mattered a lot and 
if one was perceived to be a potential troublemaker, then delays were unavoidable. 
 
Recommendation from a white employer was another extra-legal criterion that facilitated 
access to housing and land. From as early as 1913, Africans who attempted to apply for 
garden plots within the vicinity of urban areas were only recognised if their applications 
were channelled through their employers (Thornton 1999:29). This, according to Thornton, 
made the acquisition of residential plots a reward for long-serving wage earners of various 
firms in town. It became for some, a form of gratuity for unquestioning service and 
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loyalty.15 For example, the Beira and Mashonaland Railway Company applied successfully 
on behalf of their Chief Messenger whom they had employed for a number of years and 
whom they described as “the type of native we should be encouraging” (ibid) . The 
tradition of gift giving thus began to take on a new and different dimension for the 
Africans who usually gave gifts as tribute and for other traditional reasons. Ordinary 
Africans without traditional positions of authority were now on the receiving end of the 
gift-giving practice after being defined as deserving such treatment by the whites. 
 
The whites gave access to land or housing for loyalty whilst in employment and indirectly 
for protection from the legal and administrative system. The important issue was that, an 
avenue had been opened to circumvent the laid down procedures for Africans to acquire 
housing or land as a recommendation from a white employer ensured access to state 
resources. This particularistic behaviour was probably pursued because of the lack of 
legitimacy that surrounded housing allocation and it aided in the development of a 
subservient African. The idea was to cultivate more grateful Africans thus guarding against 
and keeping a check on an undesirable African urban population, but still, there was no 
social justice in the way the state allocated its resources and this lesson was not lost on the 
nationalists after independence. In the same vein, they quickly learnt to use state resources 
to reward their supporters and to mobilise support for their policies. Identifying with the 
liberation struggle later became one of the unofficial criterion in resource allocation. 
 
The Colonial Legacy in Housing Provision 
In spite of all the changes and tolerance towards African presence in towns, Tait 
(1997:155-156) points out two issues that remained unaffected: First, legally, Africans 
remained second-class citizens without the right of permanent residence or freedom of 
movement although they now had the permission to live in towns with their families for 
the duration of their working life as they were now expected to leave after retirement. 
Secondly, with respect to residential circumstances, the population growth of African 
dwellers was channelled into the already existing geographical and spatial patterns laid out 
for native housing. However, new residential categories and housing standards were 
created for Africans. Settlement areas and housing conditions attained marked internal 
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differentiation according to whether Africans qualified for municipal housing, for 
employers’ housing or were singled out for unauthorised housing areas. In other words, the 
urban segregationist policy remained, now only to become moulded around the emerging 
class differentiation among Africans (ibid). 
 
Postcolonial housing provision continued to be based on the original colonial layouts that 
were incorporated into new master plans (Rakodi and Withers 1993; Tait 157). For Tait, 
problems arose since the dichotomous, segregationist colonial structures were not 
questioned but were functionalised by the new elites in the context of their new ideology of 
socialism. These principles of segregation of urban areas are what are largely referred to as 
the ‘heritage of the colonial city’. Tait (1997:156) sums up these development s: 
Segregationist notions were to a large extent formative for the newly emerged 
urban social relationships among Africans to which tribal values did not provide 
sufficient counterbalancing orientations: the stereotypes of class and social 
differentiation were learnt from the principles of power imposed by colonial rule, 
and they were derived from the attitudes of European residents who often adhered 
to apartheid social perceptions. But the heritage of the ‘colonial city’ is not the 
exclusive key to understanding prevailing ..... provisions and the uncurbed 
dynamics of growing urban disparities. The observed failure of sovereign African 
governments to decolonise the African metropolises and to develop an appropriate 
concept of an African city in accordance with given needs and cultural traditions, 
clearly relates to the wider economic and social disparities pertaining to the 
formation of post-colonial peripheral capitalism and its urban based power 
structures. 
 
Whilst the colonial government felt it was its duty to liberate Rhodesia from the Africans, 
the new independent government sought to liberate Zimbabwe from the colonial mode of 
governance and this is reflected in the ambiguities present in postcolonial housing delivery. 
Housing provision and other urban developments continued to be built around racial, 
cultural patterns of differentiation and party politics exacerbated the problems as party 
identity was set to become a criterion for access to some public resources. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has attempted to demonstrate the establishment of selective oriented service 
delivery institutions and how they skewed the services in favour of the white community. 
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This lesson was not lost to the new independent era elites who had made as many promises 
to the equally many constituencies that had served them and that would remain crucial for 
their staying in power. The discussion shows that service delivery in the colonial period 
was shaped by the tensions between the struggle for hegemony by the colonial settler 
government and the fight for recognition and acceptance as citizens by the blacks. 
 
At the national level, race was the extra-legal bureaucratic criterion for allocating housing 
resources. Africans were in one clear category and the struggle for access to resources took 
place within that confined space. Bureaucratic rules as set by the governing system were 
thus adhered to. At the individual level, the colonial bureaucracy considered employment 
as the most important and it was the only written down criterion, followed by white 
employer recommendation. There was no correspondence between the ideal and what 
existed on the ground, a trend that continued to exist in the new independence 
dispensation. This erratic behaviour was a result of the ambiguous legal framework the 
bureaucracy operated in. Housing in urban areas can thus be viewed as ‘sites of struggle’ 16 
because it was the fight for space that culminated in a liberation war. It was also the space 
that conferred a more desirable citizenship status. 
 
Ranger (1999:62) uses the concept ‘invented traditions’ to explain the colonial attitudes of 
ethnic stereotyping in discrimination. Whites categorised Africans by tribes and decided 
what each was good for in employment and this also determined other economic and social 
benefits. For example, he explains how blacks manipulated this stereotyping and would 
take on Zulu or Portuguese identities in order to land specific jobs. This means that blacks 
would reformulate their original identity to suit the circumstances that would ensure their 
economic survival and access to other opportunities. This assumption of survival ensuring 
identities was to be replicated time and time again during the country’s transition process 
to a majority rule democracy. Identity formation in response to demands for compliance 
started early in the colonial era.  For the Africans, citizenship status was defined in the 
context of residential space they occupied and this resulted in the emergence of double 
identities. Double in the sense that Africans very often assumed one identity to access 
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public goods and services (the socio-economic identity through employment) and another 
(the political identity) to change their subject status. 
 
The ambiguities that had existed in the colonial housing legal framework were reflected in 
the new post 1980 housing policy environment. The loopholes in administrative laws 
including the institutions of acquiring compliance were thus inherited with the net effect of 
causing turmoil in the housing delivery process. The advantages of ambiguities were that 
they could be interpreted and bent to suit different circumstances and in doing so, they 
sanctioned discrimination against others. The numerous laws and regulations succeeded in 
creating distance between the white supremacist residential space and the labouring blacks 
but it also became a breeding ground for paternalistic tendencies in post-colonial 
administration. The same paternalism reappears in the “ liberation culture”  in the sense that 
those who led the struggle tend to patronise those seeking legitimate services from the 
state. A selective orientated organisational culture and administrative behaviour had been 
institutionalised by the time the new independent state took over. The “ liberation culture”  
that later developed in the bureaucracy had lessons to draw from as the ambiguous 
operating environment endorsed unfairness. A fusion of the war time experiences 
combined with the inherited inequities further nurtured the “ liberation culture” . 
 
The new state’s orientation requi red new political identities and their development could 
be realised faster through the allocation of resources such as land. The leads to an 
important question: What identities did the “ liberation culture”  require? This question is 
answered in the next two chapters. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Colonial practices varied and were determined by a combination of factors ranging from direct to indirect 
rule, the assimilation of indigens, as well as the number of settlers and natural resources in the colony. 
2 Some authors, Mamdani, M. (1996) Citizen and Subject, Princeton University Press, New Jersey and 
Masunungure, E. (1998a) Africanisation of the Public Service in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, State Power 
Consolidation and Patron Clientelism, Unpublished Paper, Department of Political Administrative Studies, 
University of Zimbabwe, question the system of indirect rule. The colonial state required instruments to 
penetrate the rural areas and naturally they turned to existing institutions, secondly the Native 
Commissioners’ presence at the local level implies the presence of the central government at the local level. 
Can the use of traditional institutions be then termed indirect rule? If so, then, can the use of the same 
institutions by the new independent states be also termed indirect rule?  
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3Authority and legitimacy go hand in hand but here I am questioning electoral legitimacy for the African and 
not legitimacy derived from performance, an issue that arises later in the post colonial period when the public 
looks across time to compare current regimes with the colonial state’s performance in service delivery.  
4The Ian Smith government proclaimed UDI after the break up of the Federation of Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in 1964. UDI was characterised by a 
high degree of paternalism and the strong repression of African political aspirations. The idea was to prevent 
the country from going the Zambian and Malawian way of attaining majority rule. The British government 
condemned this action but did not use any force to reverse the decision. Instead, sanctions were imposed on 
Rhodesia which made the country more determined to maintain its status with help which could only come 
from the equally racist apartheid South Africa. 
5 South African historians have documented the segregation policies of the apartheid states. The native was 
permitted to enter the white cities and towns only to minister to the needs of the white man and was expected 
to depart when he finished his service. See Wilkinson, P. (1998) “Housing Policy in South Africa ” , Habitat 
International, vol.22 no.3, pp215-229. 
6 Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1993) Land Housing and Urban Development in Zimbabwe, Occasional Papers 
in Planning Research, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Cardiff, define social control 
as being exercised by means of official socialisation, institutional incorporation, cooptation, accommodation 
and coercion. Official socialisation refers to the discourse of development by which an official ideology and 
appropriate values and attitudes are diffused theoretically. In such premises, social mobility was prescribed 
by the state which legitimised inequality. 
7 The federation broke up after Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) became independent. 
8 See Ivan Evans (1997) Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa, University of 
California Press. 
9Night raids or inspection ‘spaktion’  for illegal Africans in urban residential areas took place at night. 
10 The recruitment exercises were usually violent resulting in the destruction of homes to flush the men out to 
the cities when their labour was required. 
11These were house owners in the sense that they had the agreement with the municipality. A lodger is a 
person who secures accommodation in a house owned by someone else. Unlike with other forms of 
accommodation arrangements, lodgers share the same house with the owner. Many complain of too many 
restrictions imposed by owners who argue that these are designed to cut down household costs. 
12 Interview with an African senior citizen in Highfield township. 
13 Many Malawians trekked to Rhodesia from the early 1930s onwards to seek employment on the white 
settler establishments. Most ended up as farm labourers or domestic servants.   
14 Interviews in Highfield. 
15 Emphasis added. 
16The phrase ‘sites of struggle’ is borrowed from the title of a book by Raftopoulos , B. and Yoshikuni, T. 
(eds.) (1999) Sites of Struggles - Essays on Zimbabwe’s Urban History , Weaver Press. The book discusses 
tensions in the struggle for space in urban Zimbabwe between the colonial state, African men and women. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Housing the Masses in Zimbabwe 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents findings on how victims of a socialist project avoided 
marginalisation through the deliberate engagement of those who control the resources. 
This organisational capacity of the poor as well as the initiative was very much a response 
to the global discourse on housing provision by the poor and it threatened the state’s 
position on resource allocation. To fulfil the promises of the struggle, the independent state 
had defined its major challenge as the deconstruction of the colonial mentality, reshaping 
‘contaminated colonial’ identities, defining a new kind of citizenship and the development 
of a political culture that would under-gird the socialist rhetoric (Appiah 1995:2). The goal 
was clearly to create a citizenship with a socialist identity. The inevitable fact that it had to 
step into colonial authoritarian shoes of governance and ambiguities complicated its tasks 
as it meant a prolonged continuance with colonial institutions and processes. The 
ideological shifts in the inherited institutions required adjustment of the bureaucratic 
authoritarian nature of the state, and yet such a movement to a democratic state by a 
regime with a military bureaucratic type of organization proved difficult. In this chapter, 
the emphasis is on the politicisation of the bureaucracy, that is, the inculcation of the 
“liberation culture” , the institutional redesigning for equitable service delivery and the 
impact of these processes on housing provision. 
 
The centralisation of power completed by the former colonial state continued to serve the 
hegemonic agenda of the ruling party. To consolidate its hold on society and impose the 
identity it desired, all socio-political organisation had to take place within the 
government’s realm which could not be separated from the party especially at the policy 
level. Perceptions of the state derived form the colonial era,  that the state serves the 
pursuit of one’s interests, and the  liberators’ belief in ruling perpetually as a reward for 
liberating the country, nurtured the spread of the “liberation culture” . This makes it 
mandatory to examine the historical background of the housing delivery institutions and 
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more so, of the agents. Through this historical analysis, I intend to explain the striking 
continuities that have had a bearing on housing delivery. 
 
The organisation of party politics in Zimbabwe embraced all categories of people and cut 
across classes especially in urban areas where most members of the working class were not 
directly affected by the war. These groups needed to be mobilised urgently and the 
allocation of resources was the best modus operandum for creating and maintaining a 
political support base. Those Sandbrook (1985) calls the marginalised labouring poor,1 
became quite active in mobilising the urban public to rally behind the party and playing the 
surveillance role with regard to party issues. The emerging indigenous businessmen as well 
as the working class were both significant in the development of housing after 
independence.2 Many of them aligned themselves with the party to insure and secure the 
prosperity of their business. Other beneficiaries included a significant proportion of those 
who participated in the liberation struggle and even those who had ventured into business 
independently (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). The interests of the ruling party therefore need 
to be explored in order to understand the nature of housing policies the new government 
came up with. 
 
This makes it possible to answer why the urban local government institutions carry out 
specific housing related tasks and why the official actors behave in a particular way against 
a background where the state continuously projected a nationalist-populist image. All 
service delivery was envisaged to take place within the inherited institutional structures 
that were originally designed to cope with relatively slow growth for different races 
(clients). Zimbabwe inherited and comfortably pursued the colonial regimes’ commitment 
to orderly urban development and economic activity (Rakodi and Withers 1995:372). 
According to the two, this was aided by the strict anti-squatting policy as well as the 
relatively higher proportion of a formal workforce, and a well-defined housing finance 
system through the banks. Also some commendable local administrative capacity made it 
possible for public agencies to deliver services. 
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Bearing in mind that under the colonial regime the residential circumstances of Africans 
were perceived as an integral part of the racist and segregationist system, it was inevitable 
that high expectations were raised by the housing policies of the independent government 
(Tait 1997:209). However, it became clear with time that there was no progress towards 
achieving an egalitarian society as proposed by the government’s socialist philosophy. 
Instead, social structures initially encouraged by the colonial state were used by the new 
ruling elites as reinforcement of their own political and socio-economic interests (ibid). For 
instance, traditional rulers, who were at first marginalised in the power restructuring game, 
were later recognised as part of the essential structures for garnering rural votes. 
Segregation continued between races and classes and was encouraged rather than 
counteracted by town planning and housing policies. The pattern of residential zoning 
continued in the new high density areas, and there was a stark difference between these and 
the privileged spacious housing provision built with state aid by top civil servants and 
political elites (ibid). 
 
Politicisation of the Bureaucracy 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) pointed out the effects of the war in Zimbabwe in 
1983, “The political experience learnt in fighting a seven year gue rrilla war is leading to 
increasingly repressive measures and an increasing authoritarianism.” 3 What the EIU 
disregarded was that as with all colonial regimes, Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) was an 
autocratic state and this legacy of authoritarianism was embraced by the new political 
leadership in the new dispensation after independence (Moore 1994). The state had 
remained in Young’s (1986) words, alien to the core, erected upon a command relationship 
and shaped by its vocation of domination. Later on the state became placid due to fiscal 
pressure but still it left little room for any likely contestation. 
 
As can be expected, Zimbabweans who were directly affected by the war were quick to 
adapt to the liberators’ style of governance. Deference and subservience  were encouraged 
and intimidation and the constant threat of death ensured compliance and patience from the 
citizens during the war. Decisions in the villages were increasingly left for the guerrilla’s 
approval, which meant seeking assurance that they were politically acceptable and not 
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reflecting a different ideology that contradicted the liberators’ (Kriger 1992; Moore 1994;  
Ranger 1996). And in South Africa’s liberation struggle, to question authority was not just 
tantamount to rebellion but was treated as such. This was essential since liberation 
movements aimed to achieve gains for the dispossessed majority through revolutionary 
mobilisation4 (Taylor 1997:10). In this atmosphere, innovation, negotiation, compromise 
and transparency were taboo and so rule through fear became entrenched. This decision-
making milieu often caused confusion as contradictory directives were frequently issued. 
 
A new organisational culture thus emerged at the advent of independence. Government 
departments developed a tendency to wait for most if not all decisions to emanate from 
higher authorities. The principle of democratic centralism that had been advocated and 
practiced during the war began to sprout in the bureaucracy. Decisions and resource 
allocation were increasingly made on how they would reflect on the party. It thus became 
normal to be rewarded for loyalty and to be denied a service if one’s political orientations 
were not acceptable and in this way the “liberation culture”  was nurtured. 
 
The next step is to understand how this “liberation culture”  managed to permeate the 
public service. This was achieved through politicisation of the public service. Politicisation 
here means public servants openly aligning themselves with the party in power against the 
opposition parties (Barlow 1984: 23). Politicisation therefore illuminates how public 
servants came to define their role and why they act the way they do in service delivery. 
This does not mean ignoring the role of structures in influencing behaviour of the public 
servants but several studies have demonstrated this link (Simon 1965; Blau 1963; Lipsky 
1980; Peters 1984) and I intend to dwell more on the effects of politicisation. 
 
Africanisation or Administrative reform? 
In 1981, the Presidential Directive on Africanisation rocked the bureaucracy by hurtling 
qualified but inexperienced blacks5 into senior positions. The Public Service Commission 
was tasked with implementing the directive with the aim of advancing suitably qualified 
Africans to senior positions6 and especially to the politically sensitive posts.7 This led to an 
immediate withdrawal by most of the white officials. For those who stayed on longer, 
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professional and ethical tensions mounted almost overnight. The different backgrounds of 
officials manning the bureaucracy exacerbated the tension. There are those who are called 
the ‘locals’ who climb the local organisational hierarchy through experience and the 
‘cosmopolitans’ 8 who come in at a higher level because of high qualifications, usually 
degrees. The locals obviously have to teach the cosmopolitans (new superiors) the ropes 
and this causes resentment. Adherence to rules and regulations would normalise or 
minimise tensions in professional bureaucracies but in the ‘liberation culture bureaucracy’, 
fear and intimidation obligated the locals into ready submission since the superiors had 
qualifications (liberation war credentials) other than formal university degrees. This ‘local 
cosmopolitan’ struggle has had its own effects on service delivery.  Hostilities became the 
order of the day immediately after independence as one public servant in Zimbabwe put it 
in 1980; 
In 1980, when we started, we were administering with emphasis on power. The 
rationale was that it was a government system that came about through a war 
situation, and so a military type of approach was in place. It derived from the party. 
The threat to the newly-won independence through hostile forces, both external and 
internal, required government institutions that would demonstrate change… 9 
 
And another remarked in 1992, 
 
So there was this mutual distrust at first. Then there was the inexperience of the 
new ministers and the new civil servants. They had to learn on the job and many of 
us had to do the teaching. This also caused tension as always between teacher and 
pupil, especially if the pupil is several notches in rank above the teacher. I would 
say that for the first six months, no one really knew what was going on. I remember 
that time as a series of never ending meetings.10 
 
Masunungure’s  (1994a) analysis of the Africanisation project which he terms 
blackenisation, give an explicit account of the new government’s intentions. For him, 
blackenisation was designed to counter and neutralise those who, “by the acts of 
commission or omission might have been unsympathetic to the government’s policies, 
socialist or otherwise” (1999a:14). Even though this was a constitutional provision to 
balance national representativity, the net effect was to disable those who might have 
challenged the state’s intentions. The Presidential Directive thus served as an instrument of 
power consolidation in as much as it became a mechanism for maintaining a network of 
patron-client relationships (ibid:15). The party needed something concrete to use in the 
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1985 campaign for the national elections and its manifesto emphasized the role of the 
Africanisation process in advancing party interest (ZANU-PF Election Manifesto 1985: 9-
10). 
 
The first major task of the party was to gain control of the state machinery. The 
Presidential Directive, with particular emphasis on African advancement, was issued to 
allow appointments to senior positions in the army, police, judiciary and civil service of 
those loyal to the state. Without this control, there was no way the party could guide 
government in implementing its policies. 
 
Clearly, both trust and distrust were factors in entrenching the “liberation culture” . 
Furthermore, liberation wartime service in exile made it difficult to question authority. 
Resource allocation decisions tended to depend more and more on particularistic criteria as 
illustrated by the case of Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative that is discussed in the 
next chapter. A retired Zimbabwean white public servant made the following comment 
during an interview with Weiss (1994), “C ivil servants became accustomed to special 
directives to assist a particular individual or company and began to indulge in similar 
practices themselves.” Another effect of this political muddling was the abuse of resources. 
For instance, the then Ministry of National Housing collected vast amounts from civil 
servants and citizens alike in a Pay-For-Your-House Scheme which did not take off partly 
because the collected funds were channelled into constructing houses for the political 
leadership and partly because they were deposited into the bottomless treasury fund (The 
Independent 1997). After public outcry two years later, the policy was quietly abandoned 
and some citizens were lucky to get their money refunded. Those that did not get their 
refunds were quietly allocated state land four years later in a new house provision scheme 
in which people were encouraged to build their homes. The idea was noble but no 
mortgage financing was provided to build the houses and the cost of the houses they had 
initially invested in had more than doubled by then. 
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Service Delivery in the New Era 
The government’s housing policy, aimed at upholding its socialist egalitarian and 
democratic principles, was stated in the Transitional National Development Plan (1982\83 
– 1984\85:1). To realise these goals, five policy measures were adopted: the adoption of 
free hold tenure (home ownership); the adoption of an aided self-help approach; the 
establishment of building brigades; the formation of building cooperatives to complement 
the aided self-help approach; the introduction of rent control regulations and the 
involvement of the private sector in the provision of low income housing. These required 
the collaboration of other institutions. A decade later, the government had formulated 
several ‘housing policies’ which were all justified as augmenting the initially talked about 
housing policy dubbed ‘Housing For All by Year 2000!’ The piling policies affected the 
capacity of the implementing authorities who laboured to interpret and draw the parameters 
for implementation. I now briefly discuss each policy and how it created room for the 
“liberation culture”  to penetrate. An important point to note is that at the time of policy 
formation, the ‘decision makers’ had neither the time nor the analy tic capacity to enable 
them to assess the magnitude of the housing problem of the urban poor. They were thus not 
able to identify the poor in the urban black population. 
 
The introduction of rent controls came about because African housing was mostly rented 
with many of the tenants having lived in the same house for over thirty years. Private 
property owners were hiking rents at an alarming rate in response to the increased demand 
for housing after independence. This prompted the Ministry of Local Government Rural 
and Urban Development (MLGRUD), which was part of the Rent Board, to issue the Rent 
Regulation (SI 626 of 1982) and according to these regulations, the landlords could not 
increase rent without approval of the Rent Board. The logic was that rent controls would 
prevent the transfer of income and wealth from the poor tenants to the rich house owners. 
This would keep down rental costs of new houses in order to stabilise the cost and volume 
of house construction (Lindbeck 1967 cited in Makwembere 1998:2). The idea was also to 
help low income families to compete with other house-seekers in the housing market but 
the net effect was the withdrawal of private investors in rented housing provision. 
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Council and government flats and houses were not affected by the rent controls as they 
were reasonably priced and subsidised but almost all government houses were allocated to 
returning war veterans11 in 1980 who, at the lower level, shared the houses and they never 
paid for their accommodation. Public housing was not meant for their permanent 
occupation, but there was silence on the issue. Demobilisation packages had been offered 
to war veterans in 1980-82 to help them start their reintegration into civilian life. 
Eventually, the war veterans had to pay for electricity and water. Some moved out when 
they got married or relocated to elsewhere but some stayed on and in some cases, one got 
to stay behind and continued to occupy the house. By the time these units were finally sold 
off by the government in 2000, many war veterans had moved out as they found the cost of 
running a house in the former white areas unaffordable (Interview 2000). Immediately 
after independence, the government was concerned with accommodating war veterans and 
thus had a welfare approach in housing delivery. 
 
Still, the prioritisation of war veterans was evident in the ad-hoc housing policies of the 
day. The MCPH came up with a Standard Priority System for the allocation and 
regularising of ownership of houses developed by public funds and its Section 9.1 (a) 
stated that priority was to be given to the applicant who had lived and worked in that local 
authority longer than other applicants on the waiting list irrespective of when they had 
registered. Movement from one employer to another within the same local authority did 
not affect this criterion, but movement into a different area that lasted for more than twelve 
months meant a loss of privilege. This section of the policy alone was enough to throw the 
allocation process into turmoil since the council’s manual system did not provide a system 
for checks. Again, the immediate clause after this derailed the entire process and all the 
criteria that had been established was subverted. Section 9.1(b) stated that: 
The length of residence in the area does not apply to ex-combatants’ period of 
absence during the liberation struggle. If an ex-combatant decides to settle in any 
local authority area and decided to enlist with that particular local authority’s 
waiting list, then the number of years in the struggle as authenticated by the 
appropriate authorities should be counted as part of the ex-combatants’ length of 
stay in that particular local authority area. 
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Proving who was a genuine ex-combatant was difficult as many people who had been 
outside the country for different reasons claimed to have been in exile for political reasons 
and since they were working with ZANU-PF, they felt they also qualified to be categorised 
as ex-combatants. The young men and women (mujibhas and zvimbwidos) who had helped 
the ex-combatants with information and other logistical arrangements also demanded to be 
identified as ex-combatants and they therefore presented themselves as such. Local 
authority officials were uncertain about these various identities and because these groups 
could prove their participation in the struggle, they were given top priority in many 
allocative decisions. Well-known or connected party supporters were also lumped 
unofficially into this category and catered for under the provisions of the Standard Priority 
System. The “liberation culture”  was clearly in motion. By 1998, the government had 
made a special provision to have 20 percent of all land allocations set aside for war 
veterans after arm twisting and strong lobbying by the group. 
 
The aided self-help schemes and the building brigades were initially designed to work 
hand in hand. This facility provided space for the activist approach but unfortunately, it 
could not work in a heavily controlled policy environment with many curbs on 
associational activities. The schemes arose out of the reasoning that beneficiaries to the 
schemes would mobilise resources, such as labour, savings, building materials, transport 
and tools with minimum assistance from the local authority (Harare City Council 1983). 
The local authority provided tracks of land divided into plots that were supported with 
basic services like water, roads and sewerage. Individuals would apply for land and when it 
became available, the allocating authority would inform them. In 1983, the MCPH issued a 
circular (no.8) instructing all local authorities to stop using private contractors for all the 
housing schemes that were funded by the government. 
 
The local authorities were to employ persons with skills that met the requirements of the 
construction industry. By 1984, thirty-three local authorities had established their own 
building brigades but still the construction costs were not affordable for many house 
seekers, which left the cooperatives as the next best option. The building brigades 
approach was also aimed at alleviating unemployment that was high amongst ex-
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combatants and the urban youth. This implied the engagement of semi-skilled labour for 
the high-density areas where construction demand was highest. Most of the builders were 
recruited from the party ranks. The lack of skills resulted in sub-standard houses and the 
public was not impressed with the brigades. It quietly ignored them and resorted to the use 
of private contractors. Even the local authorities were unhappy with the standard of work 
and the council’s building inspectors disqualified a lot of their buildings (Harare City 
Council 1983). 
 
The policy of creating housing cooperatives was adopted with the aim of encouraging 
people to uphold the egalitarian and equity principles of the new government. Home 
seekers were expected to pool resources together to achieve affordability and were also 
expected to work collectively to construct each member’s house in the African communal 
tradition of nhimbe (Makwembere 1998).12 The only complication was that both labour 
and ability to afford financial contributions to the scheme determined membership. A more 
detailed discussion of this approach of housing delivery is presented in the next chapter. 
 
A Divided National Housing Policy? 
In the foreword to the National Housing Policy, the President admitted that since 1980, the 
government had been allocated huge amounts for the housing sector to no avail (National 
Task Force Housing: 2000): 
It has been proved beyond doubt that Zimbabwe has enough resources in terms of 
both financial and professional skills to meet its housing requirements. What is 
lacking is the mechanism to marshal these resources where they can be utilised for 
housing development. 
 
Again, twenty-two years later, both the central government and the local government levels 
continue to allocate land for housing under presumably the same policy. And yet from as 
early as 1985, the government acknowledged these problems, “Administrative and policy 
confusion between council and central government delayed planning for housing delivery 
immediately after independence” (Transitional National Development Plan  1983: 374). 
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In 1997, a National Housing Convention brought all actors involved in housing delivery 
(private, public and NGO’s) together to draft a n ational housing policy.13 A housing task 
force was immediately set up to work on this but somehow the momentum died down 
before anything was done. A National Housing Trust, composed of stakeholder technical 
teams responsible for coordinating housing delivery was also established as well as plans 
for a National Housing Bank to fund low-income housing. None of these noble plans 
managed to take off. The then Minister of Housing, Ignatious Chombo, was blamed for 
destroying three years of preliminary work by setting up parallel independent committees 
to duplicate the work agreed on at the convention. As a result, a coherent national housing 
policy never came to fruition and the policy remained fragmented until early 2000. The 
lack of political commitment was clear from the very beginning and whereas it may have 
looked like inefficiency then, it all began to make sense after the June 2000 parliamentary 
elections when war veterans seized and allocated urban land to themselves and to other 
loyal ZANU-PF members and supporters.14 
 
A national housing policy was finally produced late in 2000 and only became functional at 
the beginning of 2003. The policy came about as a result of the government’s commitment 
to the 1996 Habitat Agenda. The Agenda endorsed the universal goal of ensuring adequate 
shelter for all and making human settlements safer, healthier and more liveable, equitable, 
sustainable and productive. The Habitat Agenda was ratified by national governments 
during the United Nations’ Commission on the Human Rights Settlements Second 
Conference in Turkey. All governments reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the 
principles of the Agenda through national policies and legislation. 
 
The new housing policy was linked to economic development such that housing delivery 
would be recognised as contributing to the economic recovery of the country. Though the 
policy outlines strategies for addressing low income housing needs, it still fell short of 
allocating resources to the process (for example, through subsidies and credit facilities). 
This policy is thus likely to marginalize the poor even more! Also the major institutions, 
the National Housing Finance Bank and the National Housing Trust that are envisaged to 
deal with the housing process, were yet to be set up in 2002. As with many of Zimbabwe’s 
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policies,15 the national housing document dwells on the problems besetting the housing 
industry and goes into the history of housing delivery without spelling out distinct policies 
in what is going to be done, when and for whom. A welcome development was that the 
policy discarded the customary norm that women cannot own property in their own rights. 
However, the problem is that Section 23 (3) of the constitution still allows for 
discrimination against women in terms of customary law even though they can be granted 
security of tenure in the housing delivery system. 
 
The 2000 housing policy was formulated in the absence of comprehensive information on 
housing needs in the country. Some pre-independence sections were retained in toto such 
as the Building Act of 1979. This act established the Housing and Guarantee Fund that 
provided security to civil servants, government members, and non-civil servants to enable 
them to acquire loans from building societies to purchase homes. The minister was the sole 
manger of this fund as well as the National Housing Fund that was meant to advance funds 
for housing to local authorities, cooperatives, institutions and individuals (Munyuki and 
Jasi 2002). The absence of procedural guidelines in all these instances left the system open 
to abuse especially as section four of the act specified that “any person” qualified for 
consideration. There was no limit in the numbers of guarantees for loans which an 
individual could get and this absence of procedural fairness was used for self-enrichment 
by top office bearers who got multiple guarantees. Each applicant got different conditions 
depending on who they were. And the absence of special redistribution clauses meant the 
minister could go on pretending that the poor did not exist and yet many undeserving 
people benefited under the vague criteria. The state has no obligations to pursue certain 
economic goals that would benefit the under-privileged classes. There is no provision for 
the right to housing in the constitution and the constitution does not recognise any social 
redistribution rights (ibid). 
 
Since 1980, the fragmented post-independence housing policy had emphasized home 
ownership as the major form of tenure with a small percentage being developed for rental 
purposes. From 1982 to 2000, the United States International Aid Agency (USAID) and 
the World Bank facilitated housing programmes for the low-income category and their 
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approaches dominated housing delivery in Harare.16 There was no major housing policy 
until donor fatigue set in and the new 2000 policy coincided with the end of the two donor 
projects. Throughout this period, the lack of a clear legislative, institutional and 
administrative framework resulted in overlaps, duplication and confusion among the 
housing delivery institutions and this resulted in wastage. Actors in the relevant 
departments at the different levels have had to work in an environment of ambiguity as 
central government continues to exercise strong influence. 
 
The local authorities and public institutions inherited strong ideological commitments to 
the control of physical development and economic activity in urban areas from the settler 
regime. The government kept the residential areas segregated on the basis of building 
standards17 and income levels even though the government eliminated the parallel systems 
of representation. There was no commitment to reducing the differential standards between 
spatially segregated residential areas (Rakodi and Withers 1993). In 1980, the new 
government adopted the ‘One City’ concept as a restructuring approach that required 
departments to provide common services that were to be shared by all city residents 
irrespective of race or area (Musekiwa 1993). The concept emphasized the equal 
distribution of services and facilities to all sectors of the community and provided uniform 
tariffs and a common rating system. The permanent secretary of the ministry of housing 
stated in 1983, 
Ours being a people oriented government bent on achieving socialist goals, our 
housing policy is a redistributive mechanism for redressing colonial income and 
wealth inequalities. The geographic polarization of the nation reminiscent of the 
colonial days is being dismantled.18 
 
Noble as this idealism was, the political will was not readily forthcoming. 
 
The council deals with housing allocation to urban residents only and it uses its own 
procedures. It acquires land, services the areas by providing basic infrastructure and 
recreational facilities. It then allocates the land according to a waiting list that includes 
both low and high-income earners. The two groups are separated according to land 
availability and affordability. The low-income earners get land in former African 
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townships and the high-income earners in the new suburbs that are designed according to 
former colonial standards in former European areas that are now called the low-density 
areas. Local authorities have used their housing waiting list as the sole instrument for the 
allocation of serviced residential stands. In order to be registered, one has to fill in a form 
and pay an annual registration fee to the authority and service is on a first-come first-
served basis. Each year the register is updated manually when one pays the registration fee. 
The initial registration date remains a person’s priority date for allocation. Other criteria 
for allocation is: salary (a set amounts demarcates the boundary between the low and high 
incomes), formal employment status, proof that one is an urban dweller,19 proof of 
registration on the council’s waiting listing, and usually, it is better to be married since 
single people who attempt to get land are questioned thoroughly and are still asked to 
produce proof of marriage or of divorce.20 However, this only occurs when a single 
woman’s application manages to get considered. 
 
In Harare, many public actors in the municipalities are involved in providing a single 
house and the same procedures apply to big projects as well. Every single application goes 
through a maze of departments and the net effect is long delays in decision-making. The 
diagram below shows the departments that assess every application and they are not 
organized hierarchically. 
 
Figure 3 Processing an Application 
District Office                  land ownership & agreement of sale 
Head Office        verification of existence of land and dispensation of certificates 
Works 
Town Planning                   granting building permits & ensuring compliance with Town  
          Planning Surveys    
Land Survey                          survey of stands boundaries & checking building lines 
Water and 
Sewerage                  sewer connection to main lines, water provision & 
City architects           compliance with building by-laws, fee payments, supervision of 
          construction 
City treasurer (if process went to tender) 
Town Clerk 
Valuation and Estates 
Management       land costing 
Legal office assess implementation strategies/environmental impact assessment 
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On the other hand, the government uses other criteria to allocate land irrespective of 
whether one is an urban dweller or not. It has a lease arrangement where ‘the poor’ can 
also buy land. And it has its own low-income target group. The only critical requirement is 
proof of availability of funds for development. Whilst this also makes it possible to cater 
for the informally employed people, single women with money and those who choose not 
to register on the council waiting list, it is also open to abuse for patronage purposes. The 
government services its own land and allocates it in liaison with the city council to prevent 
the double allocation of land to the same person. Only the government checks on council 
allocation but the council does not check on or question government allocation. Hence, it is 
very possible for one to have both council and state land. 
 
Information on government land allocation is privy to only those who know about the 
scheme and it appears to target senior public servants and politicians. There is no waiting 
list and applicants are screened with each housing project. This leaves far too much room 
for interference in the decision making process. It also makes it possible to allocate land to 
specific individuals according to extra legal criteria. Though both the government and the 
council deal with the same urban dweller and the same Surveyor General’s office, land 
provision is duplicated and the government finds it desirable to keep a strong hand in the 
allocation process. For example, all new housing developments in Glen Lorne and 
Philadelphia were allocated to senior party and government officials and connected 
businessmen who are closely aligned to the party (Interview-Machipisa 2000). 
 
Rearranging the Same Old Institutions 
Immediately after independence, the government went about rearranging housing delivery 
institutions. Most of the changes were aimed at eradicating racial biases. This had been 
made clear during the struggle that this would be the final step in legitimising the new 
order and completing national liberation. Some housing functions were moved from the 
Department of Works that previously dealt with former white residential areas to the 
Department of Housing and Community Services (DHCS) that reported to the Health and 
Housing Committee. This new department had four divisions that supposedly had different 
functions but there were strong duplications. The DHCS division took over the overall 
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administration of housing allocations, handling agreements of sale and of loans between 
purchasers and building societies, transfers, cessations and cash builders. It also provides 
information and orientation to new and prospective purchasers on various housing 
schemes, monitors projects and ensures that beneficiaries make maximum use of the aided 
self-help schemes. 
 
The department also liases with donor agencies like the World Bank and USAID in the 
administration of housing projects in the city. Within this division, the most important 
office is that of the Senior Area Administrative Officer who is responsible for the 
administration of the housing waiting list and the selection of potential beneficiaries. The 
office is also responsible for the administration and management of new housing schemes; 
interviewing, screening and informing beneficiaries on aspects and benefits of the schemes 
to find out if registered persons wish to be considered for particular schemes. This is only 
done after an analysis of an applicant’s income and checking out if the applicant has no 
other registered property with the registrar of deeds. The same office also monitors illegal 
settlements in all residential areas in the city and either evicts or regularises their 
occupation by including them on the waiting list. 
 
The institutional rearrangement process allowed confusion in the operational procedures of 
many departments. Opportunists took advantage of this chaos and for instance, with regard 
to rented accommodation, councillors would constantly recommend to the District Officer 
to register some occupants irrespective of the home seekers’ priority dates (Chidyausiku 
undated:29). A tendency to give directives over the telephone also developed and this 
rendered the waiting list useless. Since its inception, the division was inundated by calls 
from “superior authorities” to provide housing services to some occupants who did not 
even appear on the waiting list. The appointments of senior personnel in the DHCS was 
done by the minister hence to maintain the good links, it became departmental policy not 
to disappoint the minister (ibid:30). Running an efficient and effective council was 
thwarted by councillors who refused to increase land prices as they argued that it would 
unnecessarily burden the low-income group with high mortgage costs. Political expediency 
logic dominated over cost effective logic because the interference deprived the local 
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authority with revenue that could have been used for further provision of housing 
(Musekiwa 1993). These problems, especially the interference, led to the establishment of 
an Allocations Committee in February 1990 to ensure just allocations. 
 
The Housing Management division dealt with the post allocation phase of housing 
provision and carried out the following task: drafting leases and purchase agreements; the 
administration of allocated stands, issuing and the certification of plans as well as effecting 
transfers from the council to purchasers; the repossession of stands due to default or non-
payment and non-development, the sale of rented houses; processing extensions to existing 
properties of adjacent or vacant stands; monitoring development and the building process 
in liaison with the District Officers and the Department of Works. In addition, it also 
carries out research on housing policies and procedures. 
 
On the other hand, the District Administrator manages more or less similar areas. The 
office is responsible for all the residential properties and related aspects such as housing 
allocation, development, electricity, water, road works, and storm water drainage. It also 
collects revenue on rentals and other charges in respect of housing and trading premises. 
The overall aim is to improve standards of living and expand the revenue base but the 
fragmentation delays decision-making and opened up opportunities for interference in the 
system. Compartmentalisation thus eroded the authority of the bureaucrats and the 
duplication of functions caused bureaucratic inertia.  
 
Civic Organisation 
Trade unions, the backbone of most of civil society organisation were never part of the 
liberation struggles and strategies partly due to the exile nature of the operations of ZANU-
PF. The four black umbrella trade unions in the country were all affiliated to four different 
political parties by the end of the seventies. These weak ties meant that the unions, students 
and church associations had limited track records of active resistance against colonial and 
settler rule in the country (Nordlund 1996:193). It was thus not a surprise that there was no 
force to challenge and keep the new government on its toes after 1980. The first five years 
of independence were characterised by limited civil society activities mimicking the 
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pattern all over Africa where there was an uneasy relationship between the state and the 
civil society (Chazan 1988). Most of the activism was by the Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace that was tracking the dissident war in Matabeleland through its vast 
parishes and engaging the government by reporting the army’s excesses to the police. 
From 1980, the government set out to control the trade union by organising it closely under 
its ever-watchful and paranoid eye. The first umbrella union organization, the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was located in the same physical space as the party 
headquarters and the first secretary general was a political appointee and also the step-
brother of the president. Unprecedented strikes in the early years of independence had 
resulted in the banning of strike action and this weakened the union’s bargaining position 
(Nordlund 1996). This paternalistic relationship and mobilisation ensured that workers 
would submit to the authority of ZCTU as they would to the party. 
 
It was therefore not a surprise that the first groups to organise for housing evolved out of 
trade unions rather than from the residential communities of aspiring home owners. This 
was because housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe were and have remained largely organised 
around securing a house only. And by the late eighties, it was apparent that the 
government’s efforts in housing delivery were unsuccessful. Even though cooperatives 
predated the independence era, there was an upsurge in their growth in the first years of 
independence in all areas of development. Encouraged by the government’s socialist 
orientations, many were organised around income generation projects. The housing 
cooperatives were therefore a response to the failures of the urban councils to provide 
housing. Unfortunately for them, as with other civic groups in the country, the ruling party 
pervades their entire fabric from conception to registration. In turn, the cooperatives in 
particular have become schooled in attracting political attention that is beneficial to them. 
The important outcome is that the party gets the recognition for any initiatives embarked 
on by the public. 
 
The government systematically restricted the autonomy of trade unions through the Labour 
Relations Act and by 1995, this had spread to the voluntary organisations through the 
Private Voluntary Organisations Act of 1995. The fear of being deregistered and 
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marginalised curbed their autonomy (Nordlund 1996). The government persistently 
pursued a strategy of cooperation and in the process violated civic and political freedoms. 
 
The absence of a clear ideological path was quite evident in the civic groups that later 
organised in the late eighties to deal with resistance to neo-liberalism’s  demands for good 
governance. These ranged from the traditional students and trade unions as well as new 
and broader coalitions such as the National Constitutional Assembly and the Organisation 
of Rural Associations for Progress. All demands were connected in one long chain from 
those for a wage increment, higher education grants to a new constitution as well as a new 
government. The government structures that later appeared under the administrative 
reforms in rural areas area also served to fill the void created by the lack of civic groups 
and these all put pressure on the public to conform to the government’s one party logic. 
These were the Ward and Village development committees that were part of the broader 
rural administrative structures. Manned by political party loyalists, they were to act as state 
agents in sanctioning development projects in their areas. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the housing delivery framework in a country where the 
leadership realised its capacity problems but did not act to remedy the situation. 
Maintaining a state of chaos was an obvious strategy that would work to the ruling party’s 
advantage. The dominance of the party dictated that disorder was beneficial for its 
mobilisation strategies and allowing it to hold onto power.21 The absence of strong 
mediating factors such as civic organisations and a strong opposition exerting a permanent 
watch that would scrutinise and act against the state’s capacity in delivery, left room for 
the government to pass regulations that allowed for particularistic criteria to determine the 
allocation of housing resources. As Blomkvist (1995) pointed out, particularism does not 
imply the absence of rules, and for Harare the problem was that of too many rules that 
created some form of anarchy. 
 
The almost overnight transformation of the bureaucracy opened up room for the 
manifestation and entrenchment of the “liberation culture” . Confusion caused by the fear 
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of the ‘comrades in charge’ who were changing the rules faster than they could be 
implemented, opened up for the use of particularistic criteria in housing allocation. In any 
case, some laws were formulated to cater for specific interests signalling the importance of 
attending to enclaves the ruling party considered to be important. The separate housing 
land allocations handled by both the council and the central government allowed for the 
“liberation culture”  to work even with individuals even though this moves closer to 
cronyism and corruption. Here the council clearly is responsible for mass housing 
provision for the poor whereas the central government widens the inequality gap by 
concentrating on the ‘haves’. Politically connected groups and individuals therefore 
became better positioned to access housing land. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated how the value carriers of the “liberation culture” , the 
political leadership’ s attempts to legally validate the rights of certain groups, such as war 
veterans and party youth brigades, to be prioritised in benefiting from state resources. 
More importantly, it showed the pockets of resistance created by professional bureaucrats 
from the previous system who insisted on doing things by the book such as insisting on 
working according to waiting lists and eventually ignoring the youth building brigades into 
extinction. Again political maturity with regard to strategizing for state resources was 
demonstrated by the trade union, showing that it is a force that holds a key to the levelling 
of the playing field with regard to resource allocation as well as democratisation. 
 
The milieu surrounding housing land allocation in Harare raises questions on the successes 
that can be scored from the transformation of the bureaucracy in the face of weak 
institutional capacity. In fact, it demonstrates that justice becomes more elusive for the 
groups that live on the margins implying that perhaps there is a need to come up with 
various models of transformation that do not lead to manipulation and impoverishment in 
the values of the bureaucracy. The next chapter explores the dynamics in self-housing 
provision by the poor in Harare. 
 
Endnotes 
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of Cardiff, p18.  
3 Also see Young Crawford (1986) Africa’s Colonial Legacy in Seymour , R.J. & Whitaker, J. (eds.) 
Strategies for Africa’s Development , University of California, Berkeley. 
4 Colonial dispossession had resulted in a complex pattern of exclusion, institutionalised fear and the 
promotion of a negative stereotype of colonised people as inferior. See Taylor, V. (1997) Social Mobilisation 
Lessons from the Mass Democratic Movement, South African Development Education and Policy Research 
Unit, School of Government, University of the Western Cape. 
5 In Zimbabwe, black refers to Africans only. 
6 In the council, all the experienced whites left because all the 38 wards had elected black councillors in 
1981. Overnight, the new managers were faced with the management of a massive capital and revenue 
budget of over 160 million dollars and a large labour force. See Chidyausiku, M. (undated) Political 
Involvement in the Operations of Public Sector Organisations: A Case of Harare’s Department of Housing 
and Community Services, unpublished Thesis for the Diploma in Public Administration, Department of 
Political and Administrative Studies Department, University of Zimbabwe. 
7 The number of Blacks in unestablished posts increased form 43 percent to 74 percent in the year following 
the directive and in the top positions, there were 134 officers compared to 142 whites. See Masunungure, E. 
(1998a) Africanisation of the Public Service in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, State Power Consolidation and 
Patron Clientelism, Unpublished Paper, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of 
Zimbabwe. 
8 Sugarman, B. (1968) uses the concepts locals and cosmopolitans to explain the administrative backgrounds 
of public officials. See his article “ Tension Management, Deviance and Social Change”, Social Quarterly, 10 
Fall, pp62-71. 
9 Interview with the Permanent Secretary for Local Government and National Housing, cited in Hammar A., 
Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S., (2003), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business , Weaver Press, p 140. Refer to this 
for a critical historical analysis of the administrative backgrounds of public officials. 
10 See Ruth Weiss, (1994) Zimbabwe and the New Elite, British Academic Press, London, p133, in which she 
explains the stratification of black society through Africanisation. Top black civil servants joined the political 
and educated elite, while lower scale civil servants became part of the black petit bourgeoisie. 
11 It is important to note that there will always be a thin line between Zimbabwe’s war veterans and refugees 
since guerrillas who proceeded for training were kept in ‘refugee camps’ for logistical reasons.  
12 This is similar to the Tanzanian concept of Ujamaa where the public voluntarily pools their labour and 
rotate tasks for the different members in times of planting and harvesting. 
13 The ministry invited all interested parties from government departments, local authorities, building 
societies, pension funds estate agents, land developers, manufacturers, contractors, suppliers of building 
materials and professional institutions to a housing convention in 1996. 
14 After the public rejected the government’s  draft constitution in February 2000, war veterans led violent 
nationwide land invasions to force the redistribution of land. The argument was that the government’s 
proposed new constitution would have addressed the long standing inequitable land ownership pattern in the 
country.  Most of the arable land (about 85 percent) was still in the hands of a few white commercial farmers 
who made up 0.05 percent of the population. 
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15 Most of Zimbabwe’s five -year plans suffered from the lack of operational detail. Targets were not set and 
resources were not identified and tied to the plans. See Zimbabwe’s First 5 Year National Development Plan 
1980-1985. 
16 Half of the plots in the World Bank’s funded  project (1200 of 2550 plots) were allocated to employers so 
that their employees would pay back directly to the company (tied employment). Government was relying on 
short term loans hence it had to adhere to a set income level. Plots were very often too expensive for those at 
the top of the waiting list leaving room for malpractice. The successful replication of the World Bank’s  
projects was impossible due to government allocations of capital funds and bureaucratic procedures. See 
Rakodi, C. and Withers, P. (1995) “Sites and Services: Home Ownership  for the Poor?”  Habitat 
International, vol.19 no.3, (pp371-389) p371. 
17 To aid cooperative’s housing efforts, the council relaxed building standards for them. They were allowed 
to use cement blocks, farm burnt bricks and informal sector manufactured windows and door-frames. Still, a 
lot of their resources got consumed by basic infrastructural servicing for water and sewerage and the minimal 
housing structure of a four roomed wet core house for each member. 
18 Interview with the Permanent Secretary for Local Government and National Housing, cited in Hammar, 
A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (eds.) (2003) Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business , Weaver Press, p140.  
19 The local authority waiting lists was only revised in 1984. Criteria up to then had remained that of male 
heads of households in formal or licensed private employment, who were legally married with  a certain 
income level and with dependants. Since then the employment criterion has remained, and single, divorced, 
widowed men and women with dependants now qualify if they meet the prescribed income ceiling level. 
20 The Ministry of Housing states that between 1995 and 1999, 21percent of serviced stands were allocated to 
female households. 
21 Chaloz and Duloz account for this abuse of power as the ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ which treats that 
which is abnormal as normal. Rule bound political and economic behavior is abandoned in favour of a 
system where all transactions are negotiable and this is the case in Africa where politics is all about resource 
exchange to buy loyalty. See Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P. (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrumentalisation of Power, Oxford, Currey. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Evolution of Housing Cooperatives 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the dynamics in housing delivery through cooperatives in 
Zimbabwe. African countries that encouraged the setting up of socialist orientated 
cooperatives perceived the cooperative nature of rural African communities as being a 
major feature of the African people that could be easily adapted to by the urban based 
people. This view proved to be the nemesis of the cooperative movement in Africa. In 
Zimbabwe, the government saw this as an instrument to distribute resources and to 
reorganise society after independence. By 2000, fifty percent of the housing cooperatives 
in the country had mushroomed due to the belief that joining a cooperative would enable 
them to jump the housing waiting list queue. However, differences in status, power, 
authority and economic resources reduced the number of people who could participate in 
the cooperative ventures. 
 
During colonial governance, cooperatives were strictly controlled and were largely 
confined to credit associations or to serving traditional family requirements (e.g. burial 
societies). With independence, they assumed a strong position that was used to facilitate 
the mobility of the poor to a higher level economically and socially and housing 
cooperatives were no exception. Much of this has to do with perceptions of cooperatives 
that governments have. Unfortunately, modern cooperatives are largely a creation of the 
state unlike traditional cooperation that was confined to a village or a community’s needs 
in which there was no emphasis by members on carving out exclusionary and inclusionary 
boundaries. Marxist-Leninist theories influenced most of the cooperative regulations and 
the by-laws that were adopted by African countries (Chingosho 1996:12). State influence 
and direction steers the development of the cooperative as Worsely (cited in Makwembere 
1998:15) noted: 
…. “cooperativism”  today is not simply the coming together of autonomous 
producers or consumers on the market to pool their resources against common 
enemies as in the 19th century but the typical development increasingly is the 
utilisation, sponsorship or incorporation of cooperatives within policy frameworks 
that are set by those who control government. 
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An ideal type definition is also offered by Munker (cited in Chingosho 1996:14) who 
views cooperatives as: 
Organised group action to improve the economic and social situation of persons of 
limited means by way of mutual assistance and by means of establishing a joint 
enterprise which is financed, controlled and used mainly by the same group of 
persons. 
 
Munker’s definition implies social equity, democratic control, self -reliance and 
independent leadership. However, the term independent leadership requires further 
analysis as it determines the success or failure of the housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe. 
The term implies that the cooperative leadership should be free to run the affairs of the 
organisation without the interference of outside agencies of which they may be a part of, as 
well as from government officials and politicians. This interference is illustrated in the case 
of Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative (KKHC) in Mabvuku and Mavambo Housing 
Scheme in Hatcliffe. The difference in the two perspectives can be attributed to 
experiences from former communist states that controlled the virtual space in peoples’ 
lives. Worsley’s definition offers more for many African count ries as a group’ s 
relationship with the state determines the success and the extent of manoeuvring capacity 
the cooperative can have. 
 
Cooperatives for Housing Delivery 
Government acceptance of housing cooperatives in Zimbabwe was a response to an 
initiative by external agents, the Canadian Coseil de Dulogement Communitare that carried 
out a study on the feasibility of housing delivery through housing cooperatives in the 
country in 1983. A new NGO, the Housing People of Zimbabwe (HPZ),1 emerged out of 
these efforts in the same year and it was tasked with giving technical and managerial 
support to housing cooperatives. By 1995, there were more than five hundred and sixty 
five housing cooperatives in the country. These cooperatives were registered under the 
Cooperative Act of 1990 and their aims were distinctly to finance, manage and administer 
the construction of housing for their members (Vakil 1994). Under the HPZ’s tutelage, the 
cooperatives were expected to find their own land, service the land, arrange their own legal 
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registration and seek their own finances for building (Housing Cooperative Development 
Manual, 1990). 
 
Generally, the success of housing cooperatives in developing countries was aided by large 
tax exemptions and large subsidies in the form of cheap loans granted by government. 
However, in Zimbabwe, housing cooperatives pay tax on interest accrued from all their 
savings and they pay another five percent of the property’s value in stamp duty that is 
collected by the deeds office. They also have to produce twenty five percent of the total 
loan cost or collateral when they borrow money from the banks. It is surprising then that 
many cooperatives sprung up in such a rather unfavourable economic climate. Many 
problems continue to surround the operations of housing provision through cooperatives in 
the country. To begin with, the government has always expressed scepticism or doubt 
about cooperative housing. They were accused of posing a big headache as they 
disadvantaged individuals on the waiting list but the municipal housing department 
decided to give them priority dates too on a separate cooperatives waiting list. 
 
This has resulted in the cooperatives remaining marginalised as it takes them a very long 
time to get registered and even then, they still lack recognition and acceptance as a major 
player in housing provision. For instance, only Harare municipality in the country has set 
up a Cooperatives’  desk that does not make allocative decisions except for assisting 
cooperatives with information on how to proceed with self housing provision. On their 
part, the cooperatives had high expectations of accessing land immediately once they were 
organised collectively. On one occasion, federation members who had turned up to register 
on the council waiting list were turned away by officials because “the members that had 
come to register at that time were too many” (ZHPF 2001). Also both government and 
donor assistance has not be forthcoming. Worst of all, possible financiers, the building 
societies, dismissed them completely as potential clients and have continued to ignore their 
existence. Another source of scepticism is caused by the fact that some cooperatives 
disbanded immediately after they had acquired the land and the former members then 
pursued building as individuals. The democratic processes in the cooperatives also work to 
 108 
their disadvantage as elections often remove the entire board such that that there is no 
continuity when a new board steps in (Interview 2000). 
 
Generally, relations between housing cooperatives and government are embroiled in 
mistrust. They are characterised by rumours and lack of knowledge of each other’s 
requirements and practices. This is worsened by the fragmentation amongst the different 
stakeholders which has been blamed for the mistrust and lack of cooperation. Due to the 
lack of a common vision, local authorities view housing cooperatives as aiming to disturb 
order and procedures and housing cooperatives equally view them as arrogant and 
disrupting their objectives and plans. One member lamented during a workshop,2 
They do not believe in us as cooperatives. They see us as a nuisance and make us 
beg for their charity. They treat us as individuals and not as cooperatives. To get rid 
of us they give us virgin land, usually rocky or poor soils and they do not tell us 
what is involved in housing development. 
 
Even though the new national housing policy recognised the role of housing cooperatives 
and communities in housing provision, housing cooperatives still lack recognition as 
entities. The failure to design a policy framework that would guide operations between 
cooperatives and authorities has left the playing field uneven with regard to the practices 
and attitudes toward cooperatives. All local authorities in the country deal with them 
differently. This lack of consistency has led to discontent amongst the cooperatives. For 
instance, the allocation of stands can be determined by the savings accumulated by the 
group in one local authority area and in another, by the needs and the potential of the 
group. Again, conditions for the purchase of land vary across the local authorities. The 
authorities insist on treating them as a collection of individuals by interviewing each 
member when they want to allocate them land whereas the ideal situation would be to 
allocate stands to the cooperative and not to individuals. This is because it would be more 
desirable to leave the vetting of members to the cooperatives as they have mechanisms for 
holding each other accountable. For instance, their constitutions spell out how to deal with 
a deceased member’s interests and also how to buy out those who want to leave the 
cooperative. 
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The HPZ has been making efforts to lobby government to review these policies amongst 
many others (HPZ 2002). It succeeded partially in pushing for joint ownership of property 
for married home seekers and managed to get local authorities to encourage joint 
ownership amongst home seekers, but still the legal requirements fell short of 
complementing these efforts. The relevant housing act recognises a ‘natural person’ who is 
clearly defined as male. This has contributed to overwhelming numbers of male members 
in housing cooperatives. In the HPZ’s cooperatives all over the country, at least seventy 
percent of the members are all male even though it is the women who participate and 
attend meetings. Patriarchal attitudes towards property ownership dominate as evidenced 
in a cooperative started by soldiers’ wives in a Harare township, Glen View. Though this 
was the women’s initiati ve and their organisational skills that set up the cooperative, the 
husbands simply marched in and took over the membership claiming that they were the 
ones whose salaries were paying for the cooperatives’ contributions. This effectively 
disempowered the women and within a few months, the cooperative had atrophied because 
the women simply stopped organising to get housing resources (Interview-Barbara Kohlo). 
 
Such problems contributed to the mushrooming of different categories of cooperatives. 
These were mostly work-based, community based, professional based and those formed by 
the least paid workers in urban areas, the domestic workers. Members naturally tended to 
form the groups according to classes but in many cases variations began to emerge after 
the construction of the basic units. In some cases, bigger extensions or ‘mansions’ began to 
go up signalling the members’ access to building resources. The middle class cooperatives 
encountered more difficulties and did not welcome technical assistance. The low-income 
cooperatives showed more of a communal spirit and have generally had a higher success 
rate even though it takes long for them to have the houses. Other reasons for the poor’s 
success are the high social capital they have to rely on. Many of them belong to burial 
societies and other informal support networks for credit and other activities. These small 
issues tie them closer to each other and strengthen their trust. They are more willing to 
learn and show an eagerness to develop community facilities as they cannot easily afford 
market options. 
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It is also logical for expectations to differ when you have the poor and the ‘haves’ 
contributing to a common fund. An experience in Mufakose turned sour for some poor 
women fruit and vegetable vendors and lodgers who had mobilised other women from 
different socio-economic backgrounds to join their cooperative. When the building 
exercise was under way, allegations were levelled against the women managing the 
cooperative. The ‘upper class’ women ( salaried and self-employed) took over the 
management of the cooperative and a complicated battle ensued. The women went to the 
ruling party, ZANU-PF, for arbitration and invited political steering and organisation for 
themselves as the party seized control of the cooperative (ibid). Another problem was that 
politically organised cooperatives tended to have complicated technical processes. This is 
because the politicians/patrons influenced members to disassociate themselves from their 
technical NGOs. Where this happened, the members often lost money they paid willingly 
because of their trust in the politicians. Local authorities too have been known to give 
negative advice to cooperatives about the technical NGOs and this encouraged them to 
withdraw and refuse the technical advice (Interview). 
 
Barbara Kohlo, the managing director of HPZ, testified to the amazing transformation that 
takes place when poor people who never dreamt of owning a house finally get one. She 
describes it as very empowering, as denoting a new status for one within a community. She 
gave an example of a now proud cooperative in Hatcliffe where domestic workers speak of 
themselves with pride and look out for each other. In the event of a death in the 
community, they can be heard asking, “Who died? Is it a l odger or is it one of us?” Thus 
owning a house makes them think differently of themselves and of others and they also 
behave differently toward those of the same status as them. Boundaries emerge where 
associational activities of house owners become oriented at supporting each other in the 
event of a crisis in the family. On the other hand, lodgers also look out for each other. 
Many of the new owners use their houses to generate income. Barbara emphasized that the 
desire to own a house is very strong in both sexes. For men, it is for security and economic 
reasons and for women, it is for their welfare and economic gains as well. 
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The HPZ describes itself as being able to ‘win the hearts of the government/ruling party’. 
As one officer put it, “ If we do something, we know we will get land.”  Since 2000 when 
the controversial land reforms started in the country, the trust now boasts of good relations 
with the Minister of Lands, Dr. Made and the former chairman of Harare Municipality, Dr. 
E. Chanakira. The relations are attributed to their ‘successful lobbying’. This is important 
to them considering that some cooperatives have been waiting for land for at least four 
years and some for as long as seven years. The NGO is thus perceived by other players on 
the housing market as belonging to the ruling party camp. The advocacy officer in 
particular is accused of associating with ruling party heavy weights. The results of this 
relationship are the frequent donations of land by the government and the municipality to 
the HPZ itself and not directly to the cooperatives. In this way, the NGO can service land, 
build low-income structures and then sell to lower income brackets. The trust also assists 
the beneficiaries to access housing loans. The problem is that the trust does not actually 
reach the poor who have erratic incomes but those with low-incomes only. Kugarika 
Kushinga was one such cooperative the HPZ tried to assist. 
 
Kugarika Kushinga Housing Cooperative 
Kugarika Kushinga cooperative was initiated by eleven men who were tired of life as 
lodgers and dancing to the whims of the landlords. They felt very insecure as they could be 
kicked out at any time by their landlords as there were no legal leases to protect them. The 
eleven used to rotate meetings at each of the member’s lodgings to discuss problems 
lodgers faced and it was out of this agonising that the idea to start a cooperative was born 
in 1986. Three officials were appointed by the eleven, these were a chairman, a secretary 
and an organising secretary. The organisation followed the same organisational structure as 
that of political parties in the country. Two of these officials also held influential positions 
in the ruling party. The chairman was the secretary for a cell3 in Mabvuku and the 
cooperative secretary was a branch leader. These political positions had significance in that 
they gave the leaders a platform from which they could spread their ideas to a wide 
audience. It also provided a vantage point from which they could recruit members. Their 
positions earned them trust from aspiring members and membership in the cooperative 
increased rapidly. 
 112 
The massive mobilisation of home seekers by the cooperative attracted the attention of the 
party and the police. The police, believing that they were acting to safeguard the interests 
of the party, arrested the cooperative’s leadership. The real reason was that more people 
were attending the cooperatives’ meetings than the party’s meetings hence the cooperative 
was competing with the party for supporters so charges that the cooperative was holding 
illegal meetings and plotting to overthrow the government were drummed up. The message 
to the public was that any organisation to access national recourses had to take place within 
the confines of the party. Organising outside the party realm was not to be tolerated. After 
the leadership was released, they were informed by the police to seek the government’s 
approval if they were still determined to form a housing cooperative. 
 
The arrests disrupted the membership of the cooperative and a significant number, 
including some founder members, became disillusioned with the process and consequently 
withdrew from the cooperative. Only the chairman and the secretary pursued their dream 
and began to undertake research into housing cooperatives. A lot of their time was spent 
shuffling between the Ministry of Cooperatives and the city council which were both 
grappling with this new concept in housing delivery. The public itself was unsure of who 
should provide housing between the council and the government. Political problems also 
threw spanners into their efforts. The Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation 
and Cooperatives (MNAECC) advised the cooperative to put its proposal through the party 
political hierarchy, meaning that they had to go through the branch, the district, and then 
the provincial level after which it would get to the ministry. Party permission was given in 
1988 after which the two members began to recruit again. But still, registration was 
impossible since there were no by-laws for housing cooperatives. The ministry only began 
then to formulate by-laws for housing cooperatives. 
 
Capacity problems that existed in the cooperative were also evident in the ministry. For 
example, inconsistencies in the records kept by the cooperative showed the lack of 
planning capacity within the cooperative’s leadership (Mudonhi 199 8; Kamete 2001). 
Even years later 1996, the MNAECC’s register showed the KKHC as having a 
membership of one thousand and six hundred. All the members were also registered on the 
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council’s housing waiting list. In that same year, the cooperative’s chairmen gave a figure 
of two thousand but admitted that the records needed updating. In 1998, the chairman gave 
a figure of one thousand and eight hundred members but still there were gaps in his 
register reflecting that the actual number of members could be less than this. Most of the 
one thousand and six hundred founding members were in the low-income category 
comprising of domestic workers and vegetable vendors. The popularity of the cooperative 
grew and more members joined in. At the same time, many founding members were forced 
to resign due to financial hardships or to the death of a breadwinner. These sold their 
shares to the public who immediately occupied the same status and priority ranking as their 
predecessor had prior to their departure. This later caused an up-roar during the allocation 
process when new members got houses before the founding members. This, the chairman 
accepted as operational inefficiency due to poor record keeping (Interview Matienga). 
 
Seeking for suitable land became the next problem and the Town Clerk was uncooperative 
as the idea still puzzled him. He finally gave in and gave the cooperative some land in 
Kuwadzana, some twenty-six kilometres from where the members lived and the 
cooperative resisted, arguing that they would prefer land in their current residential area. 
They later got land in their preferred location in 1992 for twenty houses only. The 
Cooperative was also finally registered in that same year and construction started. 
Realising the need for political recognition and acceptance from their previous experience, 
the cooperative organised for the president to officially open the first twenty houses that 
were ready for occupation. It was then that they got a chance to tell the president in person 
their frustrations in getting land for the now 2000 members. They emphasized their wish to 
be allocated land in their area in Mabvuku and the president praised them for organising 
within party structures and emphasized that this should set the example for all other efforts 
to access public resources.4 The president asked the members if they knew of any ideal 
land in their area that could be used for cooperative housing development and the members 
quickly pointed out to land that was adjacent to their first twenty houses (Interview-
Matienga 2000). 
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The president then openly and publicly asked the Minister of Public Construction and 
National Housing and the Town Clerk whether there was any reason why the cooperative 
could not have the land it wanted for housing development. On viewing the intended land, 
the president walked for about eight kilometres and stopped because he was tired. He then 
told the audience that the cooperative could have all the land stretching from where he 
started walking up to where he stopped (35 hectares). This virgin land had been reserved 
as a buffer zone between the railway line, Circle Cement (a cement producing factory) and 
Mabvuku Township. In addition to the cement dust factor, part of the land is swampy and 
required special reinforced foundations (Mudonhi 1998). Healthwise, it was an unsafe area 
for residential purposes. More importantly, council procedures for land allocation and 
plans for the land were silently shelved. But for the cooperative, open identification with 
the ruling party opened access for them to get land. A precedent was thus set for other 
cooperatives to organise around the system by incorporating political heavy weights. 
 
KKHC developed six roomed houses on this land at an average cost of fifty thousand 
Zimbabwean dollars each. Using the cooperative’s monthly contribution, a private 
contractor was hired to construct the first twenty houses. Although building large houses 
was everyone’s dream , the idea was to cater for those who would not be able to afford to 
extend the houses later on. However, this plan was dropped during the construction of the 
next two hundred and eighty houses when four roomed core houses only were built at a 
cost of forty thousand Zimbabwean dollars each (Kamete 2001). After this, the site and 
services strategy began to dominate. This allowed for parallel construction in the sense that 
infrastructural services were provided simultaneously with the actual construction of the 
house. 
 
In the allocation of the first twenty houses, two families shared a house on a rental basis 
from the cooperative. These families were chosen from the register according to their 
register number and the level of monthly subscriptions. In the second phase, the first 
priority was given to those families who were sharing the first six-roomed houses. Each 
family now had its own unit and more members from the register also got some of the two 
hundred and eighty one houses. Accusations of favouritism surfaced in the cooperative 
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with the leadership being accused of allocating completed houses to relatives and friends 
and not following the cooperatives registration list which showed membership dates. 
Though this illustrates that tension will always be present between collective interests and 
individual interests, it also demonstrates the opportunities for corruption that emerge when 
clientelism generally orders and structures the distribution of collective goods. Criticisms 
for personalizing the cooperative by the secretary also arose and members resented being 
treated as objects. Unspecified bureaucratic procedures and requirements threw spanners 
into the operations and behaviour of cooperative officials who naturally sought to develop 
the empires they had initiated. 
 
The housing cooperatives are generally affected by low levels of literacy and the lack of 
technical expertise and management skills. In 1998, members of KKHC were contributing 
one hundred and sixty five dollars a month and the present value of the units then was one 
hundred thousand dollars. The one thousand and eight hundred members at the time would 
therefore have had to raise two hundred and ninety seven thousand dollars every month 
(Mudonhi 1998). At this pace it would have taken around fifty years for all members to 
complete these houses. The HPZ offered them an alternative cost effective strategy that 
would house all the people in a reasonable time period. The strategy outlined how to settle 
all members on three hectares of land in five hundred cluster houses with rentals set at 
eighty dollars per month. The members of the cooperatives rejected this alternative as they 
did not comprehend the benefits of such a strategy (Interview 2000). They felt that the 
houses were substandard and resented the advice as undue political interference and 
steering in their decision-making. 
 
The desire to control the fate of cooperatives by the ruling party influenced the course of 
events in the cooperative. One official in the housing hierarchy remarked that, 
“Cooperatives are infiltrated by politicians after being initiated by poor people. Patrons 
interfere on allocation and if you are on your own, you get nothing”. This hampers the 
cooperative’s efforts to get land. Cooperative members openly acknowledge that  on their 
own, they have no capacity, and no influence, hence they readily accept to be used for 
political gain by the patrons as long as they gained too. The subtleness of the party 
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interference is noted from a comment by one interviewee, “In many instanc es the party 
does not directly interfere but individuals do so in the name of the party”. The HPZ noted 
that; 
Cooperatives co-opt politicians if they think they can influence or facilitate access 
to land. The politician then goes to threaten the local authority and accuses them of 
sabotaging the party’s intentions. Depending on the calibre of the politician, this 
works sometimes so it is important to go through the right politician, it works to get 
land. 
 
These practices have compelled many cooperatives to strategically position themselves to 
access land.5 Some cooperatives were mobilised from the onset by politicians with the goal 
of seeking political mileage and also using their funds as collateral for their own personal 
business. For instance, a ruling party member of parliament, Nyasha Chikwinya, used the 
group’s funds to finance her personal business ventures.  
 
To begin with, KKHC could only take off the ground with the party’s blessing. The 
relevant government ministry felt it did not have the authority to register the cooperative 
outside the party’s preferences and organisation. Both the ministry and the city council 
struggled to accept the cooperative and the saviour, ZANU-PF, intervened on behalf of the 
cooperative to hasten the process. The cooperative’s ability to get registered and to secure 
land was facilitated by the cooperative’s relationship with the party. It can safely be 
concluded from this case and some others referred to in this study, that the cooperative 
movement in Zimbabwe was forced to seek support for housing initiatives through the 
assumption of new politically correct identities as party loyalists and adherents. They had 
begun a self-identification process with the victors of the liberation struggle. 
 
The Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation 
 
By the time the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF) came into being, the 
cooperatives formed earlier had set the tempo with regard to political manipulation in order 
to access housing land. Just like the SAHPF in South Africa,6 the ZHPF is also a network 
of community based savings schemes of the homeless urban poor. Members are from 
squatter settlements, holding camps,7 backyard shacks and lodgers who largely constitute 
the urban poor. This group has erratic incomes well below four thousand dollars per 
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month, a figure less than half the eight thousands dollars8 cut-off amount that was set by 
USAID housing programmes for the poor in the early nineties. Together with Dialogue on 
Shelter, the technical wing of the ZHPF, the two organisations work to tackle the issue of 
homelessness amongst the poor. In addition to lobbying the government on behalf of the 
poor, the two organisations also try to incorporate house-seeking communities in 
negotiations with local authorities. This has resulted in the reduction of red tape that very 
often prevents the poor from approaching bureaucrats. An unfortunate reality is that the 
government in Zimbabwe continues to treat the federation’s efforts as a once off project 
and not as an ongoing empowerment process. 
 
The ZHPF kicked off in the tourist town of Victoria Fall. The town has experienced rapid 
urban population growth rates since 1990 but the municipality never kept official records 
on the people in informal settlements. In less than ten years, the federation groups in that 
area had grown to fifteen with a total of fifteen thousand members. The first saving scheme 
started there and with the aid of the SAHPF, an enumeration exercise was undertaken 
which revealed that for the fifteen thousand people living in the shacks, there was one 
toilet for every five hundred and seven shack dwellers and just one water source for every 
one thousand three hundred and fifty people (Dialogue on Shelter and ZHPF 2001). This 
analysis by a community perceived as illiterate showed the local authority the poor’s 
resolve to address their housing needs. As with their South African counterparts, the ZHPF 
also ritualised community shack counting and enumeration as evidentiary support for their 
land seeking strategies. The reliable statistical data they provide shows the bureaucrats 
their hidden capacity to ‘self-organise’ to address their community’s needs. The group was 
then eventually allocated free land on which they could build their houses. The only 
problem was that the land was not serviced and the group was to provide the essential 
services themselves. The five hundred and sixty five plots assigned to them cost around 
forty million dollars to service and the group needed to borrow money for this preliminary 
exercise. 
 
The federation then established community banks all over the country in the form of 
housing savings schemes. A loan fund called the Gungano (gathering) Urban Poor fund 
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was established to manage the housing and income generation loans. The savings groups 
used their savings as collateral. These community financial institutions were designed to 
act as social safety valves and members rely on them in times of crisis. Each federation 
member contributes five dollars a month and each can access a loan of up to thirty 
thousand dollars repayable over fifteen years at a very low interest rate of 1.25 percent per 
month. Crisis loans do not attract interest and small business loans attract a nominal cost of 
four percent and borrowers do not have to provide collateral security (ibid). The fund does 
not give loans to individual members but to the saving scheme. A major setback was that 
though the fund got some seed money from the donor community, it has been unable to 
secure additional funding from the government. 
 
Highlights of the federation’s work include the December 1998 five -day meeting to launch 
its chapter on housing for the poor in the country. Delegates came from all countries where 
the federation operates, India, Cambodia, South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Senegal. 
Before that, the federation only had five groups, but following that widely publicised 
launch, the groups grew to over fifty that were scattered all around the country. At the 
occasion, the then Minister of Local Government and National Housing, John Nkomo, 
took advantage of the international significance of the occasion and pledged twenty five 
million Zimbabwean dollars to the Special Urban Poor Fund.9 By 1999, there were over 
one hundred and forty saving schemes and about twenty thousand members. A successful 
model house exhibition aided by the South African counterparts was partly responsible for 
mobilising many poor people to join the schemes. 
 
Names of the many groups all reflect hope and a sense of fulfilment: Zvishamiso-
(Miracles); Mavambo-(Beginnings); Ruzivo-(Knowledge); Zvikomborero-(Blessings); 
Batsirai-(Help Each other); Zvido Zvedu-(What We Desire); Vimba-(Be Trustworthy) and 
Tazvida-(We like it). The joy experienced in owning a home cannot be missed in the 
community. Whilst some say there are no more landlord dares (court/reprimanding 
sessions) some go further to explain the tensions in this relationship (Interview-Mai 
Chiremba). 
 119 
….now there is no “nagging” and “trouble” from landlords. We faced hardships as 
lodgers as we could not afford to do our everyday chores without the approval of 
the landlords. Rents were being raised to fix us should we buy things like a 
television set or anything the landlord didn’t have. Our own children could not play 
radios at a moderate volume/ it was difficult. 
 
A major problem that has affected the groups in Zimbabwe is the high HIV-AIDS death 
rate amongst the founding and key members of the federation. The leadership in all the 
cooperatives have been affected by the disease. For example, in Dzivaresekwa, all four 
founding members who went on an exchange visit to South Africa are all late. All the 
members agree that; 
…the major problem we have is Aids. As the federation, our emphasis had been 
around building houses. But increasingly because people are dying and people are 
sick, we are realising that we might not even be able to build those houses and live 
in them because we will have died. Because in the federation we say that we die 
together, we have emphasised around health issues related to Aids and HIV…we 
are looking around at how people can eat healthy and also some herbs that might 
build a person’s immunity and also help them fight opportunistic infections.  
 
Through the engagement of municipality officials and exchanging knowledge on 
government requirements with regard to housing and the poor’s ideas about housing 
themselves, the federation boasts that they have destroyed the myth of officialdom that 
kept the poor from seeking services. The homeless poor in particular have always been 
suspicious of local authorities who organised their evictions and relocations from one 
holding camp to another. Worse still, is the fact that the poor do not bother to register on 
the waiting list as they know they will never be considered for housing by the local 
authorities. Local authorities were always viewed apprehensively and were mistrusted 
because of their role in sanctioning evictions. On the other hand, councils have made it 
clear that they do not condone squatter settlements as they promote immoral activities. 
Such prejudices made the poor feel that government offices had nothing to do with them 
unless if they required an identity that would enable them to vote. 
 
The ZHPF housing schemes do not feel confident enough to approach the authorities in 
search of housing land. They believe that they have to use the technical NGO, Dialogue on 
Shelter, in order for them to be heard. The Land Committee comprising of members from 
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all the affiliated housing schemes and Dialogue on Shelter approach the authorities to 
negotiate on land for the different schemes. Like with the other schemes, members of 
Mavambo openly admit that they submissively approach the officials and take them on 
foreign tours, a treat that bureaucrats and politicians live for, to orient them with similar 
initiatives in other countries. When lobbying for land, they take into consideration what 
other national, regional, and international schemes have done hence the inclusion of 
government officials on federation exchange tours. Deference is another tactic they utilise 
to be heard as one remarked, “Tinotonyengetera vakuru vakuru vanenge vari pabasa 
ravo” .10 
 
Convincing officials of the potential of their ideas costs the federation immensely. In 
Gwanda, land for twenty stands was donated after the federation had bumped into the 
Town Clerk at a conference in Namibia where he was shown federation houses and met 
homeless Namibians who had made a similar dream come true. Another delegation from 
the Harare City Council accompanied federation members to South Africa and after the 
trip, the chairperson of the committee that was running the council donated one hundred 
and fifty stands to the federation and promised to improve cooperation. The Victoria Falls 
federation members went on a visit to Pakistan and included some council members in 
their delegation. The idea was to expose these officials to how Pakistani federation 
members were dealing with problems of infrastructural provision for poor housing 
cooperatives. On their return, the council officials promised to increase their support for 
the federation’s activities.  
 
Both politicians and bureaucrats take political risks when they attempt to change 
procedures to accommodate a new innovative idea from the community but they can also 
gain political mileage from the same exercise. Public officials tend to be more threatened 
when they have to deal with large numbers of the poor to address their needs. Politicians 
thus emerge as winners, who play the role of patrons or benefactors when their 
constituencies benefit. Unfortunately, the frequent changes that take place at the top 
(ministerial positions) also disturb any progress that might have taken place with regard to 
processing cooperative requests. For instance, in 1998, the federation took the then 
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minister John Nkomo and Nyasha Chikwinya, the member of parliament for the area, on a 
federation trip to South Africa. Less than two years later, both politicians were out of 
office without making any changes in favour of housing the poor. The cooperatives were 
thus frustrated by the new incomers who brought in new policies and approaches to 
dealing with cooperatives. Housing institutions are thus blamed for advocating policy 
changes that eliminate the low-income categories from getting houses and the task of 
sensitising each new incumbent is costly for the cooperatives. 
 
Mavambo Housing Scheme 
The group started under the ZHPF in 1997 in the township of Hatcliffe with an initial 
membership of two hundred and eighty. This figure has since gone down to two hundred 
and forty. The current residents of Hatcliffe Extension were evicted from a farm located on 
the periphery of Harare that was once owned by the late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the 
president of the opposition party, ZANU Ndonga. The brutal decision to evict them after 
the state seized the farm was purely motivated to stamp out any support for the opposition 
party. A clearly traumatised woman narrated their ordeal during an interview, 
Houses were burnt to the ground, a lot of families lost their belongings, over eighty 
families were moved to Hatcliffe where frequent fights erupt, some nearly fatal as 
people impatiently wait for their turn to get safe drinking water. 
 
Mavambo was the first group of former evictees to get financial assistance from Dialogue 
on Shelter. However, only five of the members have remained very active in organising for 
housing resources and the rest attribute their angst and lethargy to untrustworthy treasurers 
who were accused of squandering the members’ collections in the formative stages of the 
group. A significant percentage of the members do not even know the membership size of 
their group. The patriarchal nature of the Zimbabwean society tends to rear its ugly head as 
many women echoed the following sentiments, “We only have one male member in our 
scheme (a twenty six year old) as most husbands died and the remaining males have no 
time to waste. Housing is confined to women.”  
 
Organising for housing has forced NGOs and CBOs working in the area to come together 
as the Community Action Group,11 a civic forum on housing that lobbies for housing 
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delivery to the poor. This group approaches both ruling party and opposition politicians 
(members of parliament and councillors in particular) to lobby for recognition by the 
government. This arrangement and the confusion it caused has made it easier for ambitious 
politicians to bulldoze and extend their tentacles and influence to specific housing 
schemes. In Mavambo, a ruling party member of parliament, Nyasha Chikwinya, assumed 
leadership and steering of the scheme. She openly stepped into an already formed housing 
cooperative and promised to deliver housing. Assured that they had a member of 
parliament from the ruling party pushing for their cause, the members willingly poured all 
their savings into an account she had created. She was later accused of spending the money 
on her fuel buying ventures. 
 
Mavambo openly acknowledges that the ruling party, ZANU-PF has helped them more 
than the opposition party to acquire land. This is despite their having an opposition party 
member of parliament for their constituency. A member expressed their position, “We 
engage politicians to get sympathy from the government/ZANU-PF. We use this as a 
strategy to win the hearts of the government”. Another made a more revealing revelation,  
The opposition MDC has lost touch with us. We voted for Trudy Stevenson 
[opposition party] in June 2000 and since then she has visited us only twice. The 
reason being that we seem to sideline with ZANU-PF. This is the case as we want 
land from the ruling party. Nyasha Chikwinya [ruling party] is very helpful even 
though she is not our member of parliament, she has helped our community with 
education fees, sinking boreholes, setting up a benevolent fund in our area. Should 
we show our true colours of sidelining with the MDC, obviously we will be evicted 
from this area! 
 
What is not lost on these members is that the ruling party does control the resources and 
the opposition cannot make them act otherwise. This is supported by a statement made by 
one interviewee, “We are forced to suppo rt the ruling party on this issue as they are the 
custodians”. Despite all this hide and seek with the world out there, the members feel that 
they are independent of political steering in their activities. Another group leader pointed 
out, “Politicians, we  only use them to open doors for the poor, to negotiate with local 
authorities and the government.”  The more subtle simply say, “We use p arliamentarians 
now and again.”  
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Three other cases illustrate these trends. Tashinga Domestic Workers Cooperative had the 
then mayor of Harare as patron on their formation in 1987. The cooperative was applauded 
for taking the right political approach to solving their housing needs as the cooperative was 
formed within the party structures. Within less than two years, the cooperative was 
allocated land for housing outside the usual council waiting list regulations (Parade 1994). 
 
In 1996, the ZANU-PF member of parliament for Mabvuku organised some home seekers 
in her constituency into six housing cooperatives. Six months after the formation, two of 
the cooperatives, Tavepamberi and Hondoyakura, were allocated land even though they 
did not meet the financial qualifying requirements for housing land allocation and they 
were not yet officially registered as cooperatives. Another one, Independence Cooperative, 
was registered very quickly and land was allocated more or less at the same time as the 
registration. Two of the cooperatives, Zororo and Tadzikamidzi, refused to go through the 
party process of acquiring party cards and attending rallies and meetings and so they pulled 
out of cooperatives that were steered by members of parliament and decided to apply for 
land as independent cooperatives. Six years later in 2000, they were still to be registered 
(Interview with cooperative members). 
 
However, contradictions are very evident in that Mavambo does not allow the presence of 
party paraphernalia during their meetings. They emphasise that no one is allowed to wear a 
t-shirt or use a cloth bearing the president’s face or the main oppo sition party’s (MDC) 
logo. The reason for this reveals a lot more than the intended objective, 
We need to show our true colours [demonstrate non-partisanship] to the outside 
world as this will end up tarnishing our name and thereby jeopardising our future 
funding prospects from well wishers who are mostly anti-ZANU-PF. 
 
The members have thus become experts at displaying the appropriate faces depending on 
the observer with the full bowl! As can be expected, some groups are quick to change with 
the tide: 
We don’t worry about the arrogant ones, like Didymus Mutasa, (the defeated ruling 
party candidate in Kuwadzana) we don’t fight the ones that are working for us. We 
are working with the ones that are for us and get them to our side-like the Mudzuri 
(a former MDC opposition party mayor of Harare administration). 
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Fortunately for Mavambo, housing land is allocated to the group and the group then has 
the responsibility to allocate to individual beneficiaries according to the group’s own 
waiting list and the council’s list. This avoids the double allocation of land to the same 
individual on the two lists. Criteria used by the groups ranges from ‘the most active’ to the 
‘most paid up’ members and this is not necessarily according to their joining date or the 
time one has spent in the group. The low levels of activeness are attributed to laziness by 
most members of the housing scheme. Most of the income generating projects started by 
many members withered over time as those running the projects did not invest time and 
commitment to the common cause. All the same, members pointed out that the reason the 
cooperative was not into big income generating projects was laziness. Some pointed out 
that they had their vegetable gardens and so they did not have to start something big.12 The 
only project Mavambo members had tried to establish was a beer outlet. The bar closed 
down after operating for a short time due to poor management. 
 
As the 2000 parliamentary elections drew closer, the ruling party promised to allocate land 
to the homeless in Hatcliffe and many of these were federation members. As usual, nothing 
was done after the elections. The saving schemes members were quick to point out that this 
was nothing new as from 1980 to 2000, most housing schemes that were implemented by 
the government had followed the previous regime’s blue -prints. During the 2000 land 
invasions, some federation members were forcibly involved in seizing land. This move 
divided the federation members and since the body is not strongly centralised, no blanket 
policy was taken by the federation. Housing scheme members agreed that because the land 
invasions were politically orchestrated and tightly controlled by the ruling party via 
liberation war veterans, it would be complicated to expect to get land without taking part in 
the violence. A group in Dzivaresekwa that occupied land was quickly taken over by war 
veterans who beat up and intimidated the savings scheme leadership and forced the 
members to contribute their savings to the veterans themselves. 
 
The housing schemes do not seem to have understood the concepts of housing scheme and 
cooperative in the same manner as their other counterparts in South Africa.13 For example, 
the treasurers of all the savings units report directly to the federation and not to the 
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schemes. These attitudes can also be explained by the way the government sometimes 
responds to the cooperatives’ request for land, and to break their mobilisation power, the 
members are sometimes scattered in different locations in other townships. Some from 
Mavambo were allocated land in Dziveresekwa extension (twenty kilometres away) which 
is a swamp such that many people do not know of the location of this new housing area. 
The area has seven hundred legal occupants and about four hundred illegal occupants. The 
government also relocated squatters evicted from Epworth and Churu farm to the same 
place and this was meant to be a temporary housing area for three months until the 
occupants could be moved elsewhere. Ten years later, they are still there. In their words, 
“The Mugabe regime and the Tavengwa’s City of Harare were not going to do anything 
about their situation and so we had to wake up!”  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have used historically, structurally and agency grounded analysis to map 
out the modus operandum in service delivery in a country where political space has been 
dominated by one party for over two decades. The poor house-seekers are very clear of the 
capacity of the government to deliver land for housing and have thus prepared themselves 
to be as crafty as necessary in organising to tackle the system. This manoeuvring capacity 
is portrayed through deferring to the political leadership accordingly and yet they continue 
to send warning signals, as when they vote for the opposition party members, that they are 
aware of the nature of clientelistic distributional pattern of resources in the country. In this 
case, they cease to be just passive subjects as they demonstrate the capacity to articulate 
their problem and take advantage of what the different identities can deliver. 
 
The housing cooperatives in Harare are very much aware of the obstacles they face in 
organising for state resources hence they readily acquiesce to party steering to get land for 
housing. Even though they too manipulate the politicians, they still emerge as the losers in 
that the empowerment process does end abruptly as they do not extend this social capital to 
the broader political process as they remain inward looking. The problem is that home 
seekers fail to look beyond the house itself as it is in the act of building the broader 
community that value essential for participation in the democratic process is fostered. The 
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global networks have worked to spread the demystification of the state and this knowledge 
has helped to cross essential bridges but the real test is in whether citizens who deliberately 
defer to patronage can become critical citizens who demand excellence from the public 
system. Only then can party patronage decline and the inequity gap be narrowed. 
 
A major success was that the housing cooperative movement compelled the government to 
acknowledge its potential as a cooperative housing desk was eventually set up to gather 
and dispense knowledge on cooperative regulation and to possibly monitor the agenda of 
these numerous groups. This shows the possibilities of the emergence of challenges that 
are likely to arise from other sources that may eventually counter the “liberation culture” . 
If people can acquiesce, they can easily revolt for the same reasons. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that patronage style politics can be selective and co-
exist with the neo-liberal expectations to roll back the state. As illustrated, the federation in 
Zimbabwe was denied recognition for its loose networking style that had massive potential 
mobilisation that would have allowed it to encroach on the ruling party’s constituency - the 
poor. And yet the HPZ was accepted as a friend by the government and yet it applied neo-
liberal logic to its housing cooperatives – a lower working class constituency that could 
afford bank loans. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 HPZ is a non-profit organisation registered under the Private Voluntary Organisations Act, PVO 14/92. It 
provides training and technical expertise in all aspects of cooperative housing. It assists cooperatives to 
acquire land, service it and secure mortgage finance from financial institutions for building operations. 
2 Sentiments expressed by cooperatives members at the HPZ workshop. Quote from the report on the 
Housing Finance Institutions and Cooperative Housing Development, HPZ, July 28 (2000). 
3 This is the lowest unit in the party hierarchy that goes up to the Polit bureau. 
4 For instance, ZANU-PF party membership cards must be shown in order to obtain food aid. Just recently in 
2002, the Daily News of 19th November, reported an increase in such accounts. Again war veterans who 
denounced the government for orchestrating the farm invasions, were labeled sell-outs and denied land 
during the recent fast tracking land reform programme and their pensions were terminated. (Reported in The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 18 October (2002). In another natural resources management programme, officials 
whose loyalty to ZANU-PF was doubted lost their posts. See Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. 
(eds.) (2003) Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business , Weaver Press, p140. 
5 The campaigning period prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections saw many cooperatives acquiring free 
land, amongst them were Harare North Housing Cooperative-1800 stands; Mudhudhudhu-16 stands; 
Gondoharishari (meaning beggars cannot be choosers) and Highlands Housing Cooperative each got 100 
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stands. Since 2000, some Harare residents have begun to reject indigenous names for their residential areas 
as this is associated with low township status. 
6 A delegation of federation members also visited Mahila Milan in India to get an idea of how the federation 
organized itself in the country. 
7 Holding camps were a result of the government’s intolerance to squatting. Squatters were evicted from their 
sites and moved to ‘temporary camps’ where they were to stay until they moved to permanent areas.  
8 At the time the exchange rate was: 1 US dollar = 54 Zimbabwean dollars. 
9 This was just a general purpose fund for the poor and the money was not necessarily for housing 
development. In this way, there was no commitment to easing the poor people’s housing plight.  
10 English translation: “We resort to sycophancy in order to get attention”.  
11 The Housing People of Zimbabwe, Intermediate Technology Development, Habitat for Humanity and the 
Forum on Housing are some of the organizations in the Community Action Group. 
12 This varies from scheme to scheme. Some mould bricks and others sell used clothes and vegetables. 
13 For instance, the chairperson of Mavambo describes the group as being different from a cooperative 
because they have a fixed subscription of ten dollars per month and three persons designated to collect the 
money each month end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Housing the ‘Aliens’ in the Cape Town Metropolitan Council 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines housing provision for the Africans in Cape Town and discusses 
their citizenship status as defined by the resource allocation pattern. It attempts to establish 
the basis for the requirement of political facilitation that perhaps only a “liberation culture”  
could provide in the absence of resources and other innovative capabilities. It also shows 
the capacities and ingenuity the poor people developed then to solve their shelter problems. 
Problems that were part of the complex institutional structure continued to loom large over 
the new democratic bureaucracy after 1994 and it is thus important to trace the rationale 
behind this design as the ghost proved to be difficult to exorcise. Through crafty 
institutional design, ingrained racial superiority attitudes shaped by exclusionary 
orientations, housing delivery to the Africans was effectively slowed down. 
 
The character of the South African regime up to 1994 makes housing provision in the Cape 
Town metropolitan area unique as it was determined by nothing more than the necessity of 
controlling the influx of Africans into white areas and maintaining the apartheid social 
order (Hendler et al 1985; Maylam 1995; Crankshaw and Parnell 1996; Lalloo 1998; 
Wilkinson 1998). As with the rest of the colonial cities, housing provision over time 
developed in relation to the migrant labour system and this relationship carved out the 
entire space occupied by Africans1 in urban areas. Mamdani (1996) pointed out the stark 
differences; 
 On one hand, there was a fully developed capitalist system that compared with the 
west and on the other was a colonial state dimension with all its accompaniments of 
indirect rule and separate development.  
 
The government systematically divided South Africans into racial and ethnic categories 
reinforced through ideology, political institutions, law and economic rights such that every 
district, street and buffer strip served a purpose as it was part of an identifiable group area 
(Zain 1989:1). However, where one could buy a house was tightly restricted with each of 
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the defined racial groups having a finite number of discrete, well segregated residential 
areas allocated to them and each group struggled to maintain its identity. Each ethnic 
identity had neatly cut physical boundaries (Maylam 1995). 
 
The destruction of African subsistence farming and self-sustaining activities became 
necessary to create labour for the capitalist ventures (Evans 1997). All South Africans had 
identity books in which they were defined by race and if they were black, they were further 
divided by ethnic group and these classifications determined where one lived, worked, 
their income, who to marry, where to travel and how far, what areas to enter as well as 
which schools to attend (Jung 2001:16). Understanding the dynamics of this regime can 
thus be successfully done through the use of the concept of ‘space’ as it applied to the 
different racial groups.2 The concept of space cuts across all time dimensions in the South 
African administrative systems, making it a useful analytic concept to discuss housing 
provision in racialised spaces. Space here is conceived not only in its physical sense but in 
its totality. All social relationships occur in distinct physical spaces that create room for 
accessing economic and more importantly in colonial states, political space. This access to 
political and economic resources is important in that it opens access to other resources in 
society. 
 
Lalloo (1998) points out the advantages of this perception of space since “space as arenas 
of citizenship, defines the variation and gradations in the pattern of citizenship”.  Space is 
therefore conceived of as ‘room for strategic manouvre’ that is dependent on resource 
availability to contending forces in a given political system (Simkins 1988:8). The 
apartheid housing policy itself defined African citizenship differently as spelt out by their 
residential space; migrant workers lived in hostels and township dwellers and rural women 
lived in townships. Townships engendered no sense of belonging as citizenship was denied 
Africans through land policy and housing policies. This confirmed that it was a place for 
Africans in transit only as it endowed a sense of impermanence, and successfully denied 
them access to physical priviledges enjoyed by the white citizens. Allegiance, a sense of 
belonging and shared community are all constructed around the notion of an abiding place 
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and locations reinforced the identity of abstractions rather than human beings with streets 
not bearing names but numbers (Lalloo 1998:9). 
 
But are racial categories and their space alone adequate to explain service delivery in the 
country? This brings in the concept of identity. Bureaucratically and legally predefined 
identities merged with the already shifting identities the ‘natives’ had and this caused 
confusion even though there might have been consensus on certain issues. What then, were 
the other dominant identities that interwove with the racial cleavage?  And how did this 
scenario trigger room for the “liberation culture”  in the housing delivery process? 
 
Determinants of Black Housing 
National government and local government relations contributed immensely to the delivery 
of housing for blacks. Both institutions did not clearly want to be burdened with 
accommodating the natives in their urban creations hence policies on housing provision 
were kept in a permanent state of confusion through legal requirements (Evans 1996; 
Kraak 1981; Elias 1980). From 1822 when the first institutions were established to provide 
services, none of them served the black population until after 1923 when the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act was effected.3 Housing was placed under the public health department 
in 1897 as a response to the overcrowding that was later believed to cause the bubonic 
plague of 1901 and influenza in 1918 (Kraak 1981). It was thus important to attend to the 
housing needs of the coloureds and the blacks to ensure the public health of the whites. 
Segregation became necessary to attend to the white health needs but justification for this 
also spilled into all social issues (ibid). 
 
The initial step of segregation on the grounds of health hazards became a social institution 
in which the segregation of the black and white groups was not only legitimated from a 
health point of view, but was also transformed and sanctioned into a situation where each 
racial group was to develop its social identities without social friction (Hansard 1950). The 
South African Native Affairs Commissioner had investigated what could be common 
‘native policy’ and sanctioned that blacks be located away from other population groups 
(Elias 1980:25). 
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The 1897 Public Health Amendment Act gave municipalities the power to erect dwellings 
for the poor with the approval of the registered voters in that locality. However, no action 
was ever taken to build housing for the poor and a new legal instrument was effected, the 
Municipal Ordinance no 10 of 1912 which made local authorities responsible to the 
Provincial Administrator (Kraak 1981). It was only after 1916 that the first housing 
scheme for coloureds was started as a response to the devastating effects of the influenza 
epidemic (Jack 1981a:12). Even then, the scheme was for municipal coloured employees 
and not the poor or the low- income groups. Years later, attempts to put up a coloured 
housing scheme at Klipfontein were strongly opposed by the whites because “It would 
bring the dagga smoker, the drunkard and the ordinary criminal from District Six to a 
district with a European population and where a big girls school was to be erected” (ibid  
68). This stereotyping of other races contributed immensely to the municipality’s inaction 
in dealing with the housing problem. 
 
The flu epidemic in particular caused the amendment of the Public Health Act (no36) of 
1919 and the establishment of a new institution, the Public Health Department. The 
amended act had a whole chapter on matters of ‘Sanitation and Housing’ and it spelt out 
the roles of local authorities in dealing with sanitation and overcrowding (Elias 1980). A 
‘Housing Commission’ was also mandated with investigating housing conditions of the 
major urban centres and most importantly, it had to advise on whether it made sense for the 
national government to provide finance to local authorities for providing housing for 
persons of limited means including coloureds and natives (Elias 1980; Kraak 1981; 
Wilkinson 1998). 
 
The main concern of the commission was the position of ‘poor whites’ who could not 
afford an economic rental. The Report of the Housing Commission (1920) noted that; 
Poor whites were living in the most degrading and undesirable conditions in many 
towns … and the importance of maintaining the prestige of the white race …  (the 
whites) should be compelled to reinstate themselves in what must be their proper 
standing in the social scale. 
 
 132 
The recommendations advised a more systematic approach to the housing problem and 
proposed that town planning legislation be effected and this was done in 1927 under the 
Town Planning Ordinance no.13 of 1922. This ordinance became preoccupied with 
ideological aims of separating the different population groups by means of barriers and 
buffer zones and this was twenty two years before the Group Areas Act of 1950,4 which 
formally legitimated the residential separation of the various races in the country (Jack 
1981a:41). 
 
The Housing Act no.35 of 1920 came into being as a result of the commission and it aimed 
to provide loans with public money for house construction and to empower local 
authorities to make such provision. A housing loan fund was provided to give loans to 
local authorities for building new housing schemes. An important co-ordinating institution, 
the Central Housing Board (CHB) was also established in 1920 and it was tasked with 
enquiring into new schemes and identifying the need for such schemes and this was to be 
done in conjunction with the Minister of Public Health under whose administration the 
Housing Act fell.5 
 
In 1923, the government passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Act which residentially 
discriminated against the Africans by restricting them to locations situated on the outskirts 
of the cities. In Cape Town, it was to places like Langa and Ndabeni. Housing for Africans 
was therefore regarded as a separate issue to that of whites and coloureds (Jack 1981:22). 
The act made it possible to move ‘illegal’ Africans into a site and service scheme  which 
was a controlled squatter camp that was later developed into a massive new black township 
called Khayelitsha-meaning a new home. The moving of Africans was intended to ease the 
housing plight of coloureds by removing competition for resources. ‘Illegal’ Africans were 
also expelled to Transkei and Ciskei under the same act. The same act prohibited blacks 
from owning land in urban areas and its amendment in 1930 authorised the local 
authorities to exclude African women from their areas of jurisdiction unless they had 
certificates to prove that accommodation was available (Brand 1981:15). After 1945, the 
laws were tightened due to the influx into urban areas after the Second World War and 
black women were only allowed to join their husbands in the Western Cape if they had 
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permits issued by the registering officer of the area to which they wished to travel to (Jack 
1981). This was complicated by the fact that one needed to get there first to obtain the 
permission. A further amendment in 1937 meant that black men had to show proof of 
being employed or of bona fide visitor status as municipalities were allowed to remove 
‘surplus’ Africans and send them to native reserves (ibid 1981).  
 
To circumvent the problem of dealing with the national government, Cape Town passed 
the Municipal Ordinance no.23 of 1919 which empowered the municipality to advance 
loans to people of limited means to provide homes for themselves (Brand 1981). Since the 
scheme was based on the principle of the ability to pay, only whites benefited as they had 
high salaries within the limits of the schemes; that was 360-600 pounds per annum then 
(ibid). The municipality also established a Housing Estates Committee in 1919 which 
assisted on all matters pertaining to housing such as controlling the various housing 
schemes and selecting ‘suitable tenants’ for these schemes and other council dwellings, 
collecting rents and to implement the Municipal (Provision of Homes) Ordinance. In 1925, 
the municipality tried to push the question of financing housing schemes for the poor into 
government hands as they were unwilling to incur costs through the provision of cheap and 
sub-economic housing (ibid). The government made it clear that responsibility for better 
housing lay with municipalities and provincial authorities and not with government. Its 
only responsibility was to provide financial facilities and assistance (Jack 1981a:53; 
Wilkinson 1998). 
 
The Definition of Africans by Space 
All Africans who came to Cape Town solely for temporary employment which expired 
hopefully on retirement or on cessation of employment were classified as migrants. 
Accommodation for these ‘oscillating’ migrants was in the form of hostels or labour 
compounds. Ramphele (1990:115) quotes Dewar (1982) who succinctly sums up the 
accommodation of Africans in hostels in South Africa; “ They are all simply unifunctional 
sleeping areas with little sense of place.”  All aspects of life for migrant workers revolved 
around a bed. A bed was the basis for relationships within the hostels, between the hostels 
and between work places and hostels (ibid). One’s very identity and legal existence 
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depended on one’s attachment to a bed. When one’s family joined them, they became 
members of ‘bed-holds’ 6 and the only access to this space was through a male bed-holder. 
Ramphele argues that hostel dwellers perfected the art of managing limited space in all its 
dimensions because their mobility was circumscribed by massive legislation which first 
defined them as temporary migrant workers without any organisational space either due to 
the Riotus Assembly Act, the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. 
Restrictions on physical space constrained the creation and utilisation of other space such 
as economic, social and intellectual. Carving out intellectual space7 in particular became a 
risky affair as fear and lack of trust between people drove organisations into secrecy thus 
encouraging even more authoritarian practices within the nascent political organisations 
(ibid 72). 
 
Legal urban residence depended on employment, duration of that employment and 
availability of approved accommodation. Likewise access to a bed depended on 
employment. Armed with a job contract, a man or his employee could apply to rent a bed 
in one of the available hostels. The applicant would then go to the housing officer in a 
township in which there was a hostel with a vacant bed and depending on availability, a 
bed would then be allocated. Residence was open to any ‘male Bantu8 over 18 years old’, 
who was in bona fide employment with legal permission to be in an urban area (Segar 
cited in Ramphele 1991:119). Initially, only women with legal permission to be in Cape 
Town were allowed to be in the hostels during the day but definitely not during the night 
(Selvan 1976:3). Owning a bed in a hostel thus denoted a new status for a family and bed-
holds were often handed down from father to son, going back a generation or two, and 
eventually some wives inherited their husbands’ beds after they died (i bid 165). 
 
A prerequisite for contract workers was that hostel accommodation had to be provided by 
the employer so workers were forced to retain their jobs in order to remain legally in Cape 
Town. Rent for the space was usually deducted automatically from their wages. Most of 
the hostel dwellers with families owned shacks in squatter camps for their families which 
meant they paid double rent every month (Motsamai 1984). They could not afford to give 
up the hostel or employer accommodation because it was a security measure against the 
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government’s impromptu removals of the family’s informal shacks. Vacating hostel 
accommodation meant going back to the bottom of the list to start all over again (Zain 
1989:64). The hostels did provide security as a home and many were compelled to join the 
security and defence forces for this reason and more importantly, to be exempted from the 
pass laws and the Bantu classification (Motsamai 1984:37). Such submission was also 
viewed as a demonstration of loyalty to the state. 
 
Selvan (1976:2) and Kraak (1981:7) categorised the African men living in the Cape 
Peninsula according to the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act’s no.25 of 1945 
requirements (as amended). First, there were men who were born in urban areas and 
qualified for permanent residence in the urban areas. Then there were workers who came 
to the urban areas on contract before 1968, these men were entitled to remain in the urban 
area in terms of Section 19(1)b of the act provided they did not leave the employ of the 
particular employer with whom they had contracted for a period of ten years. This meant 
they were able to fulfil the requirements of Section 10(1)b which qualified them for 
permanent residence (Selvan 1976). These two belonged to the category of what was 
termed local men and mobility into that status could be acquired by serving one employer 
continuously for a period of ten years. The status was important in that it determined where 
one could live. Thirdly, there were men who had entered into employment contracts after 
1968 when new legislation had been passed which restricted the legal rights of contract 
workers to a much greater degree than before (Kraak 1981). 
 
The new stipulation was that all contracts entered into with men from the reserves were to 
be for a maximum of one year and at the end of the contract, the men were to return to the 
reserves in order to enter into new contracts of employment. Accommodation for this 
category was designed to be very temporary indeed in the hostels or barracks so as to 
discourage any ideas of permanent settlement in urban areas (Zain 1989). This category 
was referred to as migrant or contract workers. The final category consisted of those men 
who were defined as living ‘illegally’ in the townships or in the squatter camps.  
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There was a clear distinction between local Africans and temporary migrant workers 
(Kraak 1981). Local men were housed in ‘Special quarters’ and these were bachelor 
quarters with rooms with one or two beds in each. Even for the locals, it seemed as if the 
favoured or lucky ones got rooms there (ibid). The African officials of the hostel boards 
lived in these special quarters but even though, they shared ablution facilities with the rest 
of the men. The only difference was that they had more dignity because they had more 
space and consequently, more privacy when sleeping only. 
 
It is important to point out that hostels did not have public facilities of their own (that is: 
educational, medical or recreational) and they had to depend on the limited public 
resources of nearby townships (Selvan 1976). Only beer-halls were readily provided. 
Hostel dwellers’ reliance on surrounding township facilities became the source of many 
conflicts over commercial activities which township residents felt was their domain 
(Ramphele 1991:343). Township dwellers had a choice in who they shared their homes 
and resources with, whereas hostel dwellers were viewed as having no institutional 
attachment since they shared their ‘impersonal space’ with total strangers (ibid). All 
accommodation in the hostels was for bachelors only. The beds were usually bunk-beds 
and they were grouped in sets of two, meaning that four men slept together in a group with 
no walls between the beds (Selvan 1976). Their houses were the beds they slept in and in 
most cases, they had to provide their own mattresses (Ramphele 1991). The ablution 
facilities were usually owned by the companies with the men occupying the hostel and 
each toilet usually served nineteen men and each shower, twenty men (Selvan 1976:23). 
Some hostels were built by companies but the housing board owned them all. This 
situation has spilled into the current era where responsibility for renovating and upgrading 
the hostels is tossed back and forth between the local authorities and the companies. 
 
Influx control regulations created criminals out of ordinary Africans who dared to seek job 
opportunities in the prescribed areas (Maylam 1995). The control measures required all 
African males above sixteen to carry a ‘pass’ or ‘reference book’ which indicated their 
legal status. Between 1916 and 1986, there were more than 17 million9 prosecutions for 
offences related to these laws and for Cape Town in particular, more women than men 
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were arrested under the pass laws in the entire country (ibid). Cape Town did not have 
hostels to accommodate African females hence the special assault on women aimed to 
curtail the development of African family life in the Cape Peninsula (Ramphele 1991:115). 
This, according to Ramphele, contributed to the breakdown of trust relations between 
spouses as many men resorted to extra-marital relations to fill in the absence of the wives 
who at times turned up on the unsuspecting husbands. 
 
Residential territories were designed differently with whites occupying more space and in 
the African areas, there was no choice of routes or any other space. Security was of 
paramount concern to the white community and so the most important consideration in 
construction was the speed with which the African areas could be sealed in the event of 
trouble (Smit 1996). Effective surveillance of the movements in these areas was thus 
facilitated by the prison layout of the hostels and townships (Evans 1995). The purposes of 
trips was easily determined as opposed to the white areas that had many access roads thus 
providing the residents with a degree of anonymity and safety as their destinations and 
routes were unpredictable (Dewar and Uytenbogaardt 1995:22). 
 
The laws and ordinances promulgated and passed between 1879 and 1935 together with 
the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act no.25 of 1945, the Group Areas Act of 1961 
and the Slums Act no.53 of 1934, all contributed to the neglect of African housing 
provision and this affects the current national housing shortage (Evans 1995; Smit 1996). 
The instruments all aimed to keep the ‘undesirable African’ from urban areas. The 
Consolidation Act in particular deterred the development of housing schemes involving 
employer participation because of the requirements of permanent residence after ten years 
of uninterrupted service by individual aspirant house owners. Exclusionary housing 
provision started long before the official adoption of the apartheid policy in 1948. 
 
A policy was designed to phase out African labour in the Western Cape province which 
was officially declared to be a ‘Coloured Preference’ area which meant that before 
employing an African man, the employer had to produce proof that there were no coloured 
men to fill the vacancy (Wilkinson 1998). It then became the Bantu Affairs Administration 
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Board’s (BAAB) responsibility to find local black men to fill the job and if there were 
none available, the workers were engaged from the Transkei or Ciskei10 and the board 
became responsible for allocating the workers beds in any one of the hostels. If the 
employer had not build a hostel, then the men were placed wherever a bed was available 
which often resulted in the mingling of contract workers with local men in the townships 
(Ramphele 1991). This complication sometimes made it impossible to categorise housing 
as being exclusively for local men or contract workers. However, a distinction was made 
between the two groups of men in the hostels as migrant workers slept on the ground floor 
and local men on the other floors (Selvan 1976:3-7). 
 
Apartheid Housing Delivery 
The apartheid government that came in 1948 continued with the union government’s 
segregationist tendencies in service delivery in a more extreme manner. The Group Areas 
Act of 1950 gave rise to the Apartheid city which placed individuals in different racial and 
socio-economic characteristics or ‘class’ identities in the same geographic space. A 
massive relocation of the African community took place during this era and between 1960 
and 1983, more than 100 000 African had been relocated in urban areas and over one 
million resettled in the homelands (Evans 1996:65). The forced relocations contributed to 
uncertainty, ill feeling and further distrust in respect of relations within the African 
community itself, and between it and the government. Years later, the Theron Commission 
(1976) reported that many coloureds were still uncertain about the permanency of declared 
coloured group areas as they feared that no matter wherever they settled, ‘the Group Areas’ 
would catch up with them (Brand 1981:10). 
 
Racial definitions dictated administrative behaviour as administrators differentiated 
between whites and coloureds on the basis of an individual’s demeanour towards officials 
when it was unclear what one’s racial category was. If one deferred and called the official 
‘Baas’ (boss), he was classified as a  coloured. Such problems of boundary definitions led 
to the official position that; 
A person’s first or initial classification need not be his final classification…the 
director general [for] internal affairs may reclassify him, or a race classification 
board may order a reclassification.11 
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Every year there were thousands of petitions for reclassification for different reasons from 
marrying into a different racial category (Jung 2001), to improving employment 
opportunities or even to improve the children’s c hances of a favourable racial 
classification. And of course, a favourable racial grouping implied improved access to 
resources especially housing. This resulted in the increased tendencies to manipulate one’s 
racial identity. 
 
A culture of mistrust was thus entrenched and whilst it marginalised Africans, it gave 
coloureds a ‘sense of rootlessness’ which had a negative effect on the housing problems of 
the coloured community. Concealing one’s African identity became an art to avoid 
removal as exemplified by the following quotation from the life-story of one African 
woman: To hide her part African identity, she and her siblings were forbidden to speak 
Xhosa outside the house. Their mother kept a stone on the stove with a bit of engine grease 
on hand for them to press the curls out of their hair, lest the police should arrive with their 
metal combs to test for ‘bantu’ blood (Mail and Guardian 2000:39) . 
 
Thus a non-African identity helped to some extent to secure one’s rights to reside in urban 
areas and consequently, to get a higher priority in housing provision even though they 
would continuously be threatened by the Group Areas Act. Raids on African 
accommodation intensified during the apartheid regime (1948-1988) and those rounded up 
were sent to the site and service schemes in Nyanga or Langa. Screening occurred at these 
sites and in 1958 after one such raid, 4000 families were found to qualify for housing and 
they were consequently moved into sheds12 and each of these sheds housed four families 
(1981:26). Illegal families with no homes or relatives in the homelands were classified as 
‘displaced people’ and they were allowed to erect their own shacks at Nyanga West (ibid.). 
Being defined as displaced was thus an avenue for staying in town and victims hoped they 
would be able to secure employment someday thus elevating one’s family’s status to 
qualify for state resources. 
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In terms of the Housing Act of 1957, the Bantu Housing Board was established to deal 
with the requirements of Africans within urban areas. In particular, the board reviewed the 
applications made by local authorities for state funding to purchase land upon which black 
accommodation could be built and to finance these loans, a National Housing Fund was 
established (Evans 1996; Evans 1997). Unfortunately state funding was influenced by the 
notion that Africans were temporary residents in urban areas. The result was to shift the 
burden of housing provision onto the Africans themselves and as building societies could 
not finance Africans households to build on land they did not own, the majority resorted to 
squatting. The state then began to provide sites and service schemes in a bid to compel 
African to provide their own homes. A site for a household was a concrete slab on less 
than 150 square metres of land with a toilet and a water tap (Smit 1995). The rationale 
behind this kind of service provision was provided by the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. 
E.G. Jansen who believed that it was impractical to think that (Morris 1981:48 cited in 
Evans 1996:70): 
.. the native who has barely left his primitive conditions should be provided with a 
house which to him resembles a palace and with conveniences which he cannot 
appreciate and which he will not require for many years to  come. 
 
The principle of home ownership was adopted to encourage individual construction of 
houses on the serviced sites. However, the ownership scheme was confined to a 30-year 
lease period which could be cancelled any time. Africans were clearly not considered as 
being indigenous to the Western Cape region hence little housing was provided to them for 
this reason (ibid 72). The rate of housing delivery was clearly dictated by black labour 
requirements in urban areas. The establishment of Bantu Advisory Boards (BAB)13 in the 
early seventies was an attempt to deal with all this legal and administrative fragmentation 
and more importantly, it linked the control of labour to the urbanisation of the African. 
Unfortunately the officials were often accused of corrupt practices (Wilkinson; 1998). The 
control and finances of urban locations was moved from local authorities to the centralised 
BAAB. The control and accommodation of the Africans was now subject to the uniform 
policy of a central authority and more importantly, location control was linked even more 
to the dictates of labour allocation (Kraak 1981:8). The boards were made directly 
responsible for the housing of workers according to their status and the system for securing 
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employment was reorganised differently. Native Commissioners in the reserves became 
responsible for organising jobs for the black population such that Africans in the reserves 
had to apply to the commissioner (Evans 1996). 
 
The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963 closed any loopholes that had been left by the 
Bantu Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945. For instance, regulations were imposed on 
the number of African women who could be granted housing rights within the urban areas 
and this applied to non-productive blacks (Wilkinson 1998). Also new regulations in June 
1968 stated that only African males over twenty one could receive housing permits in 
urban areas. In that same year, home ownership rights were withdrawn and local 
authorities instructed not to issue leases to Africans residents on land located within the 
urban areas because they could now own and provide their own houses in the homelands 
(ibid 74). In 1972, the state announced that Africans renting municipal houses would bear 
the full costs of maintaining and improving the houses even though the houses would 
remain the property of the municipality. Five years down the line, the state reintroduced 
the leasehold rights after realising the need for more skilled African labour to cope with the 
pace of industrial developments and also that it was impossible to remove all Africans 
from urban areas (Evans 1996). 
 
The reserves that had been set aside by the 1913 Land Act assumed a new status when they 
became what the government called independent. African development was to be 
contained within these homelands or ‘Bantustans’ 14 as they were officially called and 
blacks could seek work in the now separate South Africa (Mthuli 1987). Independence in 
the homelands, Transkei in 1976 and Ciskei in 1981, stripped the black population of the 
basic right of citizenship (Brand 1981:19). Following these developments, there was a 
massive deportation of blacks to the homelands which was viewed by the urban African 
dweller as forced citizenship when one could no longer generate wealth for the white 
bosses (Mthuli 1981:47). 
 
The late eighties saw the abolition of the influx control legislation and housing delivery 
shifted to a more market oriented process which saw state provision of houses decreasing 
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significantly. The problem was that housing provision remained an essentially ‘top-down’ 
approach and did not take into account the specific requirements of different households 
(Smit 1995). All houses were provided on a mass scale and they conformed to the same 
specifications (Evans 1996:80). They continued to be located far from the city and 
employment opportunities in particular. 
 
The Group Areas Act of 1950 fragmented institutions and these ‘gate keepers’ restricted 
access to housing opportunities. From 1983, the state adopted a policy of providing 
subsidised completed housing units on a rental basis for those earning 150 rands per month 
(coloureds) and for the aged (Zain 1989:9). Serviced plots were also made available for 
home ownership schemes for those earning between 150 and 1000 rands per month. 
Housing subsidies were provided for three categories up to 1989: those in government 
housing earning under 1200 rands per month; first time home buyers for a house of 60 000 
rands or less and employees who received company subsidies (mostly whites). The irony 
of this was that 82 percent of the Coloured population and 100 percent of the African 
population qualified for the subsidies but only an insignificant proportion were able to 
access the subsidies (ibid). Some Africans in the 1000-1200 rands income bracket could 
gain access to starter houses through the House of Representatives or the South African 
Housing Trust and the houses were ‘serviced core’ units of up to two rooms. Whites could 
buy on the private market with their subsidies. The rest of the African households could 
gain access to serviced sites through the Cape Provincial Administration or the South 
Africa Independent Trust (ibid). 
 
African housing had separate restrictions and until 1986, state policy restricted the 
provision of land and accommodation in order to implement influx control. Land in 
Khayelitsha was designated for development and occupation after the 1987 Black 
Communities Development Act which helped to reduce the procedures for proclaiming 
land for African development (ibid 1989:11). Official waiting lists for Africans were 
misleading as many of them did not see the point in applying for official accommodation. 
For instance, in 1986, 7422 African families appeared on the Development Board’s 
waiting list, but by 1988, 800 388 were on the lists. A survey conducted by the Urban 
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Policy Research Unit revealed that 60 percent of these had registered because of pressure 
from the forced removals (Smit 1995). 
 
Urban African communities were unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of the local 
authorities and they loathed both the quality of their houses and their councils because they 
felt inadequately represented (ibid 84). Rental increases that were forthcoming from these 
institutions were therefore ignored and civic disobedience became the norm with regard to 
housing services. The African local councils were immobilised by boycotts of payments 
for all services. Africans were trapped in a socio-economic position in which they could 
not afford to accumulate resources to cater for their accommodation needs (Mthuli 1984). 
This succeeded in preventing their economic mobility and confined them to relative and 
absolute poverty. Women in particular suffered the most as housing provision 
discriminated against them with regard to allocation, systems of tenure and access to all the 
relevant institutions (ibid). 
 
Increased nationalist demands put pressure on the government to reform which forced it to 
map out a new urbanisation strategy that aimed to redistribute resources in a manner that 
accelerated class differentiation such as the 99-year leasehold of homes to a select layer of 
residents who were termed ‘responsible Africans’ (Zain 1989). The redistribution was 
selective and targeted at those townships termed ‘oil-spot development’ that were 
categorised most likely to pose potential security problems. The idea was to contain the 
spread of nationalist influences by addressing distressing material needs such as housing 
and general community development and this involved differentiating amongst the 
Africans and introducing a more ‘propertied class’. The se developments were initiated and 
monitored by the National Security Management System which put massive administrative 
powers in the hands of the security forces. The security forces had demanded more 
authority in order to contain African nationalist aspirations and this led to the 
circumventing or truncating of traditional bureaucratic procedures (Marais 2001:47). 
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Communal Organising for Housing 
Around 1900, the white community began to organise for housing provision and the 
Citizen’s League was formed to help poor whites own houses. The government generously 
donated ‘free’ land for their ventures but this same gesture was not extended to the African 
community. For the Africans, the Hostel Dwellers’ Association (HDA) became the first 
civic organisation around housing issues. It was an initiative that aimed to instill a spirit of 
self reliance and to heal the wounds caused by the migrant labour system (Russell 1984 
cited in Ramphele 1991;352). It was also a response to the political crisis which had 
resulted in hostel dwellers being used by the government to attack local township 
residents. African communities, accustomed to the government’s strategy of creating 
cleavages amongst them, had learnt to exploit such cleavages for their political survival. 
 
The Western Cape Men’s Hostel Association was formed in 1983 with the broad aim of 
improving the welfare of hostel dwellers and more specifically, to fight for the God-given 
right of people to live with their families near their places of work, to work for full 
residence and employment rights and to campaign for the provision of family housing and 
special married quarters (ibid 354). The HDA’s membership was exclusively male until 
1986. Female presence was unacknowledged by the hostel dwellers themselves who, like 
the government, also viewed them as illegitimate. The argument was that women 
participation in the HDA would complicate male bonding. A more likely excuse would be 
that not everyone would get fair representation since not all the men could afford to have 
their wives in the urban areas. This exclusion of women later affected the loyalty of 
members in the organisation as women were accused of negatively influencing their men 
behind closed doors. This recognition of the women’s power over men as individual s 
opened up space for them in the HDA (ibid 361). 
 
Organising the hostel dwellers was a complicated task as the issue of trust in the organisers 
irked the hostel dwellers. The risks of trusting the organisers and their fellow residents and 
meddling in politics at the same time militated against the organiser’s efforts and a 
significant amount of time was spent on cultivating trust amongst the hostel dwellers. 
More ever, the better off in areas such as special quarters and Old Flats in Langa were not 
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keen to participate in the association and the HDA concluded that it was because ‘they did 
not feel the pinch of dehumanisation to the same extent as the rest of the hostel dwellers’ 
(ibid 357). 
 
The HDA had a hierarchical structure with the regional level at the top going down to local 
branches at all the hostels in the Western Cape. The local branches were run by executive 
committees and separate women’s committees were subordinate to the men’s committees. 
Regional executives were elected annually at the general conference but this was a mere 
formality at all the levels as most committees were returned unopposed (ibid). Continuity 
of the leadership was clearly preferred. From its inception, the HDA developed close 
contacts with local civic, trade union and ‘progressive’ political organisations and it also 
adopted the rhetoric that was associated with popular mass based political groupings in 
South Africa. It also became an affiliate of Cosatu which placed it in the sphere of the 
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The HDA thus completed the politicisation of hostel 
life. 
 
Funding Black Housing 
The Local Loans Act no.19 of 1926 affected the financing of building schemes within local 
authorities’  jurisdiction as they could no longer obtain funds from the sum voted for in 
parliament through provincial administrators (Elias 1980:97). Instead, the local loans were 
controlled by the Public Debt Commission which gave funds on a priority basis. Elias 
argues that the CHB feared that housing claims could be subordinated to what appeared to 
be more urgent claims in the local authorities hence Section 7 Clause 10 of the act was for 
the establishment of location and native villages, the erection of and the granting of loans 
for the erection of dwellings for the occupation of the natives and coloured persons. Elias 
observed that this simply meant that funding for black housing no longer came from a 
parliamentary vote under the Housing Act except by special permission from the Native 
Affairs department. In fact, it was official government policy that: “The success of the 
policy of segregation in urban areas may be said to depend on the fact that the provision of 
housing for the natives in locations does not become too heavy a burden on the general 
body of ratepayers” (ibid:70) . 
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To cut down on expenditure in black housing, the CHB distinguished between the 
minimum type of accommodation required by the non-European and recommended the 
smallest unit as having one living room and two bedrooms (Smit 1995). This measure was 
not adhered to in white housing. The paternalistic justification provided by the board was 
that “ if success was to be attained, the scheme must be conceived along lines which do not 
disregard the habits and customs of the native”  (Elias 1980:112). By 1929, the CHB 
reported that the CTCC had not applied for or spent a single cent from their allocated 
housing money and in 1934, the board was given wider discretion in granting loans for 
native locations but it continued to finance them as economic loans (ibid). 
 
The Peninsula Administration Board (PAB) was established as a separate legal entity with 
self-financing powers in 1973 by the former Department of Administration and 
Development with the aim of centralising the administration of all African townships 
(Evans 1997). Previously, administrative responsibility was split between the CTCC and 
the Divisional Council of the Cape. All the functions of the local authorities were assumed 
by the new BAABs which were responsible to the Bantu Affairs Department and all staff 
from the Native Affairs department were transferred to the BAAB. Its income was derived 
from rent, service levies, profits on liquor sales and from a Bantu Services levy15 which 
was imposed on local employers of African labour. Local authorities had a monopoly on 
beer sales in locations and the logic was, “ The more a community drinks, the more will be 
available to spend on amenities” 16 (Kraak 1981:24). A permit fee for whites to enter 
African locations and cemetery fees also provided additional income. The PAB was always 
affected financially by the political unrest in urban African areas. Deficit accounting 
became an institutional aspect of township financing especially as the government had 
made it clear that “It was not the task of the state to provide subsidies for the  housing of 
Bantu who were temporarily rendering services in white urban areas” (ibid 16). 
 
The officially recognised BABs were not respected by the African community as they 
considered them to be unrepresentative institutions without legitimacy. Instead community 
associations that sprung up from the communities were recognised by the blacks and the 
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government decided to capitalise on this by planning to establish community councils 
(ibid). Again, the African communities rejected these councils as experience had destroyed 
their faith in government promises. They remained sceptical of the proposed community 
councils as they would not provide them with a genuine power base. The declaration of the 
Western Cape as a coloured labour preferential area implied that local Africans were mere 
temporary residents and this was an important fact to remember (Smith and Digby 1978:6). 
 
A setback was that the PAB owned all land and property within the African residential 
areas but it was not empowered to sell land which meant no one in these areas could own 
land. On the other hand, criteria for accessing family housing was tightened; Section 1017 
of the Bantu (urban areas) Consolidation Act dictated the terms of an African’s presence in 
a white urban area (ibid). It specified that an African could reside in an urban area in the 
following circumstances: (a) if he had resided there continuously since birth; (b) had 
worked there continuously for one employer for ten years; (c) had been there continuously 
and lawfully for fifteen years and had thereafter continued to reside there, and was not 
employed outside the area and while in the area had not been sentenced to a fine exceeding 
R50 or to imprisonment for a period exceeding six months; (d) was the wife, unmarried 
daughter or son under 18 years of age of a Bantu falling into classes (a) and (b) and 
ordinarily resident with him and initially entered the area lawfully; or (e) had special 
permission to be there. 
 
This act together with R.74 and R.1036 of 1968, legislated that in order to qualify for a 
family house, both husband and wife must be in the area legally.18 But a woman could not 
be a tenant of a house unless she was a widow of a tenant with dependant children (Smith 
and Digby 1978:10). Accommodation was to be leased on a monthly basis to residents of 
the township. The lease was only renewed monthly upon the payment of rent. The tenant 
could not remain unemployed for more than thirty days. The lessee could not leave the site 
for more than thirty days without notifying the Township Superintendent and the lease 
could be terminated if in the opinion of the Superintendent, the tenant ceased to be a ‘fit 
and proper person to reside in the Bantu residential area’. 19 Housing shortages and 
backlogs continued to increase as the government did not have plans to build more houses 
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for the African population. Families on waiting lists were expected to live as lodgers with a 
tenant family and this overcrowding led many into erecting temporary shacks in squatter 
settlements where they could at least have a house of their own. 
 
Overcrowding was officially tolerated and institutionalised and profited from by the PAB. 
Any person who was not a tenant of a house (i.e. married but did not qualify under section 
ten) and who was over the edge of eighteen (including the tenants of children) was defined 
as a lodger and was obliged to pay a monthly lodging fee to the board and even whole 
families were also expected to live as lodgers (Kraak 1981:16). As a result of the struggle 
against the injustices of apartheid, a climate of civil unrest was created in the locations and 
mistrust in the bureaucracy manifested itself in the form of rent and service charge 
boycotts (Smit 1995:10). 
 
Up to the eighties, bureaucratic processes for new housing schemes in Cape Town were 
delayed and frustrated by the numerous institutions the applications had to go through. For 
instance, processes for township development required a minimum of 9-12 months 
excluding anything up to three months of the waiting period for the approval from the 
Surveyor General (Kraak 1981). The change to the Tricameral Parliamentary System 
(1986) weaved in more complexities into the delivery process as all proposals now had to 
go through coloured Management Committees, local authorities, committees and 
departments connected with the various Houses of Parliament. The Cape Town Divisional 
Councils were replaced by the Cape Town Regional Services Council which played a dual 
role of regional authority and local authority for what were previously divisional council 
areas which compounded confusion and caused further delays (Zain 1989:12). 
 
After 1983, coloureds were for the first time allowed to purchase the public dwelling rental 
accommodation they occupied under the Government Sales Campaign and all new units 
for those earning over one hundred and fifty rands were to be provided on an ownership 
basis. Four years later, African tenants of the council houses in Langa, Nyanga and 
Gugulethu were allowed to obtain 99-year leasehold agreements on their rented dwelling, 
implying that in the near future  (probably after 99 years), black prospective owners would 
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be allowed to convert 99 year old leasehold to full ownership (ibid). These changes 
boosted coloured investment in housing but the Africans were unmoved as they regarded 
their conditions with suspicion, for the lease implied that they still would not own the 
houses hence there was no point investing if their progeny would not inherit the houses 
(ibid 13-14). They were clearly unwilling to take the risk to invest in the houses. 
 
At the beginning of 1990, government loans were provided to the better off blacks and 
coloureds to purchase houses resulting in 175 000 house seekers accepting the loans. Later, 
civil unrest caused a lot of defaults amongst the households that had accepted the loans and 
this compelled the government to set up a parastatal, the Independent Development Trust 
(IDT),20 in 1994 to provide sites and toilets for the African population. The rationale was, 
as Zach de Beer21 put it (Bond 2000:128), 
When people are housed-more especially when they are home owners, they are not 
only less likely to be troublesome. They are also likely to feel they have a stake in 
the society and an interest in its stability. 
 
Still safeguarding the public health of the white community remained paramount, hence 
the provision of a toilet and a water source. 
 
Conclusion 
Housing delivery approaches used prior to majority rule in 1994 defined Africans as a 
homogeneous entity and ignored the specific needs of communities and individuals over 
time. The ‘utility’ of the urban African, engineering criteria such as the required size of the 
workforce, the existing houses, and the calculated number of Africans per room 
determined the course of housing delivery. As a racial group, Africans were treated equally 
with respect to housing allocation but differentiation in the delivery system set in later as a 
measure to appease politically conscientised African urbanites and to divide them by 
making them aware that some could belong to a superior and appreciated class. Even 
though, their de facto status remained that of aliens. In both urban and homelands, they 
remained subjects with limited rights and access to resources. Too many rules allowed 
particularistic criteria to determine access to urban residence at the individual level even 
though it had to be in line with how that ethnic group was housed. Particularism thus 
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engendered and exploited the cultural diversity of the black people of South Africa as well 
as fuelling a culture of distrust and a spirit of demanding what citizens should generally 
enjoy without having to fight for. 
 
Africans were from the beginning defined as what I would call ‘roaming citizens’ 22 who  
“… would live as a migrant and temporary sojourner group, … denied the full rig hts of 
colonial settlement, including rights to land ownership-the ultimate means of attaining 
functional control” (Davies 1981:37 cit ed in Evans 1996:41). Their citizenship status 
shifted depending on the space they inhabited at different times. Citizenship was for 
Africans defined in the context of the physical space they occupied in the homelands and 
in urban areas and this shifted according to one’s employment status over time. The 
identity of these subjects depended on the actions of the state- a state that sowed the seeds 
of distrust in the bureaucracy, for it was the bureaucracy that defined the African identities 
and determined what their lawful occupations could be and where they could set up a home 
according to what they first racially were, followed by other assigned categories. 
 
The ‘enclosure’ townships they lived in also became the political space they occupied as 
most struggles took place in the African residential areas. New knowledge in managing the 
limited space they had emerged and later became available for the struggle for full 
citizenship in the province after majority rule in 1994. Discrimination and manipulative 
practices that spilled into the post 1994 era had been nurtured in the apartheid state. 
Particularism at the racial and ethnic level, as well as a multitude of conflictual rules and 
regulations made it easier for the new rulers to use the housing resources as a mobilisation 
tool and particularism shifted to the political affiliation level. 
 
It was not a surprise then that the HDA politics on housing closely resembled the nature of 
the liberation struggle as evidenced by the designs to exclude others groups due to the lack 
of trust. A characteristic that we shall see resurfacing again in the post apartheid phase 
amongst the poor house seekers. How then could the new government set about restoring 
the citizenship of people who had been made migrants in their own country? Later, 
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political facilitation located in the “liberation culture”  value system re-emerged as a result 
of the need to break these ideological barriers. 
 
The next chapter explores the post apartheid housing delivery approaches under an ANC 
led central government and a NNP led provincial government. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The People’s Housing Process 
 
Introduction 
The chapter analyses the current housing regime through an analysis of the housing policy, 
implementing institutions and the bureaucrats’ action orientations. It also demonstrates the 
use of knowledge gained in the struggle to defeat bureaucratic hurdles and institutional 
arrangements that did not facilitate access to resources for previously disadvantaged 
groups. Manifestation of the “ liberation culture”  in the home-seeking ventures of the poor 
are also explored here. An important question to be answered here is; Why have some civic 
organizations (as opposed to individuals) managed to make significant gains in accessing 
housing resources? Does this imply that state capacity can only be realized through civil 
society? And is the cooptation of civil society the only possible answer to the redistribution 
of resources and service delivery in general? There is therefore a need for historical 
analysis to understand housing delivery in Cape Town as this involves the transformation 
from rural space to confined urban space for African households through different vehicles 
and mediums. A question emanating from this process is: How is trust cultivated in this 
housing delivery environment? 
 
An estimated 20 percent of Coloureds and 80 percent of Africans in Metropolitan Cape 
Town live in informal housing or in overcrowded conditions1 (Smit 1995:20). Housing is a 
social responsibility of the government and this is enshrined in the constitution. According 
to Smit, Housing is a primary determinant of the manner in which individual households 
are incorporated into an urban system (ibid) and since apartheid excluded blacks in its 
distribution of urban space, it becomes imperative to ask to what extent the new regime has 
reincorporated the low-income group into the mainstream urban space. Balancing the 
population and financial resources for housing provision is complicated by previous 
policies since the provision of loans and subsidies for black housing was pushed to the 
periphery by the previous government. The Government of National Unity (GNU) 
inherited complex and multiple government departments that performed the same tasks for 
the racially defined sections of the population that were located in different geographic 
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spaces (Marais 2001:67). How then does such a system function equitably? The 
maintenance and reformation of such a complex administrative system depleted resources 
that could have been channelled towards the development of the previously under 
privileged black race. 
 
Housing the ‘Wretched’ in South Africa- Post 1994 
Housing delivery for the low-income category in South Africa is organised such that house 
seekers have to access land and also the financial subsidy if they are first time home 
owners.2 Theoretically, the subsidies target the poor but the practicalities of disbursement 
show a deviation. The housing policy was formulated in capitalist tones that ensured that 
private businesses would benefit tremendously thus becoming welfare recipients 
themselves (Bond 2000). How then has the ANC, with its socialist ideals circumvented the 
policies it did not have a high degree of autonomy in articulating? The invoking of 
liberation struggle tactics (knowledge) resurfaced in many communities and it becomes 
interesting to untangle the complex relationships between and amongst the political parties, 
the poor masses and civic organisations that are involved in housing provision. Doing this 
successfully brings in the debate of the state, the party and civil society in Africa. The 
African post colonial state has been observed to capture as much of civil society as it can 
manage with the aim of achieving political and economic hegemony (Chabal 1992:249). 
Civil society becomes the tool of this hegemonic appropriation and the strong civil society 
that emerged to fight political repression in South Africa is no exception. Constitutional 
constraints emphasizing the protection of property rights left marginal room for the 
redistribution of resources but tactics from the struggle through the civil society have 
evolved into a force to reckon with. 
 
The absence of a national housing policy stalled the development of housing provision for 
Africans as fragmented decision making frustrated all initiatives and efforts during the 
1994 transition when confusion was at its peak. The CTMC, which was illegitimate 
anyway in the eyes of the African people, had its little authority further undermined in the 
process. People lost trust in the council and turned to extra-legal solutions to their 
problems. The result was anarchy in the reallocation of existing houses. Self-allocation of 
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vacant council housing became common as the unauthorised occupation of council houses 
spread in all areas. A major cause of this problem was the waiting list which was growing 
at an alarming rate every month as people signed on without fully understanding what to 
expect from the council- a rental house or a new ownership project house (Cape Argus 
1995). 
 
Almost eight years later, allocation problems still dominated the housing resource 
allocation processes. For instance, towards the end of 2002, an Irish entrepreneur donated 
thirty million rands to build homes for the shack dwellers at Imizamo Yethu in Hout Bay, 
one of the most affluent areas in Cape Town. One year later, only 250 of the 455 
beneficiaries received their title deeds for the houses built with this money. The process 
was fraught with many problems amongst them the continued influx of new shack dwellers 
into the area, bureaucratic resistance, opposition by the white community in Hout Bay and 
even more alarming, internal political problems. One intended beneficiary commented: 
“The process of plot allocation has become politicised. It is not being done legally but in 
the interests of the ruling party. If you don’t vote ANC, you won’t get a house.” 3 Several 
ANC committees took it upon themselves to define eligibility criteria and went on to 
allocate the homes. In another incident in a different housing project for fire victims, a 
homeless woman lamented, “Why are they building homes for the Joe Slovo residents and 
many more who were not born here and took no part in the struggle?” (Cape Argus 2004).  
 
Just after 1994, the media played a huge role in exposing the irregularities in housing 
provision. For instance, the council’s waiting list was useless as it was not part of the new 
post 1994 housing policy. It was only applicable to the previous government’s rental 
housing stock. In some projects, beneficiaries were drawn up from council waiting lists 
and in others, a separate beneficiary list was drawn up. Confusion was exacerbated by 
waiting lists of the previous era which were not respected due to the element of inequity in 
them. In the Cape Metropolitan area, the main beneficiaries seemed to be the largely 
African population from informal settlements who got incorporated into the projects 
(Thurman 1999:24; Interview 2001). Many waiting lists existed in different institutions 
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largely because prior to 1994, the sixty-four local authorities did not keep waiting lists 
since housing was traditionally a provincial responsibility.   
 
When the rental stock became vacant, the council was to procedurally and appropriately 
allocate it to the next person on the waiting list in terms of clear criteria. But overzealous 
councillors tended to influence the allocation process by putting undue pressure on the 
officers in charge of the allocation (City of Cape Town 1997:3). A form of remuneration 
for the civics also took place when recommendations were made to the council on 
allocation decisions. Street committees in particular were the structures that decided on 
who should obtain access to council stock, who should share their house and with whom, 
and who should be evicted. At times departing tenants, neighbours or gangs allocated 
vacant council housing making it impossible for those on the waiting list to get a chance. 
An unusual practice of tenants swapping their council houses also became common and 
contributed to problems of jumping the queue (ibid:4). 
 
In addition to influencing allocative decisions, councillors were known to interfere in the 
award of tenders to housing developers, promising beneficiaries the impossible with regard 
to housing and they deliberately promoted the interests of one organisation relative to 
similar such organizations (City of Cape Town 1991:4). The behaviour of some councillors 
and officials implied that council decisions required the ratification or endorsement of 
external structures such as the Reconstruction and Development Programmes forums 
(RDP),4 street committees and Civic and Ratepayers Associations (ibid.7). Confusion on 
who to report to and be accountable to threw the entire council into turmoil and ground it 
to a standstill. Years of racial policy, bad administration, political turmoil, lack of political 
direction, gangsterism, and poor economic circumstances all grounded housing delivery 
(Cape Argus 1995). Allocating houses became a nightmare in Cape Town as allocation 
criteria was never clarified during the transition period. The illegal occupation of newly 
built houses increased with Africans often forcibly occupying houses built for coloureds on 
the grounds that their ownership was illegitimate because houses were allocated on a racial 
basis. The council was thus ignored as a major role player in housing delivery by both the 
government and the house seeking communities. 
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The National Housing Policy 
During the struggle, the ANC had advocated a people-centred process in which 
communities could play an important role in housing provision. The constraint was that 
this had to be achieved through the private sector. At the change over to majority rule in 
1994, it was essential to reassure the west that South Africa was still a safe destination for 
investment and was generally responding to the globalization discourse on housing as led 
by the World Bank (SAHPF 1998; Lalloo 1999; Bond 2000; Wilson and Lowery 2003:48). 
South Africa’s land and housing policy therefore followed the same trajectory as most 
third world countries: the shift from government provision of housing stock towards 
deregulation, allowing market forces to dictate access to land and shelter; the acceptance of 
squatters as economic refugees requiring basic services that are to be delivered by private 
contractors and releasing state land on the periphery of the cities for would be squatters 
and illegal occupations (PD, 2001:9). This for South Africa, had started in the eighties, 
spearheaded by academic and other institutions such as The Urban Foundation5, IDT and 
the National Housing Forum (NHF),6 which set the framework for the development of a 
low-cost housing paradigm in South Africa. This paradigm heavily influences the housing 
policy of the day, which is sarcastically referred to as “government –driven housing 
intervention for private sector profit without risk” (ibid:9).  
 
During the 1994 election campaign, housing was made the number one priority of the 
impending government and was strongly emphasized in the RDP that was dubbed as the 
ANC manifesto (Wilkinson 1998). The aims were to meet the basic needs of the majority, 
develop human resources, build the economy and democratize the state and society. To 
achieve its promise to deliver the five million houses that would wipe out the housing 
backlog, the ANC appointed one of its most respected politicians from the South Africa 
Communist Party, an ANC alliance group, Joe Slovo,7 as Housing Minister in the GNU. 
Slovo immediately worked to bring all stakeholders in housing provision to a public forum 
called the Botshabelo Accord where all pledged to play their part in housing delivery in the 
new political era.8 
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The key features of the new housing policy which emerged at this forum were: a Mortgage 
Indemnity Scheme, whereby government would compensate banks (up to 80 percent of 
bond value) which could recover unpaid loans to new home buyers; a Builder’s Warranty 
which aimed to assure home buyers of the quality of the workmanship by the construction 
industry and a Capital Subsidy Scheme under which individuals or groups could apply for 
grants of up to 15 000 rands to build a new house (Ministry of Housing 1997). The scheme 
was funded by the National Department of National Housing (DOH) and administered by 
the provinces. The subsidy was designed to be accessed via a developer who would 
shoulder the responsibility of overseeing the development of the physical structure. This 
according to Bond (2000:149), was in line with neo-liberalism as developers would get 
their profit via banks that would also profit.9 Then land costs, municipal fees and 
infrastructure costs would also be deducted from the 15 000 rands leaving very little for the 
actual house itself. In an environment with a multitude of legislative blockages, 
constitutional constraints (protection of property rights) market limitations, high land 
servicing costs and a rather hostile bureaucracy, the policy slowly faced problems in 
addition to consolidating existing inequalities by developing new projects in formerly 
designated black areas. Those with higher incomes were favoured because they had the 
capacity to gain access to credit and the private sector developers targeted them (ibid). 
There clearly was an inequitable allocation of funding between different low-income 
groups. 
 
Six years later, in May 2000, the new Housing Minister, Sankie Mthembi Nkondo, 
announced publicly that the policy had failed to work as it became clear that the promised 
one million houses had failed to materialize. Only 92 000 houses went up between 1994 
and 1997 (PD 2000:2). Mass housing provision for the poor through ‘mobilising’ the 
private sector’ was clearly the wrong approach. In the Peop le’s Dialogue’s (2001:3) words,  
The ANC had assumed wrongly that the country’s highly developed capitalist 
system, with its world class banking system, construction companies and abundant 
private sector finances, could meet the housing needs of largely unemployed and 
poor people. 
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Its main setback was its lack of relevant knowledge and relative inexperience in policy 
formulation. This made the party to lose out to the traditional ‘experts’  (Gusler 2000; 
Lalloo 1998). 
 
The housing policy, one of the concrete products of the Botshabelo compromise, reflected 
the tensions between the needs of capitalism and the realities of service provision to 
multitudes of poor people. The policy was based on people’s participation but it was 
drafted by government technocrats and private sector consultants who severely restricted 
real participation by fitting the People’s Housing Process 10 into an institutional framework 
driven by market related and bureaucratic forces (People’s Dialogue  2001:1). The need for 
a consensus was essential. Waldron (cited in Barry 2002:271) makes this clear; 
...the need for a common view does not make the fact of disagreement evaporate. 
Instead it means that a basis for common action in matters of justice has to be 
forged in the heat of (the) disagreements. 
 
From 15 March 1994, the subsidy, a once off payment provided the product price of the 
property was 65000 rands or less, replaced all previous state family housing subsidy 
schemes and the following criteria was used for qualification: South African Citizenship or 
a permanent residence permit, marriage (in terms of the Civil Law or of a Customary 
Union) or living with a long term partner; being single, over 21 and with dependants; a 
household earning 3 500 rands per month or less, a spouse or a partner who had not 
previously owned property or benefited from any other state assisted subsidy scheme11 
including the IDT capital subsidy scheme and that one understands what a contract means 
and the responsibility that goes with it. This last criterion left the system open to different 
interpretations and was loaded with mistrust. 
 
Many criticisms have been directed towards the housing authorities for the insensitivity 
they portray in administering the subsidy scheme (Moss 2001). Initially, the subsidies were 
released on completion of development and yet no finance was made available during the 
construction phase. A major setback was that the poor were not in a position to ever afford 
mortgage repayments and none of those involved in the policy debate took cognisance of 
this.12 The release of the subsidy was based on the transfer of individual title to owner even 
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though occupancy rights might have been established and recognised by local authorities 
or other land owners. Secondly, subsidy applications remained complex and inaccessible to 
the poor (See appendix 3 on the various categories of subsidies). The national housing 
policy was clearly concerned with quantity and profit. The end result was that the rather 
small subsidy ended up being tied into site and infrastructure services by private 
contractors (PD 2002). See table 1. 
 
Table1 The Capital Subsidy Scheme 
Monthly beneficiary income Subsidy amount 
Up to R800 R15 000 
R801 to R1 500 R12 500 
R1 501 to R2 500 R  9 500 
R2 501 to R3 500 R  5 000 
Source: Department of Housing, Implementation Manual-Housing Subsidy Scheme, April 1995 
 
The state and the business sector do not trust the poor as reflected in the complexity 
surrounding the inaccessibility of subsidies by the poor. And lastly, implementation 
guidelines were criticized vehemently for making subsidies accessible only to big 
contractors which exacerbates the marginalization of the poor. The four types of 
subsidies13 spell out different requirements as they need an intermediary to act on their 
behalf. The patronising tendencies of the bureaucracy are revealed in that the poor black 
communities are assumed to be incapable of organizing access by themselves. 
 
Economic theories of trust organise financial transactions around mistrust resulting in 
numerous contracts to establish some compliance. This explains the maze of guidelines for 
accessing housing subsidies.14 In order to establish and enforce trust, a credible outsider, 
usually a housing developer, was required to manage the money individuals borrowed. 
This ensured that the money would be definitely used for housing (PD 2000). This implied 
mistrust since constant surveillance of the poor was to take place through a third party. The 
subsidy system itself excludes some categories of citizens such as single people with 
dependants in rural areas as one must be married or cohabiting or have one or more 
dependants. Naturally, many manipulate this and quickly assume the identity of a married 
person by quickly finding a partner. Dissatisfaction with this was displayed clearly by one 
irate new house owner towards a project manager who reported the encounter, “He told me 
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it is my mistake he is married because the community told him that he must get married in 
order to get a house. So now he has got a shit house and a shit wife” (Thurman 1999:24). 
 
Part of the problem has been that information on house seeking has not been readily 
available for the majority of house seekers.15 A survey by Thurman (1999:18) revealed that 
the majority of those who had managed to get into new council housing schemes got the 
information from a diverse range of sources including street committees, community 
leaders, neighbours, developers, councillors and council officials. Blacks, new immigrants 
in particular, rely on informal information networks and on social entry systems through 
local civic structures or community leadership to organise settlement. These traditional 
informal institutions screen new candidates and accept them into the community where 
some get to hear of the subsidies. Many others did not know about the subsidies, the house 
designs and the contractors. The bureaucrats did not bother to embark on an education 
campaign to inform citizens on how the new housing policy worked and how house 
seekers could prepare to access the subsidies. 
 
This is not surprising since, in general, bureaucrats tend to prefer the middle class who can 
afford to pay their way as their systems are not flexible enough to be responsive to 
different needs (Jenkins 1999). The poor in Cape Town thus avoid dealing with the 
bureaucracy in property dealings and carry out transactions informally (Smit 2001). 
Developers in particular were accused of concealing information and personalising the 
subsidy application process (ibid:19). This is because they are better positioned to access 
information on public services. A big problem is that the current policy favours a specific 
form of housing, the single plot per household, which marginalizes the poor as they cannot 
be located in inner city areas for many reasons (ibid 2001), amongst them the lack of land 
in those areas. This contributes to the silent attitude of the bureaucrats as it avoids having 
to deal with informed clients. 
 
Realising the problems faced in organizing to access both the subsidies and the land, the 
ANC saw the opportunity to facilitate this access with the ultimate aim of improving their 
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political gains in the province. In 1998, the ANC Housing Desk began to concentrate its 
energy on: 
…a campaign … calling on the local governments who are owners of the a ssets or 
will soon become the owners, to provide a further discount on the price (of 
housing) to ensure that transfer of ownership can happen at minimum cost to the 
purchaser. This will also be seen as a major gain by a key sector we are trying to 
organize. 
 
The ANC had begun to use housing resource allocation as a political mobilisation strategy. 
 
 
Institutional Framework for Housing Delivery 1993 
The first institutional framework for the new political dispensation was established in 
terms of the Housing Arrangements Act of 1993. The GNU immediately  embarked on a 
massive institutional restructuring of housing delivery structures. The DOH in 
collaboration with the NHF and nine Joint Technical Committees, formulated the national 
housing policy in 1994. Section 2 of the Housing Arrangements Act (No.155 of 1994) 
made provisions for the establishment of the National Housing Board (NHB) that replaced 
the former apartheid National Housing Commission and the South African Housing 
Advisory Council (DOH 1994:4). The NHB also replaced the Development and Housing 
Boards of the three Own Affairs Administration. At this time, the NHB calculated that at 
least 5 percent of the national budget had to be allocated to housing each year in order to 
cater for the estimated 370 000 housing units that had to be constructed annually to address 
the backlog of one and a half million units which was estimated to grow at 198 000 units 
per annum (ibid 1994). This institutional building and restructuring took place against the 
background of ANC promises that should it come into power, one million houses would be 
built for low-income groups for the first five years during its tenure. 
 
The new DOH was tasked with reconciling the different ideologies of the stakeholders in 
the formulation of the housing policy. However, since the process was dominated by 
conservative bureaucrats, it naturally depended more on its other conservative NHF and 
DBSA consultants (Lalloo 1999). This effectively excluded the other progressive 
technocrats and South Africa National Civic Organisation (SANCO) who had been part of 
the architects of the RDP housing programme (Bond 2000:138). According to Bond, this 
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exclusion has been blamed for the heavy pro-capitalist tones in the implementation of the 
subsidies. Though the national level was dominated by the ANC politicians, they were 
overwhelmed by the capacity of the other more experienced stakeholders- (apartheid 
technocrats in particular), who, in the true democratic fashion, also participated in policy 
formulation. Complications arose because at the provincial level in the Western Cape, the 
NNP held the reigns as it had won the majority vote in the elections. Political commitment 
at this level and the municipal level was therefore crucial for the success of any policy 
especially one targeting the poor Africans. This commitment has not been readily 
forthcoming and has contributed significantly to the development of events with regard to 
housing provision. 
 
The NHB allocates funds from the National Housing Fund to the PHBs (made up of 
representatives of housing consumers and deliverers), which in turn allocates them as lump 
sum capital subsidies to approved projects. The PHBs are responsible for the 
implementation of the housing policy at the provincial level including the distribution of 
subsidies to individuals or other project end users. They are also mandated with ensuring 
that integrated development takes place within the low-income communities in the housing 
delivery process. Capacity building within self-organising communities also falls within 
their realm of responsibility. The PHBs are at a vantage point as they advise the provincial 
Members of the Executive Council (MECs)16 on housing policy matters. This gives the 
board more power over the politicians as it makes all the decisions and signs the cheques 
for housing resources. And since it is accountable to the NHB, it can effectively bypass the 
MECs in the implementation process. With MECs being accountable to the electorate and 
to the legislature, tensions in the working relationship are inevitable. Problems arise 
between the politicians and the implementors which can be resolved by having 
independent PHBs so as to minimize the confidence gap that arises in the resource 
allocation process. 
 
For housing projects to qualify for funding from the PHBs, they had to be initiated through 
“social compacts” 17 which were forums that encompassed all affected stakeholders in an 
area with a housing need (PD 1995; DOH 1997). The stakeholders are from diverse 
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backgrounds such as civics, trade unions, employers, developers, political organisations 
and local government. The important criterion for them was that they had to be a legally 
recognized body that could be ‘trusted’ on behalf of the house seekers (ibid). The memory 
of defaulting house owners haunted the bureaucrats hence the need for an institution to 
minimize the risk was essential. Conservative attitudes within the Housing Board were 
soon softened by the real threat of mass action by house seekers. For instance, in 1994, the 
board turned down a subsidy application by one of the country’s largest and oldest housing 
cooperative, the Seven Buildings Project in Gauteng (PD 2001). It argued that the group 
was ineligible for public funds because of their collective ownership form of tenure. 
Eviction notices were then served on the group and more than 500 members staged a sit in 
until the minister of housing assured them that they would become the government’s pilot 
scheme in social housing (Bond 2000:140). This successful cooptation, as a pilot scheme, 
into the ANC’s party programme, signal led the power collective action had over the 
bureaucracy. 
 
Land availability is also an important criterion for project subsidy funding but the housing 
delivery institutional set up does not reflect the provision of land for low-income housing. 
According to the 1996 Green Paper on Land, the government18 owns a huge portion of the 
country’s land that is equal to  about one third of all the land, yet responsibility for this 
resource is not specified and housing projects have to scour for what they consider to be 
suitable land for their needs. As early as 1993, the ANC had shown clearly that it did not 
trust the Western Cape Provincial government to act in the best interests of the urban poor 
by calling for a freeze on all city development on publicly-owned land with the intention of 
first identifying all such land and transferring its ownership to a Public Land Trust which 
would then assess development needs with high density housing receiving priority (Cape 
Argus 1993). The Department of Land Affairs was just as fragmented as the DOH but it 
moved more swiftly in redefining its role in land provision for housing. A piece of 
legislation, the Development Facilitation Act, was designed to circumvent the red tape that 
was blocking the release of state land for low-cost housing (PD 2001). This ‘fast tracking’ 
was aimed at reducing delays in state land release from eighteen to six months. The 
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Western Cape Provincial government refused adamantly to implement this act (ibid) and 
effectively slowed down housing provision for low income groups, Africans in particular. 
 
An obstacle has been the apparent indifference shown by councils in the poor support they 
give to the PHP. In addition to an overwhelming desire to control the housing delivery 
process, a rather stagnant bureaucracy and a lack of political will all combine to retard 
housing delivery. The bureaucracy clearly did not consider the order as ‘legitimate’ and 
this Lipsky (1980:16) attributes to the fact that lower level bureaucrats do not necessarily 
share their superiors’ goals. Hence the refusal to carry out orders on land release was not 
just slippage between orders and implementation. 
 
Local Government Housing Institutions 
From 1909, South Africa has had a three-tier government system with the provincial level 
in between the central and local governments. Central government develops policies and 
distributes resources to provincial governments that then become responsible for 
implementing the policies and the transfer of resources to the public through the local 
authorities. Municipalities therefore continue to derive their power from provincial 
ordinances and can only carry out activities specified by the central or provincial 
ordinances. The Local Government Transition Act (209 of 1993) set out the reorganization 
of post apartheid local government that took place in three phases, the pre-interim, the 
interim and the final local government dispensation (Behrens et al, 1998). 
 
During the pre-interim phase, existing local authorities were replaced with nominated but 
more representative, transitional local government structures. In the interim phase, 
democratically elected transitional local government structures were established and the 
final phase was after the first national wide municipal elections that took place much later 
in the Western Cape as consensus over boundaries delayed progress. The re-organisation 
of local authorities in Cape Town was delayed because of political disputes over sub-
structure and boundaries. White communities were not willing to share resources with 
former poor black areas and they did not trust the ANC’s proposals for new boundaries 
that had re-distributional consequences. In the first two phases, local government structures 
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within metropolitan areas were transformed from Regional Services Councils, City 
Councils and Municipalities to Transitional Metropolitan Councils and Transitional 
Municipal Substructures (ibid:7). 
 
The housing responsibilities of all these authorities were never clarified as the Housing Act 
itself simply stated that municipalities were to engage in lower income housing provision 
in a variety of ways that ranged from facilitating housing development by developers to 
administering national housing programmes (PD 2002). This situation contributed to 
hesitancy by local governments to take the initiative in housing delivery as they naturally 
resisted being treated as mere agents of the provincial level in housing provision. Local 
authorities were tasked with the realisation of the holistic approach in that community 
developers were to manage infrastructural provision as well as management of the new 
residential areas. They were also to ensure that housing providers complied with and 
adhered to municipal building standards. However, provisions of sections 6 to 23 of the 
Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act no.63 of 1975) allowed municipalities by way of notice in 
the Provincial Gazette, to expropriate any land required for the purposes of housing 
development in terms of any national housing programme but once again, the CTMC never 
used this facility (PD 2000). For instance, as late as 1996, the province had continued to 
spend 61 percent of its allocation on projects approved under the previous government thus 
effectively ignoring African housing needs 19 (Mayibuye 1996). 
 
Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing- Transformed Bureaucrats? 
The apartheid state itself had behaved in the manner most post-colonial states have. Its 
bureaucracy was just as bloated by duplicated functions for the different racial categories 
and was stuffed mostly by white officials (Gusler 2000:23). For instance, twelve 
departments were involved in housing delivery before 1994 and an immediate task for the 
new government was to reform the institutions as well as make them representative of the 
population. In 2002, the senior management of the Western Cape’s government 
departments was very much the same as before 1994 with 70 percent being white males 
(See table 2). Honouring constitutional provisions pertaining to the creating of a 
representative bureaucracy such as Section 212(2) which states that: “The public shall… 
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(b) promote an efficient public administration broadly representative of the South African 
community” have remained elusive (South Africa Constitution  1996). As can be expected, 
there was a partial paralysis of governance emanating from the integration of old apartheid 
bureaucrats with newly elected and newly appointed officials. The new practice of 
governance in a democratic society was complicated by the dominant old mind-sets that 
stifled effective development. 
 
Table 2 Provincial Housing Directorate Gender and Racial Make-up 
Race Men Women Total 
White 36 10 46 
Coloured 62 27 89 
Black 5 1 6 
Total 103 38 141 
Source: Compiled from information from the Professional and Technical Services Department and the 
Housing Settlements Department. 
 
Further complications arose from the mistrust harboured by both sides as Maphai (1995) 
noted, 
The new (ANC) government came to office distrusting the career bureaucracy. 
They suspected it to be salted with holdovers from the previous administration and 
to be unsympathetic to their priorities. They believed they (old bureaucrats) would 
sabotage their efforts. 
 
Many of the new public managers continued to implement policies that had cosmetic 
rearrangements that fitted the new political order such that the past continued to set the 
example and standard (Human 1998). More ever, because of the coalition governance 
style, it became difficult to Africanise the public service since compromise was an 
essential part of the resource allocation process. The apartheid system had deprived most 
Africans of the necessary education to man responsible positions in key areas of the public 
service hence the public service gravitated on on the basis of the inherited expertise that is 
located in the old bureaucrats. The power of the colonial inertia was grossly 
underestimated hence the culture of mistrusting authority remained intact. 
 
By the beginning of 2000, the inherited bureaucrats were no longer protected by the 
‘sunset clauses’ 20 of the negotiated settlement. These clauses guaranteed the position of 
incumbent civil servants for five years. The ANC agreed to refrain from purging the civil 
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service thus leaving much of the institutional culture and personnel intact. To bypass these 
provisions and infuse new blood through the affirmative action programme, the ANC put 
in place a voluntary severance scheme. The affirmative action policy in South Africa was a 
deliberate attempt to form part of the new citizenship status for the previously 
disenfranchised blacks. The result was that the old bureaucrats who stayed on became 
more resistant to change in order to safeguard their careers, a move that has affected 
service delivery. 
 
Politicians in the province have been known to pressure government officials (many of 
them old anti-apartheid activists) to provide them with ‘legislative provisions’ to use 
against land invaders (PD 2001:10). On the other hand, the civil service officials who have 
to implement the policies have demonstrated an eagerness to pursue a more 
accommodating approach that includes not taking any action. Eight years into the ANC’s 
term of office, these officials continue to define the context in which land availability, 
service delivery and the construction of formal houses take place. Development tribunals 
decide on how land is to be used but the Western Cape’s provincial government has 
consistently refused to use the Development Facilitation Act to release land. The national 
government has powers of expropriation but even if it gives the land, the process of 
rezoning causes delays and problems notably because the provincial level has power over 
local authorities in rezoning land for low-income residential purposes (ibid). 
 
Thurman (1999) conducted a survey in 1998-1999 that captured the attitudes of the public 
officials in dealing with the housing problem. Her findings confirm that paternalistic 
tendencies became a way of dealing with the Africans for many of post-apartheid’s 
bureaucrats as the PHB’s Billy Coetzee’s sentiments  revealed; 
I think we are concentrating too much on turning people into home owners … they 
(Africans) are not trained to be homeowners, they don’t necessarily  want to be 
homeowners, they just want a roof over their heads…may be we should be spending 
money on creating job opportunities and upgrading  squatter settlements and 
spending money on services…. I think they (Africans) will look after themselves 
when it comes to housing…  
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The head of research in the CTMC housing department cynically commented, “These 
people do not want land, they are interested in the top structure only” .21 The housing 
director of the CTMC was also in the same boat when he concurred, “There is no such 
thing as a housing problem, there is only an employment and income problem”. And most 
incredulous of all was the 1995 research report by the National Business Initiative, which 
claimed that blacks actually liked living in shacks (Bond 2000:144). This was reminiscent 
of the attitudes that had been exhibited more than fifty years before. An acting 
Commissioner of Lands in South Africa in 1949, E.R. Cousins, had remarked in a report 
that influenced the state’s behaviour towards housing provision for blacks  then; “There are 
far more individual Africans who would be prepared to build suitable houses for 
themselves than I had thought”. The response was that “they [Africans] be granted as much 
latitude as possible…let [them] do [their] own work … and not be too particular about the 
results” (Harris Richard 1998:181).  
 
It is against this background of the need for a representative bureaucracy that the ANC 
developed a Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy22 in 1996 with the intention of seizing 
control over the entire state machinery and extending hegemony over civil society. The 
policy document stated that the ANC must strengthen (its) leadership in all other sectors of 
social activity [outside of the state] including: the economy, arts and culture, mass popular 
organisation, mass communication, recreation, education, sports and science and 
technology (ANC Discussion Documents 1997 and 1998). A National Deployment 
Committee headed by the ANC deputy president and Deployment Committees at the 
provincial and local government levels were consequently set up. From 1994, many career 
civil servants who retired or took retrenchment packages were replaced by ANC members 
or veterans of the struggle but this was not coordinated which undermined the collective 
mandate as some believed in the independence of the civil service and some adhered to 
party discipline (Democratic Party 2001:41). 
 
According to the terms of the policy, the National Working Committee,23 the supreme 
body of the ANC, was mandated to deploy ANC cadres to all state institutions including 
the public service, local government administration and statutory bodies.24 The cadres in 
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all spheres were expected to defend and implement the will of the party leadership with 
maximum political discipline prevailing (Democratic Party 2000:iii; Friedman 2004).25 
The understanding was that constitutional constraints could be bypassed if loyal people 
were placed in strategic positions.26 A deployment strategy to ensure loyalty to the party 
became crucial as stated in the party’s Challenges of Leadership Document; 27 
It is not individuals as such who are in government, but ANC members deployed to 
fulfill a function. The parameters within which they carry out their functions are 
defined by the ANC and they should account to it (ANC Discussion Document 
1997b). 
 
The NEC publicly condemned its own cadres in 1997 for not showing more loyalty to the 
party; “You are not only ANC cadres after hours” 28 (ANC-NEC Report 1997). At the 
party’s 50th National Conference in Mafikeng, the party resurrected and reaffirmed the 
principle of democratic centralism in a conference resolution. This fuelled and confirmed 
fears that a new class loyal to the party and whose positions depended on the party staying 
in power was emerging (Democratic Party 2000). 
 
Mandela’s  (ANC-NEC Report 1997) statement at the Mafikeng conference signified a 
move from the ANC’s earlier commitment to a non -partisan civil service as he spelt out; 
Our starting point as we tackle the task of further strengthening the ANC must be 
based on recognition of the fact that fundamental social transformation of our 
country cannot happen without the people who understand and are committed to 
bringing this transformation about. In other words, to discharge this revolutionary 
task ahead of us, we need battalions of revolutionaries who are as ready to serve the 
people as have been the generations of cadres that preceded them.29 
 
 
Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor, echoed the same sentiments at the same venue . He 
emphasised that there was; 
… a need for a strong ANC made up of honest and dedicated cadres because this  is 
the only political instrument that the masses of our people have in their hands to 
carry out the many and difficult tasks we have to discharge … without a strong 
ANC dedicated to the service of the people by word and deed, the ordinary masses 
of our people would have no political organisation to advance their cause and 
protect their interests.  
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The Public Services Amendment Act which contained a new clause authorising the 
President and the premiers to make appointments and other career incidents came into 
effect on July 7 1999. Deputy ANC President Jacob Zuma acknowledged in parliament 
that though the ANC had established these deployment committees, the identification of 
people, not just from the ANC but those committed to the ideals of the constitution and 
with the necessary skills for particular positions would be encouraged hence the normal 
and transparent employment procedures would still be followed (DP 2000:21). With this 
strategising, the ANC got a good grip on most power centres in most of the provinces 
except in Kwa-Zulu Natal30 and the Western Cape. But still, the ANC uses every 
opportunity it can get to infuse loyal civil servants through the affirmative action policy. 
The question then is: Is representativity then indistinguishable from ANC control? 
 
Perhaps Friedman (2001:3) aptly rationalises these actions for a hurting nation, 
Many of the leaders including the president are also products of exile. They have 
experienced a type of politics different from that required now. In exile it was 
unwise to trust anyone except your closest connections-the new and unknown 
‘friend’ you embrace is as likely to be a spy as (much as) an ally. The demands of 
an underground fight encourage secrecy and centralization. Inevitably these habits 
now influence the way in which we are governed. 
 
In the Western Cape province, to improve the level of tolerance for cultural differences in a 
heterogenous community requires the creation of a representative bureaucracy. This 
transformation has been slowed down by the power struggle between the ANC and the 
NNP. The affirmative action31 policy sought to correct imbalances in the bureaucracy by 
making it representative. Some analysts accused the NNP of using the coloureds to shield 
themselves against the ANC’s policies (Wilmot e t al 1996:85). Since before 1994, The 
NNP has continued to carve an image of the ANC as destructive with its commitment to 
Africanisation, a perception confirmed when African squatters invaded houses built for 
coloureds (ibid 35). The affirmative action policy was resisted and portrayed as “a threat to 
the positions of coloureds- a new form of swart gevaar (danger posed by blacks)”. For 
coloureds, the threat became real that blacks would take over their homes, jobs, social and 
economic opportunities.32 
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The ANC has not penetrated the coloured community where it was largely viewed as the 
face of black majoritarianism hence the coloureds did not trust it as it was unsure of its 
intentions (James, 1996:40). A further setback was that in coloured communities, it is not 
easily allowed to change one’s political stance because changing to adapt to a shifting 
political environment is regarded as evidence of opportunism, of blowing with the wind 
and of a deficiency in core political values (ibid:40). As a group that is still seeking for an 
identity, it is important for them to be suspicious of all political action. An expression they 
frequently use with regard to housing resource allocation is: “Before we were not white 
enough, now we are not black enough” (Wilmot 1996 ; People’s Dialogue 1999).  
 
Steering or liberating? The ANC’s Role in Housing Delivery 
As an opposition party in the province, the ANC works directly with the national 
government and civil society in housing delivery. For effective co-ordination of the party’s 
policy and monitoring activities, a housing desk was set up at the provincial level. The 
desk includes ANC officials at all levels: Western Cape Members of Parliament and 
Members of the Provincial Legislature standing committee, the National Assembly 
Standing Committee as well as the National Council of the Province’s permanent delegates 
dealing with housing; councillors serving on housing committees in the Metropolitan Local 
Councils and Transitional Local Councils; ANC regional representatives, alliance partners, 
ANC aligned officials in housing departments at the provincial and local government 
levels; ANC comrades working in housing and development NGOs and ANC members in 
the province with knowledge of housing delivery (Interview 2000). 
 
The desk organises monthly meetings that are intended to facilitate and work with civil 
society since informal associations in particular require assistance. The ANC housing desk 
also invites all concerned and interested parties in housing projects to debate contending 
issues especially access to land in metropolitan areas and financing of housing ventures. 
The party’s position is that land should be free for all those on full subsidies. It therefore 
commits itself to help identify land, campaign for that land and attempts to win the battle 
for that land at no cost (Interview 2000). This stance annoys the provincial government 
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which argues against this as they feel it would create inequities amongst poor home 
seekers. 
 
The ANC housing desk tasks itself with concentrating all the knowledge on land 
availability in its hands because it argues that the people are still disempowered and, in any 
case, it is difficult for them to access all information from the maze of institutions. The 
homeless poor are usually ignorant of all the legislation that is passed and illiteracy and 
fear of authority compound their problems. City officials have been accused of selling 
available city land on the market disregarding the needs of the poor (PD 1999). This 
reflects the agenda of the council as being driven by profit maximisation through and 
through. The absence of both a representative and responsible bureaucracy to act as a 
watchdog against these practices compounds the problem as do the policy differences 
between the national government (free land for the poor) and the provincial government 
(sell all land at market price) (ibid). 
 
In this Western Cape province, the ANC has organised more with regard to housing than 
the government and in the provinces where the ANC dominates, more houses were 
delivered. Due to its influence, and its education campaign, the poor have come to realize 
that they do have a choice on where to stay and owning a house has become very important 
such that poor people are willing to sacrifice their lives for a house in areas where job 
opportunities and better livelihoods are more likely. Initially, housing was not important 
for Africans in the Western Cape because they were told that their houses must be in rural 
areas and so they had continued to invest in temporary shacks with the hope of eventually 
returning to their rural homes. For the politicians, the black majority was positioned as 
being central to the creation of a democratic non-racial, non-sexist society. Pallo Jordan 
(1994), a high ranking government official and a veteran of the struggle, made this clear, 
“Would the ANC profit by trying to ponder to the baser instincts of the Coloured and 
Indian working people?”  
 
The ANC helps to organise communities even though they maybe out of ANC structures 
and it clearly does not matter where they are from.33 The party is recognized for its 
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historical role in black communities which earns it trust that is based on evidence of 
commitment and follow up by officials handling the issue. In the words of the ANC 
Provincial spokesperson on housing,  
When communities are blocked by officials, they come to the ANC first or later… 
no trust for bureaucrats because of unrepresentativeness, also individual members 
help to break down trust. 
 
For instance in 1999, the housing desk tried to engage the housing board with a view to 
developing criteria to prioritise ‘certain applications’. 34 The ANC has always considered 
itself as having broad responsibilities for grassroots development and on top of its agenda 
is transformation and ultimately political power. It thus takes “on the bureaucracy” by 
facilitating meetings with officials and assuming an activist role that involves campaigning 
and mobilisation. This strategy has earned the housing desk the title, ‘the ANC shadow 
department to the MEC housing department’. The ANC adamantly states that  (Claasens 
1991:43), 
The redistribution of the land is the absolute imperative in our conditions, the 
fundamental national demand. It will have to be done, even if it involves some 
economic cost, in order to continue to mobilise the people whose support has 
brought the democratic forces to power. 
 
The ANC housing desk admitted that it tells the people to make more demands on the 
system and it provides the information which is the power they need (Interview 2000). 
Many CBOs usually go through many ANC structures and the ANC tends to take charge of 
the townships. There are also complementary organisations but these pose no threat to the 
ANC which rests in the comfort that “Though everyone can get land under th e ANC, once 
they join the project, they join the ANC”. 35 However, intolerance to independent 
organization is explicit as evidenced by councillor Sidina’s remarks, “You cannot organise 
projects within ANC as SANCO36 or as an individual. That is not tolerable” . 
 
The ANC’s influence is visualised more in the attitude of its councillors who dominate the 
low-income areas. These play both a positive and a negative role depending on who is 
delivering the product and who is benefiting. With housing as the ultimate public good in 
Cape Town’s urban politics, ANC councillors bear the burden of being judge and jury with 
regard to African housing delivery. For instance, supporting ‘toilet houses’ was deemed 
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catastrophic for one’s political career and yet being sidelined by  private providers meant 
sidelining the party itself in the development of these new communities (PD 2000). Being 
between a rock and a hard place was a fatal place for a mobilising party. 
 
The councillors’ negative role came to the fore in the Gauteng prov ince when they delayed 
the housing provision process by fuelling tensions within projects that did not recognise 
them as steering the housing delivery process (ibid). Acting as guardians of the people, the 
councillors acted to inform the house seekers of the profit margins the developers 
concealed from them and the variations in price and expenses of similar housing schemes 
which all exposed the developer’s profiteering from the subsidy. Armed with this 
information, beneficiaries increasingly refused the houses provided by private housing 
providers. 
 
Civic Organisations 
Civic associations played a critical role in mobilising for the transformation of the political 
system and through SANCO, they contributed significantly to the collapse of local 
government institutions37 (Tapscott 2000). SANCO’s vision was to build a socialist 
movement consisting of the poor and the marginalised of society (Umrabulo 1999). Civic 
associations in this context refers to bodies representing specific interests of residents 
within a geographical area. Many sprung up from 1970 onwards and most were fronts of 
the national liberation movements. 
 
The civic organisations emphasized the destruction of apartheid rather than the movement 
to socialism as the goal of the national liberation struggle and neglected many other social 
issues (Bond 2000; Tapscott 2000). This was to be expected since in non-democratic 
societies, political mobilization tends to take precedent over community development 
(Miraftab 1997:362). The liberation struggles facilitated the growth of civic associations in 
townships which were previously insulated from political activity, while existing 
associations were often at the centre of mobilisation of the anti-apartheid campaigns 
(Houston 1999:260). Their challenging of the dominant system was also evident in the new 
structures created by them during the second half of the eighties. The introduction of street 
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committees constituted a challenge to the authority of local government in particular. 
Many civics stepped into the vacuum created by the collapse of the local authorities in 
1985, and established ‘people’s councils’ that performed limited administrative and 
judicial duties (Tapscott 2000). Their strategies took the form of challenging state power 
by directing their activities at opposing all forms of apartheid oppression and exploitation 
which township residents were experiencing. They began to link local demands such as 
rent and consumer boycotts with national political demands. The boycotts were well 
supported and played a central role in the collapse of the black local authorities in the mid 
eighties (Smit 2001). 
 
Such organisations usually dealt with local governance issues, service delivery and 
meeting basic needs in addition to challenging the political system when the ANC and 
PAC were banned. The civics promoted populist principles, encouraged popular 
participation but they also resorted to coercion and violence when compliance was not 
forthcoming (Tapscott 2000:11). However, they also demonstrated a willingness to be 
tolerant of authoritarianism as one civic leader commented, “We don’t mind a bit of 
authoritarianism as long as the ANC delivers”. Their significance was that they could be 
counted on to circumvent constitutional constraints and institutional blockages through 
their vibrancy. On remarks that South Africa still has a liberationist culture, another civic 
leader replied that blacks had a culture of entitlement just as most whites had a culture of 
priviledge. And another stated that since little had changed in South Africa, they saw no 
reason why should they pay for what was still apartheid with regard to social geography 
and poverty (ibid 119). 
 
In many instances, activists leading civic organizations used the symbols and rhetoric of 
the ANC to curb an independent spirit from emerging within their communities (Marais 
2001). Independent organizational initiatives and ideological heterogeneity was suppressed 
by force prompting Friedman (Mail and Guardian 2001) to conclude that “the symbolic 
strength of the exile movement often weakened attempts to build grassroots power within 
the country”.  Many of the civics maintained a lobbying role at the expense of their 
grassroots links (Wilson and Lowery 2003:49; ibid 268). Most of the CBOs that united 
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under the umbrella of SANCO which had a close alliance with the ANC, were ‘closed’ 
groups of politically committed cadres who enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
but were inexperienced in democratic governance, development or social upliftment (PD 
2001:3). The struggle had socialised them into a culture and a practice of sacrifice, warfare 
and authoritarian command. 
 
Many civic leaders in the fight for housing land were also ANC supporters seeking to 
mobilise their communities within the context of the national liberation struggle (DAG 
1999:5). Liberation tactics earned them the trust of their communities as evidenced by 
Goniwe Park residents who refused to approach the responsible government authority and 
instead went to a civic group during a land dispute. “This was  because the people trusted 
the civic to take up their issues effectively. They had no faith in speaking to the white 
people” (ibid  9). Civic organisations can thus be said to be located in the arena of local 
government where they act as checks on the untrustworthy officials. Thurman (1999:9) 
noted the comments of one civic official; 
It doesn’t pay for us to spend late nights in council meetings making decisions if 
they are not implemented. We do have some uncooperative officials; therefore, 
there must be a civic to ensure implementation of the decisions that are made by the 
council. 
 
It is through these links with civic organisations that housing delivery has made some 
commendable progress. It was within these civics that the cat and mouse game with civil 
servants took form. The Homeless People’s federation arose out of this background.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the relationship between the institutional framework for housing 
delivery and the housing policy formulation and implementation processes, the attitudes of 
key bureaucrats and other stakeholders. Successful access of housing resources requires an 
effective navigation of the terrain of conditionalities that determine housing provision for 
the poor. An important issue is that the ANC realized its relatively weak autonomy with 
regard to policy formulation and the constraints it placed on its redistribution project. This 
was a key decisive factor for its success in organizing legally within the party, though this 
was outside the government system, to facilitate housing delivery for the poor. Coupled 
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with a rather slow and frustrated affirmative action programme in the province, managing 
the knowledge system in housing delivery was crucial as that information was the essential 
ingredient in the face of a hostile bureaucracy. All the same, the motivations of the ANC 
were clear through out- continuous mobilization. Lessons from the struggle remained a 
reservoir for the ANC cadres especially when they sought to empower the poor with 
information for challenging a resistant system. And it is important to underscore that the 
resistance was not only a racial issue but a professional bureaucracy struggling to maintain 
its merit with regard to adherence to rules and regulations- however unjust. 
 
Civic groups have proved to be a real force on the development landscape in South Africa 
as they have been able to lobby government successfully on many policy issues. Many of 
the skills in negotiating and bargaining were learnt in the struggle hence the tendency to 
resort to military-like arm twisting tactics. This has also been aided by bureaucrats and 
politicians who at times connive with civic leaders and at times hold back due to a general 
lack of administrative capacity and protection of their interests. Even though, the new 
regime has yet to achieve integration of the poor Africans into the mainstream both 
physically and politically. All housing projects continue to be located far from employment 
and other opportunities. 
 
This chapter also challenges Africanisation as an administrative reform project since 
legislation appears to have the same effect in redressing inequalities and facilitating 
implementation. That housing bureaucrats resisted and ignored both also points to the need 
for further research on attitudes and values of not just post liberation war bureaucracies, 
but all post colonial bureaucracies in general. 
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which would have swayed black voters in its favour. See Gusler, F. (2000) Toilets in the Veld: Similarities in 
the Housing Policy of the New South Africa and the Former Apartheid State, Paper submitted to Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University for the degree of Mater of Urban and Regional Planning, p25. 
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23 Real power within the ANC resides in the National Working Committee which is the organ’s politburo. It 
meets more than fortnightly and is responsible for the day today running of the ANC. Even though, the 
National Executive Council is the highest organ of the ANC which determines policy within the framework 
set by the national conference. It has a broad policymaking and oversight role.  
24 Strategies for this are outlined in the ANC’s publication, Umrabulo, 4 th Quarter 1996. 
25 See also Marais, H. (2001), South Africa’s Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition, Zed 
Books, NY, who remarks that the ANC has a documented history that confirms its adeptness at nurturing and 
consolidating loyalty and consent. 
26 Part of the ANC discipline aims to ensure that its members and cadres internalise the liberation struggle 
principles, strategies, norms and organisational culture through political education, public debates as well as 
taking on specified responsibilities. See ANC Document (1997) Organisational Democracy and Discipline in 
the Movement. 
27 This ANC Discussion Document was prepared by a cadre who is also an academic, Joel Netshitenzhe. 
28 The ANC’s NEC complained that the ANC members in local government were not being sufficiently loyal 
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group. In the South African sense, it is targeted at the black majority and women who were discriminated 
against during apartheid’s affirmative action for the white community. The Hom eland policy cut across 
legitimate principles underpinning citizenship and the result manifested in a virtual absence of blacks from 
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action too by the ANC. However poverty surveys reveal a colour dimension-that 95percent of South Africa’s 
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a whole and its effect on the black population. They emerged in response to a wide range of political, 
economic and social factors and in some cases as a result of the organisational efforts of activists and the 
emphasis of these organisations was on the mobilisation and organisation of people around the concrete 
particulars of their everyday lives. See Houston, G.F. (1999) The National Liberation Struggle in South 
Africa, Ashgate, Sydney, p260. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Collective Action for Accessing Housing Resources 
 
Introduction 
This chapter looks into the PHP activist approach and the tactics used by the poor in the 
self-provision of housing by the SAHPF and the Silver City Housing cooperatives. The 
realization of dreams very often requires energy to translate the vision into reality and 
members of the housing schemes in this chapter demonstrate that resilience. 
Developmentalists believe that there can be no social change to the benefit of low income 
communities if the poor do not participate in designing, managing and realizing that 
process of change (Mitlin and Patel 2002:128). This is because when professionals are the 
agents of change, the locus of learning is viewed as shifting from the community. 
 
This chapter demonstrates the application of liberation struggle knowledge to counteract 
bureaucratic hurdles that blocked transformation as demonstrated by improved and equal 
access to services. Persuading the Afrikaner bureaucrats to ‘include’ housing provision for 
the African community on the provincial agenda proved to be a challenge that compelled 
the house seeking communities to be confrontational at times in their dealings with 
officials. The dynamics in land seeking highlight the problems of state capacity faced by 
unrepresentative bureaucracies. 
 
The Homeless People’s Federation 
Most of the important knowledge for our development was buried in our 
communities, like gold buried deep in the earth. If we wanted to get stronger we 
needed to dig it out and use it. For a long time now we have allowed others to mine 
the knowledge in our settlements for their own profit (Homeless South African cited 
in Biti et al 1998:19).1 
 
The SAHPF has received tremendous attention in the last few years from both academics 
and the media. Much of the attention has been on the achievements of the federation in 
regenerating social capital for development and the power of community solidarity in 
poverty alleviation (Patel and Mitlin 2002; Bond 2000). My focus is on how the group 
strategically manouvred through the use of patronage, to organize access to housing land. 
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The SAHPF is a network of homeless communities made up of women’s savings groups  in 
South Africa’s informal settlements. The network arose as a result of a People’s Dialogue 
on Land and Shelter2 conference that was initiated by the Catholic and Welfare 
Development of Cape Town. The idea was conceived in 1991 after a coming together of 
South Africa’s grassroots liberation movement, development ‘professionals’ and an 
experienced social housing movement from India, The National Slum Dwellers’ 
Federation (NSDF) (PD 1994). It was also a response to the lack of housing and basic 
social services provision by the apartheid government in the eighties. 
 
Everyone involved in housing initiatives for the poor wanted space in the dialogue 
initiative. To make sure the poor would have space to talk, each NGO working with the 
homeless was required to bring along five shack dwellers who would engage in dialogue 
whilst the NGO’s observed and shared knowledge from their experiences (Wilson and 
Lowery 2003:52). A strong lobby of ANC activists and civic leaders tried to discredit the 
people’s housing process from the very start, arguing that the conference lacked credibility 
because it had not ‘received a mandate’ from either the liberation organisations or th e 
communities (PD 2001:3). The expectation was that the organisers would seek the ANC’s 
blessing in this endeavour. At this first conference, the group split into two with some 
believing that the ANC would deliver houses for them whilst they sat back and the other 
group was willing to address their housing problems3 (Wilson and Lowery 2003:52). 
 
With about half the delegates willing to focus on socio-economic issues as opposed to 
political issues, and with the influence of the international network delegates, the 
conference culminated in the establishment of horizontal relations through exchange 
programmes amongst the international squatter organisations in India and South Africa 
(PD 2001:3). At this conference, the delegates were highly critical of all the political 
parties’ housing policies and they the refore formulated their own people-centred housing 
policy especially after the ANC had diplomatically urged them on; “In terms of the ANC 
style, whatever policy is decided upon, will be discussed with the people. It is not ANC 
style to make decisions from above” (PD  1994:4). The ANC continued to be cautious on 
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criticisms pertaining to the formulation of the ANC’s housing policy which had initially 
excluded the poor. 
 
From then on, the People’s Dialogue 4 began to mobilise thousands of homeless poor 
families into Savings and Loan Schemes for housing5 resulting in the official launch of the 
South African Homeless People’s Federation 6 in March 1994 at a People’s Dialogue 
Housing Policy Conference. The People’s Dialogue 7 then assumed the role of a 
professional, technical-administrative supporter for the federation and the homeless people 
organised themselves (Biti et al 1998:15). The PD’s role as professionals (facilitators) 
became that of legitimising the federation’s approaches especially bridging the knowledge 
gap between the white bureaucrats and the black community since framing the choices and 
options proposed by the poor was considered as requiring ‘expert knowledge’ (Fraser and 
Lepofsky 2004). 
 
All the saving schemes in the federation are autonomous groups with the right to make 
their own decisions as long as they resolve to do so through collective action sanctioned by 
the federation. Throughout the federation, membership consisted of ‘anarchist cells’ with a 
high level of participation, but always following the direction of the core group as Wilson 
and Lowery (2003:53) point out, “The federation kept them in tow in terms of exercising 
self discipline so that they would be included in the land accessing process”.  
 
Capacity Building-Technical Support and Resource Substitution 
The development of both vertical and horizontal relationships by the People’s Dialogue 
brought in new knowledge in organising for housing resources. From the very beginning, 
the organisation established very close working relationships with three NGOs in India, 
The NSDF, Mahila Milan and the Society for Promotion of Area Resource Centres 
(SPARC)8 (Biti et al 1998:10). The link started way back in 1989 when delegates from 
these three organisations met some ANC workers in Bangkok in 1989. The Indian groups 
became determined to help the South African black community live a decent life (SPARC 
1992:23). Their strategies in India, another highly divided society, provided invaluable 
knowledge. These international linkages and exchange visits expanded to include several 
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other countries such as the Phillipines, Namibia, Senegal, Kenya and Zimbabwe and 
continuous exchange programmes of the homeless and poor continue to influence 
strategies in the different countries. Intra-country knowledge exchanges between different 
federation communities capitalise on this knowledge and add on their own. 
 
Many home seekers joined the federation adding to the pool of skills already in it (PD 
2001:6). For the People’s Dialogue accepts and respects that:  
Only the poor themselves can truly understand their situation in the context of 
developing strategies to address poverty. Only they can understand their needs and 
priorities, the resources that they can offer, the social and political constraints that 
need to be overcome, and the opportunities that each specific context offers. 
Moreover, only the poor themselves know what they are prepared to do in order to 
address their needs (cited in Biti et al 1998:11) 
 
To assist with technical capacity, Building Information and Training centres sprung up as a 
logical response to the building activities of the HSS. Here, all housing information was 
collected by the federation members themselves and was shared with other communities 
via practical and on-going training processes that took place on a regular basis through 
exchange programmes. They thus effectively maximized on local knowledge and its 
applicability to their different contexts. 
 
The establishment of a revolving fund was essential for the federation to mobilize funds 
since government subsidies involved complicated procedures for both individuals and 
groups. The HSSs that make up the federation are independent units with their own distinct 
identities but they all do the following: survey and enumerate settlements, identify land, 
allocate sites, negotiate for tenure, design their own houses, determine levels of income 
and affordability, build the houses and control their own housing loan fund. The schemes 
are dominated by women, 85 percent of the members are women, but men are not excluded 
as long as they are very poor and live in shacks or in informal settlements (Interview-Rose 
2000). In every scheme in every region, many members of the federation tell stories about 
the obstructions by civic organisations, residents committee and political parties who felt 
they had to be consulted in the initiative (PD 2000). Though the federation was composed 
of independent units, the federation tasked itself with lobbying national leaders and 
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canvassing for resources from all units at the national level first and the provincial level 
later on (Interview 2000). The house seekers were thus in a position to exercise power that 
would save them from marginalisation by the authorities who controlled access to the 
desired resources. 
 
During the first democratic elections in 1994, there was a dramatic increase in land 
occupations9 all over the country that were well planned. From the onset, the group took 
advantage of the democratic elections and occupied land and all invasions were carefully 
planned (PD 1995).  These included plans for basic services such as water supply and 
roads. The first nationally coordinated land invasions10 undertaken by the federation took 
place in March 1997 after the leadership had put in place a “24 point plan” to prepare 
groups for successful invasion11 (See Appendix 4). The plan has remained in place and it 
prepares schemes for rapid site development. Groups wishing to occupy land are required 
to show that they have followed the steps outlined in the plan so that the federation can 
support them and how soon these steps can be completed depends on the attitude of the 
federation leader (Biti et al 1998:43). The main setback for the federation was that housing 
subsidies were only allocated to those already possessing individual land title and there 
were only two such communities in the federation. Any other housing collective 
organisations could not access this state resource designed for the poor. The much talked 
about equity principle was thus not fulfilled. The federation then tasked itself with 
acquiring land for its schemes through a combination of invasions, negotiations with 
owners and purchases facilitated by the Department of Land Affairs (ibid 1998:3). 
 
The complex bureaucratic arrangements surrounding the subsidy compelled the federation 
to make contact and lobby the then Minister of Housing, Comrade Joe Slovo. Part of the 
federation’s strategy involved penetrating new territory through the leadership of the 
organisation that enjoyed support within the “community” and invi ting dignitaries to attend 
special ceremonies. These were, as expected, people who had influence in the sphere of 
land and shelter (PD 1997:26). Noting that the federation was an institution for mobilising 
and empowering the poor, Slovo pledged to release twenty million rands for their projects 
(PD 2001:13). As a devoted communist, the assumption was that he was the official that 
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could handle a people’s organization (ibid). He lived up to the expectation as he 
demonstrated how people’s organisations could a ccess state resources outside of the 
normal channels. 
 
For instance, in Kanana, Gauteng Province, a savings scheme that had invaded land made 
links through the federation to the Minister for Land Affairs. The Minister openly 
supported the federation’s init iative in Kanana and urged his officials to use the new 
legislation, passed by the ANC led government, to fast track the granting of tenure for the 
people of Kanana (PD 1999:10). After the approval, the Lekoa Town Council in which 
Kanana fell, applied for subsidies on behalf of all the families in the settlements in Kanana, 
Election Park and Freedom Square. Inspite of this support, legitimation of the federation’s 
activities upset the new ANC councillors the most. For they had been the loyal comrades 
who fought apartheid violently and now the federation members in Kanana were making 
the comrade councillors look useless in the eyes of the people. The women in the savings 
scheme were viewed as “a handful of agitators who were causing all the trouble and 
standing in the way of (party official) development”  (ibid 11)-my emphasis. This split the 
loyalties of members between the federation and the councillors. 
 
Even though the federation got the support of one of the country’s most influential 
politicians, it failed to penetrate the ‘zone of indifference’ that is, the civil servants 
responsible for policy implementation to get them to understand the logic of a people’s 
housing process.12 The Housing Department spent a good fourteen months debating with 
their private consultants on disbursing the twenty million rand loan (ibid 12). This was 
eventually consolidated into a ten million grant and the department’s efforts were 
concentrated more on getting the federation’s own new fund (Utshani fund) to operate 
within a framework devised by them. This would have given bureaucrats more control 
over the federation’s housing delivery process. Senior  technical advisors to the minister 
insisted that the ten million rands be a once-off grant that was never to be repeated by 
government. The federation resisted the bureaucrats’ efforts to establish a government trust 
for managing the funds and the uTshani Trust was eventually set up within its structures 
for managing the funds. 
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Since the national government developed the housing policy and distributed the necessary 
resources, it was imperative to get the support of the provincial government, which has the 
responsibility for policy implementation and transferring resources to home-seekers. The 
Western Cape Provincial minister promised his support after attending a federation’s field 
day and observing a model house constructed by the women. However, more than a year 
later, the subsidies had not yet been released for the actual buildings to start. The next 
institution to be lobbied by the federation was the Land Affairs department. Derek 
Hanekom, the then National Minister for Land Affairs, was invited to speak at a 
conference on Land Invasions and Eviction in 1994. He later travelled with the federation 
to India to meet the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) and Mahila Milan 
members to get insight on their shelter provision strategies and on return, he visited many 
informal settlements all over the country. After all these visits, a steering committee 
representing both the Department of Land Affairs and the SAHPF was set up and later, 
Hanekon offered a matching grant of ten million rand to be used for financing land 
acquisitions by the federation members. 
 
The federation tried from its inception to have the subsidies for its members channeled 
through it. This meant adherence to bureaucratic criteria that; they be registered either as a 
voluntary association (not-for profit) or housing association and that bridging finance 
would have to be provided by the federation members. The Director General of the DOH 
offered his support to the federation and the proposal was accommodated into the subsidy-
channelling scheme. Through the NHF and the stakeholder consultative forum, private 
sector representatives fought hard to reverse this bending of the rules. The ANC had lived 
up to its dictates, that “..it has a direct interest in supporting its allies and their 
organizational and policy making capacity” 13 (ANC Document 1998). On the other hand, 
the private sector did succeed in ensuring that this modification of regulations could only 
be applied to the federation groups and could not be applicable to all community 
organisations that were saving for housing (Biti et al 1998:31). 
 
Contrary to the PHB’ stance that project subsidies are processed on a fir st come first 
served basis, the federation’s experience again demonstrated that project subsidies do not 
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depend on a waiting list. They proved that pressure can be exerted on the PHB to process 
them expeditiously depending on the tactics utilized by the applicants. For instance, one 
group outside the federation occupied the provincial housing offices and threatened the 
officials until they gave in within a matter of hours. As with local authorities, the 
provincial officials lack the capacity to work with poor communities and to empower them 
(Interview–Pat Matolengwe 2000). Communities mistrust local authorities to act in their 
best interests in accessing project subsidies, which justifies their reliance on technical 
NGOs. Fortunately, most people in the NGOs came from the ANC and have experience in 
struggling against the dominant behaviour of the government institutions and they at times 
act according to this struggle logic. 
 
The minister of housing’s death in January 1995 threatened to upset the federation’s  gains, 
but the new Minister, Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo promised to continue with the pledged 
support. After two months in office, she visited one of the HSS to inspect a house they had 
built and there she publicly and formally pledged the ten million grant offered earlier to 
uTshani Fund (PD 2001:14). The Minister chose a highly public event, the inauguration of 
the Victoria Mxenge scheme in Phillipi, for the presentation. At this same time, two new 
advisory boards were set up to advise the Minister on policy as well as a Housing Support 
Task Team whose task was to design housing support initiatives together with officials 
from the national and provincial housing departments. The federation was then co-opted to 
sit on both boards with People’s Dialogue sitting on the Support Task Team (Interview 
Hoffman). Once inside the housing institutional set-up, the federation strengthened its 
alliance with SANCO, a people’s organisation, which also sat on the Task Team. Later on, 
the Minister accompanied the federation to India to get first hand experience of how the 
NSDF was building its own houses with government support and the Task Team also got 
an opportunity to visit India thus exposing the other technocrats to what a people’s housing 
process involved. 
 
The last months of 1995 were characterised by continuous contact between the federation 
and the national departments of housing and land affairs at the ministerial and director 
general level. By the end of November 1996, the national department disbursed financial 
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resources to provincial departments to support these people’s housing initiatives and the 
provinces proposed sixty-three such centres and eighteen of these were the federation’s 
building and technology centres. The rest were expected to follow the federation’s 
initiatives. Both politicians and government officials began to make public reference to the 
federation’s mobilisation approach in a bid to gain political mileage. Towards the end of 
the year, the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki and President Nelson Mandela visited 
the federation’s international conferences and selected projects ( ibid 15). The federation 
was projected as what the ANC was about, people’s empowerment, reconciliation, 
reconstruction and redistribution. And in the Federation’s own words  (PD 2001:21); 
... a visit from a member of the government is an honour that cannot be 
quantified. The presence of leading figures of the government, from 
the president to members of the cabinet to more local pillars, encourages 
new members to join the federation and regalvanises older members into 
action. 
 
An irony is that the federation realises that the government gave it a ‘gift’ as evidenced by 
the questions it poses for the rest of NGOs’ and CBO in the development process  (ibid 22); 
What is the government’ s motivation? Who will benefit from the interaction in the long 
term, whatever the short-term benefits may be? Will this strengthen or undermine the 
central dynamic of the community organisation, that is, that thing which gives it its 
vitality? 
 
The question is, did the federation take advantage of the populist discourse or did the 
national leadership take advantage of the mobilisation channel that existed within the 
federation structures? Provincial housing departments were clearly under immense 
pressure because the federation enjoyed a high national profile and had strong links with 
national ministers. The National Housing Board recommended that uTshani Fund could 
serve as a conduit for subsidies of federation members, making it possible to bypass 
intermediaries demanded by the system (ibid:19; Baumann et al undated:8). There are 
clear tensions and conflicts of interests between provincial governments and the centre as 
reflected by the departments’ fear to support the federation’s effectiveness because the 
federation was regarded as the “sweet heart” of the politicians at the centre (ibid 50). Most 
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important of all was that the ANC feared and distrusted the federation’s  mobilisational 
capacity. 
 
With these events, a selective resource distribution process was clearly in motion. Land 
Affairs Ministers and Housing Ministers tend to make regular visits to savings schemes, 
seeking to identify with and be seen to identify with the federation.14 The federation and 
People’s Dialogue representatives were consequently co-opted into at least ten working 
groups on housing at all the three levels of government (Biti et al 1998:2000). The climax 
for the federation was when it secured an agreement to have 20 percent of the land in any 
low-income housing scheme reserved for its members15 in every new public housing 
scheme. Thus belonging to the SAHPF facilitates access to land resources for house 
seekers. 
 
Utshani Fund 
Utshani Fund is the federation’s own revolving finance scheme for housing . The credit 
mechanisms are controlled by the HSSs. The fund was designed to provide bridging and 
topping up finance to low-income groups and all loans must be repaid within fifteen years. 
The People’s Dialogue secured the initial funding from MISEREOR, a German donor 
agency, after ‘Comrade’ Joe Slovo’s initial donation of ten million. Other donors later 
provided more funds after this demonstration of political commitment. All the money is 
distributed as collective loans to HSS, which in turn gives them out as individual loans for 
either income generation activities or building purposes.16 The loans are repaid to the fund 
collectively which places the responsibility of loan repayment on every member. 
 
Security for the repayment of these loans is primarily through peer pressure in the social 
network of savings’ groups and the broader federation. Loans are given in small groups of 
about ten to fifteen and future lending is tied to the performance of existing loans (PD & 
SAHPF 2000:10). Building loans are given to scheme members in the form of materials. 
Crisis loans for medical bills, school fees, funerals and other problems attract a 1 percent 
interest rate and income generation loans a 2 percent rate. The loan terms are flexible and 
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they recognise the diversity within the communities hence the terms take local conditions 
into consideration. 
 
The fund is managed by a Board of Governors composed of all the ten regions’ conveners, 
the People’s Dialogue director, a nominee from the Ministry of Lands and the Minister of 
Housing, Sankie Mthembi-Nkondo (1997-2003) is the patron. The board makes lending 
decisions based on the merits of the project proposed by the scheme and the intimate 
knowledge of the history and capacity of the borrowing scheme which is located in the 
leadership. Some criteria that ensures the democratic functioning and continuity of the 
group’s activities are that the scheme: should have maximised female participation in the 
group, practise daily savings and banking, have internal loan management mechanisms, 
hold regular meetings, have sub groups with leaders, have completed all preparations for 
the actual building itself (modelling, costing, mapping etc) and the groups must agree to 
future participation in all federation activities (PD 1998:25). Each scheme is required to 
come up with 5 percent as a deposit of the loan to be borrowed. This helps to provide 
insurance for those who might die during their loan-servicing period. 
 
The saving process promotes regular interaction and enables the emergence of strong 
bonds that translate into support systems for their communities. Lending decisions are 
made democratically on the basis that one saves regularly and that they attend the scheme’s 
fortnightly meetings often. Mistrust sets in when the better off are involved in housing 
schemes because many groups have experienced a 20-30 percent drop out rate after some 
members acquired their houses (Interview 2001). But the poor feel that if beneficiary 
selection was done correctly, there would not be this problem because for them “poverty 
does not end with a house” (Biti et al 1998:36). Many members have made it clear that 
they also do not want people who have already acquired developer-built houses to be part 
of their savings schemes or to access uTshani funds for extending their homes. These self 
imposed boundaries serve to define federation members as an exclusive group of the poor 
who have special rights to land for housing. 
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From the federation’s experience, savings carve out space for women’s participation in 
informal settlements because they are the ones who demonstrated the most interest in 
saving for houses17. Community organisations become empowered to manage financial 
resources through the house and community building process. The federation boasts 
proudly, with mobilisational undertones, that; “ We do not collect money, we collect 
people” ( Baumann et al undated:5). Their mobilisation capacity was one of the reasons 
why they were perceived with suspicion by political parties and government as an 
emerging political threat18 (See table 3). The highest number of members are found in the 
two provinces that do not belong to the ANC at the provincial level, the Western Cape and 
KwaZulu Natal. An emerging question here is: What explains the variation in the 
mobilisation capacities of the federation in these different regions? This perhaps could be 
an indication of the level of difficulty the Africans experience in accessing the Western 
Cape bureaucracy in order to benefit from state resources. Another explanation could be 
that the ANC led provinces have inculcated a culture of complacency amongst home 
seekers who wait for government delivery. However, the government has also delivered 
more in those same provinces. The ANC won the first local government elections in the 
CTMC but it was still in opposition at the provincial level. 
 
Table 3  Federation Membership December 1999 
Region Groups Households 
KwaZulu 685   6 000 
Eastern Cape   89   6 000 
Southern Cape   23   2 500 
Western Cape 264 18 000 
Northern Cape     4     200 
Free State   67   3 000 
Gauteng 173 10 000 
North West   53   3 500 
Northern Province   16      900 
Mpumalanga   14      500 
Total 1 288 80 600 
Source: People’s Dialogue Newsletter, uTshani Buyakhuluma, South Africa, Issue 12, December 1999. 
Notes: The latest count revealed that the federation’s membership had risen to 530 000  
households in 1 500 savings schemes by March 2000. PD and SAHPF (2000) 
An Alliance at the Cutting Edge, SAHPF, South Africa, p5. 
 
Of all the processes in the federation’s housing process, the uTshani fund is the  focal point 
for building trust relations for as the PD says, “it is the glue that holds community groups 
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and underlies their other activities” (PD  undated:3). Saving collectively brings families 
together and they learn to trust one another. This trust provides the basis for effective 
collection. Savings are the one resource that enhances the women’s citizenship status as it 
buys them bargaining power. After all, the communities go through the process of 
identifying and discussing common development priorities together. The different 
experiences people had in their struggles against apartheid constrained the development of 
natural association bonds and coupled with the relationships of authority and leadership in 
that same period, it became necessary to have a starting point for building trust relations 
(Patel and Mitlin 2002). The desperately poor are never in a position to reciprocate hence 
assistance rarely comes their way from the usual social networks but within a collective 
saving scheme, capacity for them to reciprocate into the collective fund was created (PD 
1996). Built on the concept of collective savings, the federation succeeds in mobilising 
poor people as savings ensure high participation levels and mutual interaction amongst 
members. And because they risk all they have, the poor have a material stake in the 
organisation and in its planning and decision-making. 
 
The federation is sustained by the HSSs and encouraging community members to save has 
been the biggest challenge. Members are encouraged to save according to their financial 
capacity on any day because the important issue is the frequency of saving, rather than the 
amount saved (Interview). The reasoning is that poor people do not necessarily have stable 
incomes hence they need to save whenever they can. Though most active members save 
once every four-five days, the daily collections are recognised by many to be important in 
strengthening contact between members and in assisting the poor to save (Biti et al 
1998:16). Regular contact is maintained amongst officials and members and this promotes 
the search for compassionate solutions when a member is going through a crisis. As the 
women put it, “…the savings method and the crisis and income loa ns are given to create 
trust” (i bid).19 
 
Women’s dom inance of the saving schemes and their participation is strongly felt since 
they steer the strategies needed to solve their housing problem. As Baumann et al 
(undated:ii) noted, in general, the collective approach appeals to women more than men. 
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They hold most of the posts in the schemes but at the national level, their participation was 
less evident until 1996 when at least 60 percent of these positions were filled by women. 
Members of these savings groups were noted to have confidence and cohesion that is rare 
amongst communities anywhere. However, despair sometimes sets in as one leader 
remarked, “We have waited for three hundred years for justice, now with our government, 
we expect miracles” (PD 1998) .20 One woman put it in the following words (PD 2000:8): 
We are poor, we have no money. If we went to the banks to borrow some, they 
would chase us away. So if we need money, we have to look for it inside our own 
community. And that is actually how our savings scheme began. What we really 
wanted was money for houses. If we have our own plots of land with decent homes 
on them, many of our difficulties will be overcome. 
 
What the members mean by a house is thus very different from how government 
bureaucrats, professionals and businessmen define it. The members’  conception is of an 
empowerment process that allows them to pool all their resources, money, knowledge and 
skills to build self-sustaining communities. Many unaffiliated savings schemes observed 
and acquired knowledge of the operations of the federation’s s chemes and later approached 
them for membership. This boosted their skills with regard to organizing for housing. The 
black (poor in particular) people have developed confused identities based on promises so 
they assume identities that yield benefits. Many just care about basic survival. Most are 
loyal to the ANC but they deviate for economic reasons. The use of Afrikaner surnames 
and wanting to belong in the apartheid state shaped many identities in which one could 
achieve anything if they were white or coloured –a stunt that raises questions on how far 
people will go to gain respectability and elevate themselves in their society. Owning a 
house gives blacks a new identity and it fulfills what they believe about themselves, “You 
have to be something in order to achieve something”. There is a certain pride that comes 
with owning a house. One informant, Bheki Nkonyane (2001), lamented to me; 
..the first human experience comes with owning a house, the first sense of self … I 
am nothing without a house. It is the first step to having property, it belongs to me, 
I can gain lots of things… credibilities. If you have got a house you are worth 
something. I personally believe that I need to own a house, a sense of having 
something, it is the only thing most blacks can own. You can do so many things. It 
helps break racism. 
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The Victoria Mxenge Housing Savings Scheme 
The Victoria Mxenge21 HSS was started in 1992 by a group of twelve women and in less 
than two years, it had grown to two hundred and eighty women and six men (mostly 
married) from Khayelitsha Site B informal settlement.22 The group, after being inspired by 
the Indian group, Mahila Milan, have been building their homes and community ever 
since. From the beginning, the saving scheme was viewed as a political party and no one 
liked their mobilisation capacity. The leadership maintained this figure because they 
wanted to keep the group manageable hence they encouraged the formation of separate 
schemes in the same area. The federation acknowledges that it is women who are the most 
affected by landlessness and homelessness as they are the ones who transform the plastic 
shacks into homes and maintain them (Interview Hoffman). In South Africa and other 
countries, women are usually the ones who confront eviction authorities and yet most 
housing schemes are traditionally dominated by men. It had come as no surprise then when 
after the initial meeting, the women’s response to the call to organise for housing under the 
federation was overwhelming. 
 
The scheme started off with three treasurers who collected the savings and managed the 
scheme’s account.  The organisational structure was later altered to cater for the 
practicalities of housing provision (See table 4). After the construction of the houses was 
completed (save for the finishing touches), a Community Property Association of eleven 
members took over the running of the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme. They rotate 
holding all the portfolios including the leadership. The majority of the members of Victoria 
Mxenge (70 percent) are unemployed with an average income of less than six hundred 
rands per month, hence everyone was encouraged to save whatever they could everyday. 
The women had first organised themselves into small groups and approached financial 
institutions where they confirmed the discrimination against women finance seekers. The 
women spoke of ‘interrogation’ even if one had deposit money that qualified them for 
credit.23 Some of the questions they found humiliating were: “Are you married? Do you 
own property and do you own a car?” 24 
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Table 4 Victoria Mxenge Committees 
Committee Function 
Trust Supervises development. Negotiates   for 
grants and loans 
Land Negotiates title 
Treasury Manages savings 
Survey Conducts participatory research 
House model Facilitates house designing 
Catering Arranges functions for visiting groups 
Building Co-op Costs building materials. Builds houses 
 
The local authority also did not like the idea of savings schemes and tried to avoid the 
scheme when it sought their help for the ‘social compact’ 25 requirement in accessing 
housing resources. After several unfruitful visits to their offices and broken appointments, 
the scheme resorted to trade union tactics to force them to accept and act on their demands. 
They locked up the officials in their offices until they signed the ‘social compact’ that was 
needed to access the subsidies for the development of new housing projects (Interview -
Rose Maso). 
 
Even with a signed ‘social compact, the scheme failed to access any state owned land for 
housing despite persistent negotiations with concerned authorities. State land had its own 
bureaucracy and the absence of land release systems and policies, the lack of information 
regarding ownership and political infighting all worked against the scheme. For instance, 
the group identified a piece of land at the corner of Landsdowne and Jan Smuts roads in 
1993 and approached the local authority in a bid to secure the land. After several years of 
negotiations in 1999, the council finally told them the land belonged to the education 
department. On following this up, the education department revealed that it had forgotten 
that it owned the land as it did not have records and absolutely no idea that it owned the 
land. It was finally discovered that the land belonged to the law enforcement department 
(Interview Pat Matolengwe). The group was tossed back and forth between the province 
and the CTMC whenever they identified land they found suitable for their scheme. One of 
the scheme’s leaders summed up the bureaucratic in ertia with regard to land release for 
low-income housing: 
We started the negotiations (with the local authority) for land and everything was 
good between us, we have a good relationship but the delivery is just not there. The 
bureaucracy is stopping everything that we have done all these years. You go back 
and the people have gone and there is no communication, you have to start afresh. 
 198 
 
Another problem that complicated the scheme’s work was ‘Colour politics’. Coloured 
politicians often objected openly to the development of land they had earmarked for their 
people (Thurman 1999:61). The ANC housing desk in particular played a big role in the 
scheme’s efforts in providing information on who owned the land the project would have 
identified as suitable for their needs. 
 
When the People’s Dialogue informed Victoria Mxenge members of the availability of 
three hectares of land in Phillipi26 which was being offered by the Catholic Welfare and 
Development, the scheme elected five members as a land committee that would negotiate 
on their behalf as a community organisation. The entire scheme supported the negotiations 
by turning up in large groups and preparing fervently for the land. They compiled a 
document titled “What we need now is land” which included their income status, 
household details, savings record, migration histories and housing requirements and this 
they circulated to the broader Cape Town community. After competing against twelve 
other NGOs outside the federation, the scheme finally got the land, which they now own 
communally, after a gruelling nine months. After establishing the actual size of the land 
which was thirty thousand square metres, the group agreed on one hundred square metre 
plots for each member and left room for a church and a health centre. Even with this little 
land per household, only one hundred and ninety members could fit on this piece of land 
and this complicated the allocation process.  
 
To do the allocations fairly, the scheme had to elect and register a trust, the Victoria 
Mxenge Board of Trustees. The board is run by the homeless and no professionals sit on 
this board. Six members are from the scheme, one is from the province’s federation 
structure, one was nominated by the national federation and the other is an honorary 
member from the Indian partner, Mahila Milan. The other ninety members who did not get 
stands in the same area accepted the decision in good faith and remained as faithful as 
before and helped in the building process. For them, the investment was in the reciprocal 
action they would get when their turn came. By 2001, the deal on land for these remaining 
members had been finalized. 
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However, a long struggle ensued during which the group tried to get government support 
and approval for their work and to determine under which new local authority they fell 
under. By the time their new local authority, the CTMC, decided to acknowledge their 
efforts, the group had already received approval from the national and provincial 
authorities as an innovative approach to housing delivery. The ANC led CTMC, manned 
by apartheid bureaucrats, responded negatively with the aim of deterring similar people 
from organising housing projects. The council’s Engineering Committee, pointed to what 
they called imminent structural defects in the houses because of the quality of the land they 
had built on and the quality of the buildings.27 The land required draining as it was on 
marshland and this had forced the scheme to hire an architect on a consultancy basis to 
manage the process. The council clearly perceived this as a challenge to its role in 
managing communities and its obsession with control rang loud and clear as one official 
raved and ranted: “…the PHP, not everyone wants to do it, and it is not an option for mass 
or fast delivery, and you can’t control it!” (PD  1997). Skepticism towards the efforts were 
the order of the day in all formal institutions as many posed a rhetorical question, “How 
could poor, uneducated people, especially women, manage something as complicated as 
housing development?” (Biti et al 1996). The scheme finally succeeded in earning the 
support of the Provincial Minister of Housing, the Cape Provincial Administration Board 
and the Regional Services Council of Civic groups and political parties through inviting 
them to their public meetings. 
 
The Victoria Mxenge group applied for their 12 500 rand subsidy and stated that they 
wanted the money to be paid directly to their HSS and that the council should install water 
and sewerage service connections free of charge. The fact that the scheme’s community 
was established under the Less Formal Township Establishment Act that sidelined the 
usual regulations and standards for township development in low-income areas28 worked to 
their disadvantage. Enacted at the national level, the act placed implementation 
responsibility on the province, and it stated that some land use and building regulations 
were not applicable to informal settlements, site services projects and incremental housing 
(DOH/National Business Initiative 1997). The act was a way of getting around the 
administrative complexities associated with racially biased local authorities. Obstacles 
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emerged later after the local government elections that required the province to approve the 
establishment of a township under the act only after approval by the local authority. This 
automatically introduced delays in securing approval from both authorities. The national 
government may have acted in good faith to avoid insensitive bureaucrats, but the net 
effect was that it showed a continuation of the parallel development attitude since 
standards of service delivery were allowed to differ. The act might have solved one 
problem but it clearly perpetuated the previous government’s approach to accommodating 
the poor. Worse still, it sanctioned the insensitivity of the local authority officials as they 
refused to provide services or to bill the residents for services they organised for 
themselves. These were for sewerage, water and electricity. 
 
A notable personality and the major driving force in the Victoria Mxenge scheme was 
Patricia Matolengwe, a Regional Executive Member of the ANC and a branch executive of 
its Women’s Lea gue. She was tasked by the ANC Women’s League with organising the 
women in Khayelitsha even though she argued that everyone is apolitical in the federation 
when organising for housing, “We don’t want to involve that word [politics]. We do not 
mention politics at all or anything of that nature”. However, counci llor Sidina’s words 
were more revealing of the party’s ambitions of a continuous celebration of freedom and to 
carry on with the traditions of the liberation struggle experienced in the country as outlined 
in the document on the character of the ANC:29 
All PHP projects are ANC initiated and organised… accessing public of ficials and 
going through the bureaucratic maze requires ANC facilitation. Many projects in 
Khayelitsha are organised like that and there are only three or four successful ones 
as the Victoria Mxenge. It is difficult to get land in this province-the army helps 
because the top positions are Umkonto Wesizwe30 and they can discuss land … can 
make use of army land, you get the list of army land first, then go to the Ministry of 
Defence and negotiate on land for free for the poor. 
 
Recognising her mobilisational and organisational capacity, Patricia was co-opted into the 
PHB where she contributes to decision making on resource allocation for housing delivery 
in the province. Patricia’s experiences (her now expert knowledge) 31 was considered as 
being universal in applying to South Africa’s  national housing problems. To be able to 
manage parallel ambiguous and complex relationships with government departments and 
other NGOs calls for a higher level of political sophistication which Patricia represented as 
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a high ranking official in the ANC’s W omen’ League and in the federation. Over time, 
politicians, officials and activists all develop tactics in managing and redirecting political 
disagreement. They do this through the use of institutional procedures, containing party 
discipline and the use of patronage amongst other strategies (Barry 2002:271). 
 
This cooptation by the state does affect community organizations that rely on social capital 
and trust. Co-opted leaders are inevitably distanced from their communities and in turn, 
they tend to treat all other communities as alike in their new roles which puts them in the 
interface between communities and the state (Craig et al 2000:329-330). With the ANC in 
the lead, this cooptation signalled the tendency towards a movement to a corporatist32 
model of community development which sought to control participation (Smit 2001). The 
co-optation sought to harmonise community efforts with ruling party efforts but all under 
the government’s banner of success. At the same time, it also s ent signals to other 
collectivities of how success was prescribed. 
 
Gender Power Struggles 
This self-housing provision experience created confidence in poor individuals to devise 
alternative means of pooling their meagre resources and acting positively to improve their 
living standards. It enabled women who are usually excluded from decision-making 
processes to be empowered with knowledge they generate within their own communities. 
They developed the capacity to bargain for recognition and acceptance by authorities, and 
to influence their development strategies. Many members of Victoria Mxenge all agreed 
with Rose Molokoane’s , (cited in SAHPF 2002) views that; 
… a person becomes more confident in approaching life in general as now you 
have some people to share your experiences with, to give advice to and get advice 
from… And if you are alone, two definitions will become a difficult choice but if 
you are with other people you will get some stories from other people and become 
confident to say it is not me alone who is facing this kind of challenge. So by 
challenging the challenges collectively, it is easier and lessens the risk of how to 
resolve the problems. 
 
The mood in the Victoria Mxenge community was expressed by a 97-year-old woman who 
spoke full of emotion, “You feel like you have something now, something permanent. You 
did not have pride before, but now you do” .33 However, the experience was not as smooth 
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as the women had another battle to deal with, the patriarchal attitudes that have haunted 
housing provision in most of Africa. A woman in the scheme explained their struggles 
against many odds in building their houses (PD 1997:9): 
Most groups are now building houses. In the beginning, men were not so interested, 
but now they come into help us. Men do not want to work for nothing. But we are 
unemployed, and in the end get a house! We do everything: saving, planning, 
making models of houses, affordability studies and finally the building. We spend a 
long time preparing to build houses…and we have to repay lo ans. We are selling 
meat, sweets, fruits and vegetables to get money to feed our children… This shows 
us how to solve problems, it is really empowering us. 
 
The whole process was a learning experience for the women as they came to realise that it 
was not easy to own property because it has to be done through marriage. Women are not 
recognised in the policy for housing even though they shoulder the burden of housing 
provision at the household level. However, many of the female heads of households in the 
project got the title deeds in their maiden names even though most are married. For some, 
the subsidy was accessed in the husband’s name yet the women were the ones involved in 
the actual provision process and were also the scheme’s members. Some husbands had 
discouraged their wives’ from participation in the scheme but the women defied and 
dismissed the husbands’ attitudes,  
Men do not have the experience that we have, they thought of houses as 
construction only and they only have the experience of being labourers in this 
process as they are used to being labourers at their work places.34 
 
This assumption of male dominated terrain by the women caused negative feelings after 
the houses were completed. The men openly argued that it was culturally wrong for 
women to own the houses. There were incidences of increased domestic unrest between 
1998 and 1999 as the men became aggressive fearing eviction by the women. Some 
women openly regretted participating in the project but a collective decision was later 
taken to reincorporate the men if they were willing to work in the scheme. The scheme had 
tried in the beginning to appoint men into some of the committees but none of the 
appointees ever fulfilled their role, hence women were co-opted to replace them 
(Interview-Pat Matolengwe 2001). 
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A depressing fact is that the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme is built next to a waste 
dump and this affects both the health and property values of this community. The toxic 
waste, smell, mosquitoes, marshes and flies all wreak havoc on this new development and 
since the trash is never covered, dust during the summer has contributed to the increasing 
number of asthma victims (PD 2000). Ross Demolition, a private company, dumped 
concrete on this site such that there can never be development on this land as removing the 
concrete would be very expensive. 
 
In 2002, dynamism slowed down in the federation and the problem was located mainly in 
the leadership. A confidence gap had grown between them and the communities they 
served. Part of the problem was that the leadership had never been democratic in the 
federation as it was on a self-inclusion basis that was determined by one’s level of activism 
in the organization and their other positions in the ANC effectively blurred the 
accountability lines (Wilson and Lowery 2003:55). 
 
Despite these problems, the group managed to develop a close community with a strong 
sense of unity. They hold weekly meetings and attendance is always above one hundred 
and fifty members at any time. The committee members meet once a week and all the 
committees work together on a daily basis thus keeping the momentum on housing 
provision. Federation meetings are punctuated by spontaneous singing giving members a 
chance to let out emotions. Hoggett and Miller (2000:360) support this outlet of emotions 
and the role it plays in democracy, 
Democracy has to be convivial; a sense of duty and responsibility is no longer 
enough to sustain people’s participation, getting involved has to be enjoyable or 
else the majority of people just won’t bother. Moreover conviviality builds trust 
that in turn enables the expression of differences, often in playful or ritualized ways 
which enable aggression to be harnessed constructively. 
 
 
Silver City Housing Project 
This housing project was organized by a group of homeless Africans who were outside the 
federation. In October 1993, a group of Africans invaded houses that had been built for the 
coloured community in Lost City. Faced with an election the following year (1994), the 
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apartheid government felt it had to evict them and this was done by providing them with 
alternative land and nine square-metre shacks across the road from the houses they had 
occupied. After the relocation, the group began to negotiate with the council for permanent 
ownership of the land. For six years, the group was tossed back and forth different 
government agencies believed to own the land, but the owner of the land was never 
identified. Their efforts were further derailed by the involvement of the ANC, the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) and SANCO who all claimed to further the group’s cause but 
instead, they quarrelled and disagreed amongst themselves on strategies and priorities. The 
ANC was incensed as it saw SANCO as meddling in political affairs instead of attending 
to civic matters.35 The beneficiaries eventually took it upon themselves to organize to get 
the land and formed the Tafelsig Development Committee. The group was rather slow to 
organize for housing and was only concerned with security over the land as reassurance 
that they would never be evicted again was important to them. They eventually just settled 
and began to build their homes on what was meant to be temporary land. The authorities 
turned a blind eye to the developments surrounding the group’s efforts to provide  
themselves with decent housing. 
 
Savings groups had existed within the group before they began to save seriously for 
housing in 1999 as a response to Minister Sankie’s call to participate in the PHP as 
organized projects. In this earlier phase, the savings were organized around networks of 
friends who rotated credit (stokvels) and they mainly sponsored income-generating 
projects that served the group’s basic needs. The housing savings group, with two hundred 
and fifty members, one hundred and thirty of them men, became involved in all processes 
concerning owning a house and a critical issue was the need to educate members about 
home ownership because they “ were used to cheap life in a shack and therefore needed to 
understand the value of a house” .36 Responsibilities for housing provision were shared 
between the sexes with young unemployed men acting as the major drive in the scheme. 
Public meetings were organized to sell the idea to people from diverse backgrounds and in 
this way, bricklayers, carpenters and plumbers came forward to sell their labour to the 
project. This meant that project members only required training to manage the house 
building process. DAG, the equivalent of Peoples’ Dialogue, offered training to monitor 
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the building process and recommended the establishment of a management committee with 
technical expertise. 
 
The project has kept a simple management structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the 
beneficiaries and immediately below them, their chosen representatives who are organized 
into committees led by a treasury, a chairperson and a secretary. At the lowest are the 
management staff who do the technical work. The management staff report to the 
committees and the committees report to the beneficiaries in weekly meetings. The staff is 
paid monthly salaries from the government grant of five hundred and seventy five rands 
per month per subsidy beneficiary. This money is to aid in capacity building for the 
duration of the project and to buy tools that revert back to the state when the project ends. 
In this way, the equipment can be passed on to the next housing project. Although the staff 
members were some of the leaders in the formation of the project, they moved on to 
become full time employees of the project. The treasury collects the fixed amount of 
twenty rands per month from every beneficiary and up to one hundred and fifty rands per 
month for the actual houses. Members can borrow from the savings and pay back within 
the stipulated time and credit is also rotated in the project. There are no written down rules 
and regulations to enforce paying back as the project relies on the community’s moral 
sanctions to monitor compliance. The unspecified sanctions just emanate if you default and 
unorthodox means (including violence) are often utilized (Interview-Mandisa Dlanjwa 
2001). There is an option for those in the project to stay on and continue to save or to pull 
out after their houses have been completed but the project is not organized to go beyond 
the delivery of a house. 
 
The management of the project are all ANC members as are the majority of the project 
members. That the management belongs to the ANC is important in that ‘they know where 
to go when they need facilitation’ and they have done this at all the stages in providing 
their own houses. A notable and prominent figure in the project is Mandisa Dlanjwa who 
has experience in community organization and is well placed and connected in the ANC 
and openly admits that she knows her way around when she requires doors opened. During 
my interview with her, she suddenly called out to colleagues in an adjacent room, “Is there 
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anyone who is not ANC in this project?” An expert at cat and mouse games with the 
bureaucrats, she gets her way most of the time when she believes the officials are being 
unreasonable and as they openly believe that she is ignorant, she plays the ignorant 
aggressive service seeker when necessary. In one incident, the City Planner demanded a 
plan for a structure she had planned to transform into a crèche for the community and she 
told him to come back the next day to collect it. On the following day, she waited for the 
official to turn up and in his presence, she drew a rectangle and indicated the positions of 
the windows and doors and handed it to the official. Shocked and numbed, the official 
shook his, uttered that she was mad and left. She never heard from him again and the 
cooperative continued to build many more houses without plans. The plans are only drawn 
up at the end and submitted to the officials when it suits the project.37 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the sometimes ‘silent’ strategies of the ANC of planting leaders 
amongst the people to steer and organise them to make claims upon the state. And many 
interviewees concurred that “Sooner or later you join the ANC eve n if you are not when 
you first join these housing groups.” The normal course of service seeking does not take 
place in the CTMC as groups plan to deal with the rules and regulations before they even 
approach officials. Interacting with the bureaucrats appears to drain housing cooperatives 
of their time and energy as they spend a significant amount of time preparing to deal with 
them. This implies the presence of a clandestine mentality and attitudes reminiscent of 
struggle logic. One main tactic the cooperatives and civic groups use is to lobby the 
national level such that by the time they get back to the provincial level, they would have 
made their issue part of the national agenda. However, the government’s response breeds 
the application of particularistic criteria and it sanctions political steering as ANC cadres 
are largely responsible for mobilising the poor house seekers. 
 
The allocation of subsidies to Victoria Mxenge only and not to all other house seekers is 
very much a manifestation of the liberation logic as is the steering of the group by ANC 
leaders. The pedestal the cooperative sits on reflects ANC capacity in delivery and the 
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federation, with its reserved land allocation, serves as a route for effective mobilisation and 
inclusion is by choice. 
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dwellers demonstrated immense skills in organising for housing through the use of knowledge and skills within 
their communities. See PD (1997) Regaining Knowledge – An Appeal to Illusions, Manual for Innovative, 
Community –Based Shelter Training Programmes, p19. 
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development agencies. It was initiated by the Southern African Bishops Conference and the Southern African 
Catholic Development Agency and the targets of their efforts were the under-represented women and squatters. 
See Biti, B., Hasan, A. and Mitlin, D. (1998) Evaluation of the People’s Dialogue and the Homeless People’s 
Federation, International Institute for Environment and Development, p8. In a way, the SAHPF was the 
coming together of sectors of South Africa’s grassroots liberation movement.  
3 The vote was split 55 to 45 who wanted to give it a try. 
4 It became registered as a sub-committee of the Southern African Catholic Development Association which 
entitled it to use its welfare organisation number, 08 800512 000 0. This gave it the legal status required to act 
as a support organisation for the federation. 
5 By December 2000, there were 15 000 registered savers in the different savings groups and more than 13 000 
of these were led by women. At first, the public was skeptical of the federation’s activities and viewed it as a 
stokvel where members access the funds they pool by drawing their share on a rotational basis. See PD 
(undated) An Alliance at the Cutting Edge, SAHPF, South Africa. 
6 There are ten fully-fledged regional federations, which combined to form the SAHPF. A region needs to have 
a minimum of five savings schemes, with a minimum of seven conveners elected from the savings schemes 
who keep the activities of the federation going (they serve for two years). Each region has a networking team, 
training unit, technical and building support team, land unit, housing loan unit, housing savings scheme support 
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7 People’s Dialogue’s responsibilities involve obtaining resources for the federation, providing professional 
support in formal negotiations and neutralising the politics of the country-racism- through creating space for the 
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8 The NSDF is a loose network of slum dwellers in which members participate in organised struggles of the 
urban poor. They have demonstrated an immense capacity in mobilising poor communities. Mahila Milan, 
(Women in Togetherness) is a federation of women’s collectives which organises and trains women to solve 
their shelter problems collectively through initiating savings schemes and developing other relevant skills. 
SPARC is a registered society founded by a group of professionals-social workers, researchers in social science 
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a partner rather than as a patron. SPARC defines an Area Resource Centre as a space where different 
communities of the urban poor who share common problems and issues come together to reflect and analyse 
their problems with the aim of developing solutions. It provides professional support to NSDF and Mahila 
Milan. 
9 White officials were overwhelmed by the invasions that were occurring all around them but they knew 
enough not to evict black squatters when Nelson Mandela was getting into office. PD (1999) The Liberating 
Power of Self Reliance, p5. 
10 Of 16 schemes in the Federation that acquired land, only three groups purchased their land, the rest was 
acquired through land invasions. 
11 It is important to stress that land invasions were to be resorted to only as a last resort. This was one of the 
conditions for getting the federation’s support.  
12 The government’s People’s  Housing Process policy has remained marginalised within the Housing 
Department as less than 1percent of the subsidies had been spent in this area by 2002.  See Baumann, T., 
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BuyaKhuluma, (1998), People’s Dialogue Newsletter, Issue 9.  
15 Interview Warren Smit 2001 and Michael Hoffman 2001. 
16 The People’ Dialogue was in the process of decentralising fund management to the regional level. At this 
level, a regional loan fund to which all groups make a monthly contribution, the Inqolobane,  would give the 
schemes loans. Inqolobane, (the granary) is for financing large production and enterprise loans.  
17 Women are usually viewed as the community managers who deal with basic necessities like water, and 
sanitation. 
18 An example is that of a group in Siyanda, north of Durban, which decided to join the savings scheme but the 
political leadership in the settlement regarded this as a threat. All the houses of the members were attacked and 
the organiser, Mr. Ndaba, was killed. The whole group fled permanently from the area. See People’s Dialogue 
Newsletter (1998)  uTshani Buyakhuluma,  Issue no7, May,  p7. 
19 This is not to say that there were no problems in the group as both members and leaders were distracted from 
their original mission and became more interested in accessing the loans. See Wilson, P.A. and Lowery, C. 
(2003) “Building Deep Democracy: The Story of a Grassroots Learning Organisation in South Africa ” ,  
Planning Forum, no.9, p53-54. 
20 Quote from Iris Namo, director of Dialogue on Shelter in Johannesburg.  
21 The scheme was named after the late Victoria Mxenge, an ANC liberation heroine and campaigner for the 
rights of poor women. 
22 The tiny plots in Khayelitsha were given to the members after they fled from the vigilante-related violence in 
Crossroads in 1985. 
23 This shows the half-hearted attempts at addressing problems of the ‘Previously Disadvantaged People’ since 
disadvantaged black women are asked to provide a financial guarantee of 5percent of the housing project when 
they sign up for contractor provided housing. 
24 Many people who failed to service their loans were compelled to lie to financial authorities about their status 
so they could qualify for housing loans. 
25 The social compact is an agreement with the local authority for approval by the provincial government that a 
housing cooperative was a ‘recognised community’. After 1997, it was no longer a requirement to get the social 
compact which complicated the entire process for project subsidy seekers. 
26 The area is surrounded by informal settlements called Sweet Homes, Pola Park, Siyahlala and Samora 
Machel. 
27 An article appeared in the Cape Argus on May 15th, 2000, castigating the Victoria Mxenge houses as 
structurally defective. It explained how the Engineering Committee had expressed its concern to the provincial 
and national authorities on this kind of community mobilisation through attacking the low-lying flood prone 
area in which the houses were built. The council therefore refused to accept responsibility for maintaining the 
services and roadways which had been built on ‘uncompacted’ land. As a result, the residents of Victoria 
Mxenge have never received an invoice for services rendered despite several visits by Masakhane Campaign 
officials. Also see Thurman D. (1999) Development Action Group, South Africa, p36. 
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jurisdiction of a local authority. Implementation responsibility lies with the local authority. 
29 Mckinley points out that the ANC was more than an organisation for many people and that even after it was 
banned it remained a cultural presence that became a reference point in conversations. But the important issue 
was that it remained a reservoir of support for the organisation. See Mckinley, D.T. (2004) The African 
National Congress (ANC) Underground Between Rivonia and 1976, Paper presented to the ICS/SOAS 
conference, “Looking at South Africa Ten Years On,” London, 10 -12 September. 
30 This was the ANC’s military wing.  
31How knowledge is acquired marks the distinction between local knowledge and expert knowledge. The latter 
can be supported by scientific qualifications and can be quite mobile. The former is confined to residential 
space and history-it is the most critical part of the knowledge chain that ‘experts’ very often have to build on. 
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Part IV 
 
Chapter 9 
 
Comparing Regimes 
 
Introduction 
The comparison takes place between different time periods in each country that are defined 
by white minority rule and the current majority rule regimes. Across the two country cases, 
it takes place between the two municipalities and amongst the cooperatives. Though the 
comparison is across all the issues as outlined in the first two chapters, much of the focus 
is on the interplay amongst the four key variables: ‘liberation logistics’ , Africanisation, 
state autonomy and civic organisation. However, the study also identified other key issues 
that influence housing delivery. These merit attention and they are the legal and 
institutional framework, trust relations and the patterns of citizenship construction 
emanating from the house seeking processes. Through an analysis of the legal and 
institutional continuities and discontinuities, the presence and intensity of the “liberation 
culture”  is also compared alongside the four variables. The differences and similarities 
between the strategies utilized by the home-seekers in the two countries give possible 
indicators on the trajectories likely to emerge with regard to service provision. They also 
show a shift in values amongst the poor as they increasingly shoulder the responsibility for 
their individual welfare- a much required characteristic for citizens in capacity starved 
states. 
 
A brief analysis of the significance of names given to housing cooperatives by the 
members, the effect of time on the comparison and the concept of a house, sets the stage 
for the comparison. This is followed by the section on the war time resource allocation 
models (liberation logistics), the infusion of their modus operandi into the post colonial 
bureaucracies (Africanisation), the extent of state autonomy as well as the patterns of 
engagement utilised by civic groups in their claims on the state and party actors. A 
comparison of the intensity of the “liberation culture”  in the two cases follows the 
comparison of these four variables. Finally, the other factors, the continuities and 
discontinuities, trust relations and citizenship are compared and contrasted. 
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The Significance of Names 
To begin with, an interesting comparison can be discerned in the significance of names 
given to housing settlements by the homeless poor. The names given to residential areas 
are a critical part of a people’s history. As with names of people, they very often intend to 
keep some memories alive.  In Harare, the names signify hope, some general optimism as 
well as some jubilation at times. They convey more of what the people have experienced 
and come to realize, as well as their aspirations to rise to the political realities of the time. 
However, the names are also laden with innuendos of what to expect in addition to telling 
the stories of the cooperatives’ struggles. In Cape Town, due to the pretense that African 
housing demands do not exist, the names of housing settlements reflect appreciation for 
what leaders of the struggle have achieved. The naming therefore takes the mode of praise 
appreciation. The implication being that only the struggle logic can overcome the hurdles. 
This can be also interpreted to mean that the poor very much refer to the memories of the 
struggle and still identify strongly with the liberators. Perhaps it also echoes Thabo 
Mbeki’s words that the poor black people  in South Africa have nothing but the ANC. 
 
The Effect of Time on the Comparison 
A crucial fact to remember when doing the comparison is that ZANU-PF had had more 
time to entrench its legitimacy than the ANC due to the twenty years it had been in power 
at the time of the study. The ANC was, just after six years, still trying to prove itself by 
appealing to the many constituencies where its credibility on its calibre (educational) and 
expertise in running a government was questioned. The local colored, white and Indian 
communities were part of the broader business and international communities that required 
appeasement. 
 
The time it took to transform the bureaucracy too had an effect. For Zimbabwe, 
transformation was almost an overnight event. There was thus less resistance to the 
“liberation culture”  as many of the particularistic tendencies became infused with the 
party’s rhetoric. Initially, r esistance to move towards liberalism was led by workers and 
students immediately after independence in 1980. Later on, the same forces, plus 
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intellectuals, led the crusade against the one party state the government tried to go for in 
the mid to the late eighties. In South Africa, the presence of many forces exerting a 
countervailing influence such as trade unions and civic groups have always acted to 
constrain excesses. At the same time, the same forces continue to exercise their power and 
the emphasis is now on the need to join forces to transform the system. The extensive 
finance capital also forced the ANC to reach out and carve a legitimate space for itself. The 
liberation mode for South Africa thus requires different mechanisms in which the value 
generated by liberation experiences becomes indispensable. 
 
The Concept of a House 
A convergence point for the poor across time and space in both cases is the essence of 
what an urban house means. Besides the more general effects of providing security, 
income generation and a status symbol, the one important issue that emerged from the 
communities in this study is the affirmation of being ‘a somebody’  that comes from 
owning a house. As one citizen lamented, “The government regards us as being like our 
shacks-useless. Without a house, I am a nobody with no rights, no say.” 1 A house 
symbolizes who the person is and infuses people with a sense of identity. This makes the 
idea of belonging central to understanding citizenship.2 Prior to majority rule in both 
countries, urban land/house ownership allowed a citizen to have an active voice for it was 
only when one owned it that they could participate in some governance affairs. Ignatieff 
(1991:26) captured this categorically, "Without property, a citizen cannot be independent, 
without the income of property, an individual will not have the leisure necessary to be a 
good citizen". Simply put, owning property gives one the peace of mind and security that 
allows one to pursue higher ideals, its absence means the lack of capacity to pursue the 
same ideals that the propertied enjoy. Until 1993 in Zimbabwe, only urban dwellers 
belonging to the propertied class could vote in local government elections. The new house 
owners in the cooperatives in this study demonstrated the emergence of boundaries that are 
constructed from a sense of belonging to the propertied class as well as to urban space. 
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The “Liberation culture” and Housing Distribution: Capturing Similarities and 
Differences 
Table five above shows the differences and similarities amongst the four factors that 
determine the intensity of the “liberation culture” in each country.  Implicit in these 
differences is the fact that different factors combine differently and with varying intensity 
to produce the “liberation culture” a nd this determines its impact on housing distribution. 
Whilst a cursory glance at the factors would lead to the conclusion that outcomes would be 
different, the combination of these factors does result in what can be treated as very similar 
outcomes. 
 
Table 5 Summary of the Comparison 
Factor                  Harare            Cape Town 
Liberation culture Maintenance of 
hegemonic 
status-
Mobilisational 
goals 
Revolutionary mode 
Mobilisational goals 
Liberation 
logistics 
Exile governing 
experience 
Peasant rural 
mobilisation 
Guerrilla warfare 
Exile governing 
experience 
Urban worker 
mobilisation 
Civic 
disobedience/sporadic 
military disruptions 
Africanisation Uncontested, 
covers virtual 
bureaucracy 
Institutions 
remodelled, new 
bureaucrats 
Resistance, slow 
change process, top 
officials 
New institutions, old 
bureaucrats 
State autonomy Lack of local  
contestation 
Despotic 
environment 
Constrained, local 
opposition 
Open political space 
Civic organisation Change oriented 
civic leaders-new 
generation 
Deference high 
Struggle experienced 
leadership 
Struggle tactics-
Deference to ANC 
 
A cursory glance shows that the “liberation culture”  outcome for Zimbabwe is determined 
by its high intensity and is directed at the maintenance of ZANU-PF’s  post 1980 
hegemonic status. Even then, the mobilisational undertones are always present. The 2000 
events that saw the main opposition party, the MDC, intrude on its traditional territory that 
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included the entire country, has forced the ruling party to intensify its unfair land 
distribution as party loyalty has become even more important. Cape Town, South Africa, 
has a mediated intensity of the “liberation culture”  due to the presence of contesting forces 
that rationalise some possible excesses. The result is what can be termed a ‘fairness’ that 
has mobilisational tones for those Africans who may not necessarily be ANC loyalists.  
This is because for the ANC to wrestle the province from the NNP requires extensive 
mobilisation of the Africans partly because the majority in the province, the Coloureds, 
cannot be counted on to gain political mileage by the ANC and mainly because its actions 
are open to wide scrutiny by other opposing forces. 
 
That ZANU-PF waged a peasant based struggle alienated the urban working class in 
Zimbabwe leaving them without adequate knowledge on how to contest its hegemonic 
position. Anti colonial struggle tactics such as demonstrations by urban workers were 
ruthlessly put down leading to sporadic episodes of protest against what were considered to 
be undemocratic acts by the government. Thus ‘liberation logistics’  largely remained raw 
and in high gear until its infusion into the extant bureaucratic culture. On the other hand, 
the widespread nature of the liberation struggle gave the ANC the advantage of starting off 
with the need to reconcile the various brands of the struggle logic. Mediation was not just 
from opposition parties but also from the many groups that were allied to the ANC. This 
consequently set ‘liberation logistics’  in a relatively low gear. 
 
The rapid and highly successful Africanisation project worked to ZANU-PF’s advantage as 
contestation and alternatives to its discourse were absent. The physical presence of black 
officers led to the neglect in creating new institutions and the drafting of extensive pro-
poor radical legislation. The cosmetic changes that were done did not disturb the basic 
principles that were simply amended to capture distinct constituencies and reporting 
structures were simply altered to reflect the power of the new incumbents. In Cape Town, 
resistance by the inherited institutions and members of the ANC alliance all coalesced to 
slow down the transformation process. Confinement of the changes to the top echelons of 
the ANC and the challenges posed by the establishment of new institutions mediated on 
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the impact of the Africanisation process leaving it relatively weak especially in the 
Western Cape Province. 
 
The lack of consultation and contestation in housing policy formulation and the general 
mono-party decision making style places Zimbabwe in the high state autonomy realm. 
Under normal circumstances, this would have been a vantage point for the government to 
deliver housing to many home seekers but pursuance of its own rhetoric determined 
otherwise. For South Africa, housing policy formulation constraints posed by the 
democratic process restrained the government leaving it in a position of weak autonomy. 
The open political space built in some form of equity for the stakeholders to influence the 
process but for the poor majority, they lost out, making the ANC anxious about prospects 
for mobilisation since in this set up, it was destined to fail in its delivery promises. 
 
Vibrancy in civic organisation is a post 2000 phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The leadership in 
virtually all civic organisations does not have the struggle experience depriving them of the 
knowledge requisite for dismantling the now anti-revolutionary mindset. Up to the late 
nineties, the different generation leading the civic society was concerned with changing the 
plight of workers leaving organisations and groups dealing with housing to grapple with 
strategising to acquire the resources. The result for them was high deference to the ruling 
party in the absence of a strong civil society that would have enacted measures to oppose 
the overbearing party dominance. On the other hand, the civics in South Africa harbour 
much of the struggle experiences which they direct at both the resistant bureaucracy as 
well as at other forces. Adeptness at manipulation of authority thus places the civics 
several notches above their counterparts in Zimbabwe. The insensitivity and ineptitude of 
the Cape Town housing bureaucracy also requires high organisational skills to stimulate a 
response from them. The following sections look at these issues in more detail. 
 
‘Liberation Logistics’ 
Exile governing experience was by nature ad-hoc and generally reactive. Guerrilla warfare 
is an unpredictable venture and it thrives on always being one step ahead of the envisaged 
enemy. The need for secrecy and the capacity to sustain the liberation wars required such 
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organisational approaches. However, for Zimbabwe, intimidation of the peasants during 
the struggle effectively disempowered them as they continued to fear to express their 
demands or voice their opinions well after the war ended. For the urban workers, their 
alienation during the struggle left them vulnerable for mobilisation through various means 
by the ruling party. And housing land allocation was just one amongst many. As was the 
pattern during the war in ‘liberated zones’ that were controlled by the war veterans,  
resource seeking and allocation was determined by the uncertainty and tension caused by 
failing to demonstrate open loyalty to the liberators. Years after the war ended, ZANU-PF 
still intimidates citizens who align themselves with opposition parties by destroying their 
homes as has happened after every election since 1985. The actual use of violence and not 
just threats, has left ‘liberation logistics’  in a high mode of operation especially where the 
poor masses can be targeted directly. 
 
In South Africa, secrecy and trust were equally upheld values but with many players on the 
liberating scene, there was room for variation that converged on the same principles. Urban 
workers were faced with the options of boycotting official institutions spontaneously, 
belonging clandestinely to political parties as well as to civic bodies that generally took 
over management of the African communities. With the ultimate goal the achievement of 
liberation, some unity was inevitable and compromises toned down extremities. That many 
variants of the struggle logic continue to demand to be heard moderates the actions of the 
ANC that could easily fall out of step with democracy in the attempts to be popular with 
the poor public. This constraint on ‘liberation logistics’  is crucial in a democracy even 
though some confusion undoubtedly arise as the same voices also make the loudest noises 
on criticising government for slow delivery. The advantages of such a  scenario are that the 
system can be manipulated to dispense favours sporadically to certain groups first by the 
ANC as the dominant party and secondly by all the groups when they refer to struggle 
promises and experiences.  
 
The Effects of Africanisation 
The socialist era sanctioned the politicisation of the public service and the costs of this 
process on developing countries’ administrative systems severely depleted resources 
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because of excessive patronage, which affects professionalism in service delivery. 
However in both countries, it was essential to realise wartime promises through official 
channels hence key officials/strategists had to be appointed to head the various 
departments of the public service. Both municipalities experienced bureaucratic tensions 
caused by the political leadership’s thriving on political promises. The appointment of 
party loyalists led to a period of confusion in decision-making and consequently, the 
implementation of policies. The over centralised decision making structure and the need to 
ensure that administrative decisions were in line with the socialist ideology (for 
Zimbabwe) further confused public servants who became unsure of who to serve and to 
what extent (Weiss 1994). On the other hand, the treatment of Coloureds, Indians and 
Africans as one group of blacks who were beneficiaries of Africanisation complicated 
transformation of the bureaucracy as much as the categories complicated the definition of 
targets for housing delivery. Thus the confidence gap was just as wide in both countries. 
 
The process of politicization itself changed cultural meanings, definitions, boundaries and 
hierarchies and the party identity became primary through politicization (Jung 2001:258).  
Party identity became important for both public officials (in Harare) and for the home 
seekers in general. Jung set out five variables for investigating political identity: political 
institutions, mobilizing discourse, material conditions, available ideology and organization. 
Conditioning variables are the material conditions, organization and available ideology that 
frame the cognition of those who are mobilized even though they are usually also linked by 
some other network shaped by similar variables. Political institutions and mobilisation 
discourse are essentially top down and are deliberately involved in the manipulation of 
identities (ibid:236). 
 
The identities of the bureaucrats who were beneficiaries of the Africanisation process 
responded to the new incentives that were ushered in by the liberating parties. Likewise the 
identities and groups constructed out of the house seeking experience were defined and 
laden with content under the changing conditions that gave more meaning to some 
boundaries. However, how long the constructed identities last and whether they will 
continue to be constructed around the same issues, may shift with time. Associational 
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identities in particular are taken up as a matter of choice and can thus be discarded when 
they no longer serve the purpose (ibid). This has been seen in the three cooperatives that 
were simply interested in getting houses. Members withdrew their activism once their 
goals were met losing the momentum of community building and a possibility of 
replicating the efforts enmasse. 
 
Because ruling party affiliation proved to be essential in both countries, a representative 
bureaucracy would go a long way towards professionalizing housing delivery in Cape 
Town by removing all the racial tensions and insensitivity that is directed at 
accommodating poor Africans. In Harare, a professional culture would restore respect for 
the rule of law. 
 
State Autonomy 
For South Africa, a negotiated power transfer bound the state’s  autonomy in almost every 
housing policy direction resulting in 'minimal autonomy' that constrained the new 
democratic government’s capacity to act as it may have wished. The housing formulation 
process and its numerous commissions bear testimony to this fact and yet autonomy in 
terms of goal formulation is important for exercising political power (Gran 1984). Though 
state autonomy was constitutionally restricted in the power hand-over process, with regard 
to pursuing its policies where the private sector was not necessarily directly concerned as 
in housing for the low income group, the state failed to exercise considerable autonomy. 
The state had vast tracts of state land at its disposal but the vertical power dispersal system 
impinged on its use particularly in Cape Town. This was even more so in the redistribution 
of land, a key resource to housing the more than twenty million homeless urban blacks. 
This qualifies South Africa to be a state with weak autonomy according to Bayart's 
(1993:8) classification of African states. 
 
The decentralised nature and structure of the government3 also bound the central4 
government’s autono my in that the provincial level of government can interpret policies 
contextually and challenge the central government if a constitutional provision can be 
interpreted to have been violated. Power is thus dispersed vertically because of the 
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provincial government's constitutionally defined autonomy and control of lower levels. 
With regard to housing policies, the state clearly lacked autonomy throughout the system 
from policy formulation to implementation. Bureaucrats, fearful of the pending 
Africanisation, were in a position to connive with the private sector actors to defeat any 
public sector provision of land or housing (Wilkinson 1998; Gusler 2000). 
 
In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF dominated the local housing policy arena and the ruling party’s 
'consensus' reigned in many policy areas and this provided room for the government to 
draw up new legislation that openly rewarded specific sections of the population such as 
the war veterans. Ideological uncertainties generated by the mobilisation discourse of the 
liberation struggle heightened expectations and at the same time, they stifled any debates 
that might have arisen in the housing policy formulation process. The state had enough 
autonomy that it did not bother to attempt to formulate a post-colonial housing policy until 
almost twenty years later!5 And when it did, both the process and the result did not reflect 
the input of civic groups and other stakeholders. Civics that participated in the process 
referred to it as a sham for it did not reflect the outcome of the deliberations. The policy 
remained as vague as many other development plans and for the government, the 
advantage lay in that it would be difficult to pinpoint blame in the event of the failure to 
deliver. Part of the problem was that modelling the housing convention along the South 
African lines that had taken place ten years earlier is likely to have offended the 
government. This explains why the policy process was only a consultative process at the 
deliberation stage and yet when it came to the actual formulation, the ministry acted alone 
and consequently ignored the inputs of other stake-holders. However, the civic groups 
were driven by global forces and the government too had made global commitments hence 
some superficial attempt at redressing the problem was essential. 
 
Civic Groups: The Quest for Autonomy or State Resources? 
The autonomy of civic organisations is best brought to light by comparing the successes of 
the two different housing cooperatives: the two in a dominant party system (Zimbabwe) 
and the other two in a multi-party system (South Africa), and in their willingness to 
surrender their autonomy in order to benefit from state resources. Other important issues 
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are the extent to which authoritarianism is concealed in the organizations and how far they 
have been able to survive capture by the state. To begin with, as explained in chapters one 
and two, both countries share a similar history of disrupted civic organisation during the 
period of colonial rule and as non-state actors, they could not organise on matters of 
common consent within public space. Due to this historical background, an exclusionary 
vision of civic organisations emerged in both countries in that territorial and social space 
was segregated. Other races, notably coloureds and whites in both countries, still do not 
participate in organising for housing resources and when they do, it is in separate 
organisations with different resource bases. 
 
Zimbabwe’s corporatist strategies, inherited from the colonial state, created a political 
culture that did not allow for the separation of state and civil society (Nordlund 1996:205). 
Organising as groups with an alternative voice and approach was thus heavily 
circumscribed. Government restrictions on the autonomy of civil society was eventually 
pronounced in the Private Voluntary Organisations act of 1995 which structures society-
state interactions and censors civic organisational life in the country (ibid). The absence of 
relatively autonomous actors in the civic realm especially in the first fifteen years after 
independence compounded the problem. However, the international ties established by 
civic groups working on housing issues have allowed them to gnaw at the power of the 
state and influence decisions even though they never had distinct ideological inclinations 
and were just concerned with countering the incapacity of the state when it came to 
housing issues. 
 
The HPZ, partly because it arose in an environment where banks and the working class 
poor were involved, required political facilitation as progress was retarded by the slow 
bureaucracy and working with donor funds meant that timeous implementation was 
essential. This target group of the lower working class also explains the dominance of men 
in its housing schemes as salaried applicants only qualified for the low interest bank loans. 
The major weakness was that the global networks of the HPZ did not embrace the 
empowerment, self-reliance discourse and the government was therefore more comfortable 
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with them. They were organising within an existing system, they recognised the role of the 
party and established a rapport that saw them being prioritised in housing land schemes. 
 
The ZHPF’s approach of collecting people and organising independently of the party was 
bound to run into problems sooner or later. Though the federation attempted to remain 
detached from party politics, the housing cooperatives fell prey to the politics of the time 
as politicians sought them out and they in turn, looked for politicians who could deliver 
their housing needs. The cooperatives thus benefit from both avenues, belonging to the 
federation where global skills and tactics are learned, and deferring to the party where the 
only likely quick access to housing land can be found. This manoeuvring contributes to the 
lack of interest in building communities and not just houses. Here the poor seem to be 
more concerned with fitting in into urban areas by owning a house and joining the urban 
community in general. 
 
The Silver City scheme was, like the Harare cooperatives, not interested in building 
communities or generally changing the life of the poor, but were just concerned with the 
security and opportunities an urban house provides. The short term goals of the scheme 
make them less of a threat when compared to the federation with its mammoth 
organizational structure and thousands of members who do not have a defined means as 
such of sustaining themselves in urban areas. Realisation of the real hurdles and odds 
against this group is what led the SAHPF to develop liaisons with the politicians from the 
ruling party who have always claimed that the poor were their constituency. With urban 
poverty on the increase, political support was imperative as bureaucrats were unlikely to 
accommodate their demands. 
 
In South Africa, civic associations formed during the struggle for liberation became the 
pillars of civil society in black residential areas. The numerous civics that emerged in 
response to a wide range of political, economic and social factors were all concerned with 
creating a culture of democracy  and the SAHPF demonstrated this clearly. However, the 
Silver City project does not hesitate to resort to violence to enforce compliance where 
money is concerned. Its mechanisms differ radically from those of the SAHPF indicating 
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the problems likely to emerge when collective organization becomes a basis for laying 
claims on a state perceived as unresponsive. Ties bound by coercive methods to enforce 
compliance are unlikely to be unsustainable and often tend to be very short lived. On the 
other hand, the SAHPF has conditions that are designed to exclude those who waver in 
their commitment. And around the world, it is common practice that homeowners’ 
associations use their powers to exclude, discriminate and segregate and the cooperatives 
in this study were no different (Holston and Appadurai 1999:5). 
 
A positive point is that the members in the cooperatives in both countries had ties that 
bound them long before they began organising for housing. First of all, the cooperatives in 
the study cut across ethnic groups and emphasized other cleavages such as income and 
class. This does not mean that ethnicity has lost its explanatory power as a basis for self-
identification or associational activity (Reed 1979:15). What has changed, according to 
Reed (1979) is the distinctiveness of the institutional forms which were the source of group 
consciousness in the first place and traditional ethnic ways have to compete for survival 
where massification determines likely success. Secondly, they lived in the same 
communities and were already involved in other cooperative ventures such as the stokvels 
(credit rotation schemes). The social capital generated in these informal associational 
activities proves to be credible for encouraging self-help initiatives even though more 
research requires to be done so as to be able to predict the prospects of success with each 
group. 
 
Intensity of the “Liberation culture” 
Resource allocation processes in the two countries raise important questions of how the 
state distinguishes between citizens collectively. There are differences between the 
strategies used in Cape Town and Harare. For instance, in Cape Town-South Africa, there 
is collusion between civic organisations and some bureaucrats who are ruling party 
members/loyalists to circumvent bureaucratic criteria that is interpreted as thwarting the 
efforts to redistribute wealth and extend services to the previously disadvantaged black 
community. The black community is thus perceived as one group of citizens but within it, 
submission to party steering further distinguishes between the citizens as shown by 
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priviledges accorded to the SAHPF. Citizenship rights within this newly defined party 
community occurs as an end result of the allocation process. Organisations may be ANC 
led and initiated, but inclusion is broad in that all desiring the resource will benefit and 
ultimately render their loyalty to the benefactor, the ANC. In Harare-Zimbabwe, politicians 
openly allocate and prioritise land for housing to groups acknowledged as belonging to the 
party. The order is reversed in that you first identify with the party and become part of its 
community, then access is opened. Identity with the ruling party tends to come first 
irrespective of how service seekers organise to access the service. The choice of whether or 
not to organize with the party leads to exclusion and can cause blockades and frustrations 
in accessing housing resources. 
 
Zimbabwe aimed to disable citizens in so far as they could exercise their democratic rights 
and responsibilities. Obfuscated administrative procedures contributed to hollow 
citizenship tendencies that characterised the politics of allocation dictated by the ruling 
party/government. The amount of autonomy the new governments enjoyed in planning for 
redistribution of housing resources determines how much of the war-time knowledge they 
could draw on. Reforming the inherited bureaucracies by making them more representative 
through Africanisation, successfully instilled much of the “liberation culture”  values. The 
work of civic groups organising for housing facilitates the application of the “liberation 
culture”  to large visible groups. It also partially completes the ruling parties’ rhetoric on 
the deliverance of war-time promises. It is in these civic groups that political identities 
took shape either at the beginning or at the end of the organising for housing process. 
 
Some theorists have argued that a vibrant and associational life expressed in wide 
participation in voluntary association equips citizens to reject patron clientelism. And this 
study finds contradictory evidence in both countries that a ‘liberationist’ kind of 
citizenship evolves out of the house-seeking process when people are poor and access to 
resources has many blockages. Because of the racial factor in Cape Town, the ANC 
embraces all blacks and exclusion is either by choice or extreme poverty. Where the ANC 
initiates and engineers the housing delivery process, service seekers are compelled to 
identify with the ANC as an end result of the patron-client relationship. The institutional 
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culture from the previous era is still dominant in Cape Town forcing the “liberation 
culture”  to function in a revolutionary mode. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the presence of state autonomy in housing policy formulation, combined 
with Africanisation (“ liberation culture”  value carriers) and the absence of a vibrant and 
autonomous civil society strengthens the “ liberation culture”  and it permeated public 
institutions with relative ease. The community solution was part of the hegemonic 
apparatus of the state aimed at organizing consent and managing dissent (Kenny 
2002:410). There is thus a high intensity of the “liberation culture”  as mediating forces are 
largely absent. On the other hand, the relative absence of state autonomy in South Africa, 
combined with the contested Africanisation process, constraints the utilisation of liberation 
war time knowledge and experience and retards its infusion into public institutions. 
However, civic organisations, in whose leadership this knowledge resides, challenge the 
system from below and enforce the “liberation culture”  amidst much manoeuvring and 
strategising. There is therefore a low (or mediated) intensity of the “ liberation culture” . 
Varying strategies are therefore utilised in the two countries in allocating state resources 
and consequently, different mechanisms are employed by both the seekers of services (who 
may have more room to challenge the state) and the ruling party. 
 
In the Western Cape, political space is more open for contestation as evidenced by the 
visibility of opposition parties that constantly keep government in check. Generally, the 
political environment is more open and supportive of civic society involvement. Real 
opposition to the rulers poses a threat that constantly keeps them in line with regard to 
exercising tolerance and delivering on promises. All contestants are interested in protecting 
their constituencies and are also open to manipulating the mobilisation power that lies in 
meeting delivery promises as well as in courting others. A recent study on land 
redistribution by Gran (2005) supports this. The study revealed that there is more 
transparency and less corruption but also more resistance to change in the Western Cape 
bureaucracy. 
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Other Key Factors 
 
Continuities and Discontinuities -the Legal and Institutional Framework 
The similarities between the Apartheid and the ANC led governments’ housing policies, as 
well as the Rhodesian and ZANU-PF’s, are better understood as continuities. Nowhere is 
this clearer than in the financial arrangements for assisting housing provision for the poor. 
Any changes that took place were incremental rather than radical as would have been 
expected in the face of the demands for housing expressed by the increasing numbers of 
the urban and homeless poor. For Zimbabwe, the government never intended to integrate 
the poor into the city. Right from the beginning in 1980, with land still abundant and the 
city surrounded by farms, all new housing developments were on the periphery of the city 
and the new government continued to expand away from the city and the low-income areas 
were located next to other low-income areas. Since the initial housing projects for the poor 
were financed by the World Bank and USAID, low income did not exactly target the poor 
as a basic salary was required to qualify for the projects. With the banking system acting as 
intermediaries, suspect applicants were screened out and for a long time, the council had 
control over housing developments. Problems arose when funding began to dwindle and as 
it also became clear that the government had neither the plans nor the capacity to address 
housing needs of the poor. 
 
Whereas legal provisions were altered as a matter of urgency for Cape Town’s house -
seekers, Harare maintained ‘the revised’ institutions, kept most of the old legislation, and 
infused new bureaucrats at all levels of government. Legal acts in particular were used to 
facilitate access to land by the political leadership in Harare as chapter four illustrated and 
old institutions simply got new or additional functions. Whereas South Africa used legal 
provisions, e.g. the Development Facilitation Act, to facilitate access to land, the 
Zimbabwe government thwarted self-housing efforts by the poor through enacting legal 
provisions that emphasized order and control such as the Cooperative Act. The reverse 
happened in Cape Town, new institutions emerged overnight, with new legislation and 
unfortunately, for a change oriented regime, old bureaucrats in virtually the entire 
bureaucracy. Just as the struggle was protracted, so is the demise of apartheid and though 
most of the ANC cadres in the public service man the top positions, the senior bureaucrats 
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are largely from the apartheid era and nowhere is this more prominent than in the CTMC 
housing departments. Despite the radical housing institutional building in South Africa, all 
efforts appeared to be incremental due to the resistance by other actors especially at the 
provincial level. This ‘zone of indifference’ had the o ld previous regime members as the 
dominant actors. The Zimbabwe ‘zone of indifference’ had other causal elements, amongst 
them the fear of Zanu-PF’s wrath if wrong decisions were implemented or rather if the 
wrong beneficiaries appeared in the picture and paralysis was caused by the fear of major 
deviations from party policy procedures. 
 
Maintenance of the subsidy policy illustrates the rampant nature of incrementalism in ANC 
housing policy. The ANC left the 1993 interim subsidy intact when it got into office in 
1994 (Wilkinson 1998:225; Gusler 2000:31). To begin with, the capital subsidy and the 
trust guarding element, the social compacts, had been part of the Nationalist Party policies 
espoused in the IDT. The subsidy remained a once off grant, values were increased from 
7500 rands during the IDT phase to 15 000 rands by the White Paper even though inflation 
eroded the actual values (ibid). As can be expected, qualifying margins for the subsidy rose 
too from less than 1000 rands per month to less than 3 500 a month, and the provision 
mode remained the same with business-government and NGO partnership playing 
important roles and all emphasizing freehold tenure (Gusler 2000). The main difference 
was that whereas the IDT delivered to communities, the NHF shifted delivery to 
communities organized as projects as the White Paper had broadened the scope to reflect 
the heterogeneity in the society.  Individual subsidies were provided for the first time to 
Africans and institutional and consolidation subsidies were also introduced as these would 
be extended to the majority of the African population in urban areas (ibid). 
 
The search for both domestic and international legitimacy affected the ANC’s options with 
regard to housing delivery (Bond 2000). The ANC’s increment al approach, which left 
much of the institutional memory intact, was described partly as a means of appeasing the 
white community by bowing to the demands of neo-liberalisms. Conforming to neo-liberal 
principles was important in the global economy and this was a key determinant in 
articulating housing provision in the developing world. The housing policy therefore 
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emerged as a tool for legitimizing the ANC in the eyes of the white business community in 
particular (ibid). Courting the minority white group’s trust contributed to the establishment 
of an orderly transformation but still, the ANC owed the African people what they 
expected in a democratic order. It was this debt that partly forced it to quickly co-opt the 
federation’s strategy and bless it as an a nswer to the poor’s housing problems. Both 
governments’ responses to the neo -liberal and global communal initiatives dictated similar 
responses to housing the poor. That is, a shift to a market oriented approach and embracing 
the activist approach that appeared to solve problems of urban poverty. However, housing 
approaches continue to emphasise ownership whereas in the rest of the developed world, 
more people rent housing in urban areas. The African reality of low populations, coupled 
with land availability allows for this owner housing approach even though congested cities 
like Cape Town have begun to run out of space (Smit 2001). 
 
Even though there is convergence in the incremental nature of housing delivery across the 
two countries, the South African regime has a developmental approach to housing delivery 
as it provides all resources required for housing. That housing is a constitutional obligation 
also gives the ANC an edge at the implementation level. On the other hand, Zimbabwe’s 
welfarism ends with land provision as the only housing resource that government feels it 
has some obligation in providing and there are no mechanisms for ensuring equality in the 
rather idiosyncratic allocative procedures. Housing delivery is not obligatory on the 
government as it is not enshrined in the constitution as part of the local government 
functions. This silence on what the government is mandated to provide as part of the 
housing package leaves room for opportunism. Communities are thus seen as taking the 
responsibility for the self provision of housing within the limits prescribed by both the 
legal framework and the party. 
 
Both governments have a monopoly on housing delivery for the poor and this positions the 
home seekers directly against them. On the other hand, the ruling parties have traditionally 
influenced popular sectors and have played the major role in mobilizing grassroots 
communities (Miraftab 1997:369). Ruling parties thus resent and tend to view NGOs as 
“stealing their clientele by providing social assista nce outside state defined channels” 
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(ibid:364). For Cape Town, the solution to NGO steering lay in the co-optation of the 
leadership in the driving organizations into provincial structures thus creating new loyalty 
demands. The implication was the toning down of poor groups’ demands such that they 
were forced to fit into the bureaucratic mould in addition to allaying the ruling party’s fears 
of the mobilisation power of the self-help housing institutions. The SAHPF, instead of 
viewing the government as protecting its space ‘through exploitation of the opposition’s 
discourse’, decided to develop amicable (patronage) relations with government and 
consequently lost much of its autonomy (Baumann et al, undated). However, this was an 
essential strategy to avoid exclusion. Land ended up being given to the SAHPF not as a 
“citizenship right, but as a favour by the government/ruling party to serve them through an 
extra-government channel” (Miraftab 1997:368). It is therefore essential to always 
remember that “people h ave never got anything without having to give something-often 
political- in return” (ibid:371).  Political movements do not regard empowerment of the 
poor as something to be praised and supported lest they view themselves as comprehensive 
liberators, rather, their successes are assumed to have been achieved by virtue of the 
party’s ascendancy (Baumann et al undated:35). 
 
Inspite of its controversial origins, the SAHPF was successful in lobbying the state and 
ended up being co-opted thus effectively silencing its confrontational stance with regard to 
accessing land. Its mobilization capacity had triggered uneasiness on the part of the 
government. The other cooperative, Silver City Housing, was not threatening to build a 
community and was just bent on solving its shelter problem at a very micro level. This 
alone was not a challenge to the state’s capacity, hence support in terms of ignoring legal 
requirements and tools was readily available. Officials, by choosing to ignore the self-help 
efforts of the Silver City Cooperative, sanctioned these initiatives by default as the poor 
continued to realize their dreams. 
 
Though the federation appeared on the scene much later in Zimbabwe, its impact has taken 
very long. The government’s initial response was that such an o rganization that demanded 
land as a citizens’ resource was encroaching on government territory and consequently 
sought to challenge its capacity. This affected ZHPF’s plans, but because the HPZ 
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reorgnised and ‘respected’ the ruling party’s authority, it wa s readily recognized and won 
favours from the government with regard to accessing land. The relationship demonstrates 
a clear tolerance for clientelistic politics. The question is, what explains this variation 
between the two governments, that in Cape Town-South Africa, the federation wins the 
governments’ sympathies and yet that same federation - following the very same logic, fails 
to win ZANU-PF’s heart and yet the ruling parties have somewhat similar ideological 
leanings and centralizing tendencies? One obvious reason is that both parties were anxious 
of the federation’s capacity to mobilize the poor but one chose to neutralize through 
cooptation and the other, through the most different response, did nothing to frustrate the 
initiative and simply expected them to defer to political steering. The other is that in South 
Africa, scrutiny of policy implementation is a reality whereas in Zimbabwe, the state has 
made itself immune to criticism. 
 
Mechanisms in organising for houses by poor house-seekers differ in many respects as do 
the allocation procedures, but courting official support is one area where global influences 
play a major role. One technique used by the two federations to influence relevant 
authorities is to invite foreign visitors who would have gone through the same experience 
to highly publicized events where local politicians will be invited to officiate thus lending 
legitimacy to the whole initiative. This has been found to have a profound impact on both 
the attitudes and perceptions of bureaucratic officials and politicians who would otherwise 
dismiss invitations by poor homeless people (Baumann et al, undated:36). International 
presence thus aids in encouraging desirable official support. In many other cases, 
government officials and politicians have been known to offer substantial support to 
projects, not just housing, that would have achieved significant political presence. 
 
The successes and failures are also explained by the different organizational capacities of 
the civic organizations in the two cases. In Cape Town, the civics operate in a more 
democratic environment that allows free expression such that citizens can organize and act 
freely to influence policies. Also in the province as a whole, the ruling party was the main 
opposition party from 1994 until after 2000. It was also the only party concerned with the 
plight of the poor Africans and though it equally feared the impact of the power 
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independent civics would have on its political constituency, it equally realized the political 
gains to be made out of the entire endeavour at the national level. In Harare, the closed 
political space did not allow much room for civic bodies, especially those representing the 
poor, to organize and influence the policy process. ZANU-PF has thus continuously 
rejected riding the same global bandwagon as everybody else and this the government has 
consistently demonstrated in the last six years which have seen political space shrink even 
more. 
 
Trust Relations 
Mistrust was evidently higher in Cape Town in the financial arrangements, in the actual 
delivery of the houses and in ensuring access to state resources. This was evidenced by the 
requirement of a social contract to be signed by a trusted intermediary as has been shown 
in chapter seven. Like South Africa, Zimbabwe too used and trusted private companies to 
deliver housing for the poor. For example, a private company, Brian Colquhoun, Hugh, 
O’Donnell and Partners, were the project managers in some of the major housing schemes 
implemented by the Municipality of Harare in the eighties. In fact, mistrust of the poor has 
always been a fact as evidenced by the automatic deduction of rents from salaries thus 
restricting both employment and accommodation related mobility during the white 
minority rule era.  The democratic era ended such practices. 
 
At the same time, the dominance of the ruling ZANU-PF stifled initiatives and generally 
retarded progress. In fact, mistrust created by uncertainty over how the party would react 
defined the space in which organizations could organize for housing resources. It was no 
wonder then that trade unions, that from 1981, had demonstrated the audacity to challenge 
the state, were again the first ones to form housing cooperatives. It is also important to 
remember that during this phase, the government encouraged ‘workers’ to organize and 
buy into the capitalist ventures around them. Mistrust then was between the ruling party 
and any other pockets that might have demonstrated some form of organisational prowess 
that posed a challenge to its centralising tendencies. As time went on, and aided by a 
restricted political environment and a largely partisan bureaucracy, mistrust against anyone 
organizing outside the party channels increased. Successful poverty alleviation 
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programmes such as those ran by PLAN International in Matebeleleland and other 
provinces, were all ignored. Problems in housing delivery can thus be attributed to a large 
extent, to the lack of political will. 
 
There are many layers of lack of trust in the Cape Town housing regime. These are 
between blacks and whites; between coloureds and whites; between political parties and 
the public-the poor in particular; between political parties and bureaucrats and between the 
homeless poor and bureaucrats. The tension caused by the suspicions between and amongst 
these groups negatively affect the housing delivery process. A major setback is that both 
Harare and Cape Town have housing implementation processes that emphasise the 
commodity value of a house. Because of this emphasis, the net effect is the hindrance of 
housing delivery as such housing is expensive to provide, it requires expansive land and 
can only accommodate a few people. Also the well off inevitably show resistance to the 
location of low-income groups near their affluent areas. 
 
White residential suburbs in Cape Town resist black areas sprouting up near their 
communities and coloureds equally resist this (despite their being a part of the black 
community). A coloured man vented his and many others’ hatred, “We can’t live  next to 
these [African] people. It is just not right” (Thurman 1999). The problem is that the 
affirmative action policy lumps everyone else into the black category and this increased the 
competition for resources as statistically, the Africans, who are the majority population 
group, will benefit more.  This fuels the resentment especially amongst the coloureds who 
had become accustomed to the coloured preferential area treatment in the province. Fear of 
loss of this priviledge and a desire to continue to be higher up on the social rank by one 
notch is thus clear. The irony is that the coloureds quickly claim their blackness only when 
it is about employment opportunities as they want to benefit from the affirmative action 
policy that recognizes them as beneficiaries. 
 
Another incident that was loaded with mistrust was the unwillingness by bureaucrats to 
subsidize poor people whom they defined as not necessarily affording the houses they had 
built. This would have sent the wrong signals to the poor blacks and perhaps encouraged a 
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heavy influx of newcomers to the city. Therefore the CTMC refused to show any signs of 
accepting the self housing initiatives by refusing to provide connection points to the main 
sewer and water lines for the Victoria Mxenge community. Resistance by both 
communities and institutions to the location of poor blacks near their affluent areas and 
closer to town revealed the hard core stereotypes of the ‘African’.  
 
Liberationist Citizenship 
“Neither nationhood nor citizenship is a thing; both are processes which involve, inventing 
‘the People’ ” 6 (Howe 1991:128). 
 
Benefits of ‘Active’ Citizenship 
Through social and political action in the process of organizing for  housing resources in 
which power is demanded and claimed from below, the poor home-seekers in this study 
have repoliticised citizenship (Shaw and Martin 2000:410). They have bridged the gap in 
which citizenship is on the one hand, an individually ascribed status and on the other, a 
collectively asserted practice. When the poor can force inclusion there can be hope for 
democratic renewal as Friedman (1992 cited in Shaw and Martin:410) noted, “Without 
democracy there can be no politics and without a genuine inclusive politics, the claims of 
the disempowered will not be heard.”  Because citizenship is in conformity with an ethos of 
civic virtue, duty and obligation and because rights of citizenship adhere to the identity of 
citizen, they depend on being recognised as a proper citizen. 
 
Citizenship7 rights and obligations provide techniques for the state to intervene in the lives 
of citizens especially where there are dominant ruling parties and where civil rights are 
curtailed. The traditional conceptions of citizenship and their categorizations are restrictive 
in explaining the outcomes of administrative behaviour in post liberation war states as 
some elements of all three variations tend to straddle all the three distinctions. Liberation 
struggles/wars were the midwife to a new conception of citizenship that was couched in 
terms of the liberation ideology and experience. If citizenship entails the protection of the 
citizen against the arbitrary exercise of state power, the post liberation war states 
constructed new notions of citizenship that pose a challenge to this ideal as they depended 
on loyalty and submission to some extent. However, globalisation processes of social 
 233 
liberalization and democratization have enabled the homeless in South Africa to contest 
political space and struggle for resources. Poor communities were compelled to explore 
and devise innovative ways of internal organization and governance-(Baumann et al, 
undated:1). 
 
Citizenship as an identity that is defined by rights and duties and by an awareness of others 
in a similar position (March and Olsen 1995:56) strengthened the bonds of the federations’ 
members in both countries. Citizenship denotes sharing rights, duties and responsibilities 
and citizens have free speech, free association and free access to information but the last 
element is difficult for home seekers in both countries to access partly because of hesitancy 
by the bureaucracy in empowering groups that demonstrate initiative and capacity in 
solving their problems. The state has rights and obligations in relation to its citizens and it 
has latitude in meeting expectations towards citizens; it makes policy decisions about the 
level of protection or constraint that it extends to citizens and it provides differentially in 
terms of categories of citizenship (Walters 1989). There therefore resides in citizenship the 
possibility of unequal treatment by the state as captured by Walters (1989:160) in his 
definition: 
Modern citizenship is a set of normative expectations specifying the relationship 
between the nation state and its individual members which procedurally establish 
the rights and obligations of members and set of practices by which these 
expectations are realised. 
 
Barker (1990:3) argues that whilst all citizens are subjects, not all subjects are citizens and 
the character of the government determines alterations in these positions. Subjects, in the 
manner that Mamdani (1996) describes them, do not play a role in shaping the government 
and yet citizens on the other hand engage in politics and influence government. The 
successes of the SAHPF in gaining government recognition, even though this ended up 
being perilous for them, proves that citizens can have both the statuses  of citizen and 
subject and this position is very much a situational issue. If poor groups can force the 
government to act otherwise, then the assumed passivity of subjects falls away as there is 
evidence that they can reconfigure their status in some instances in the post colony. 
However, in Zimbabwe, the situation is different in that the poor, irrespective of their 
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innovative capabilities, constantly need to defer to political authorities to enjoy their full 
rights and are thus kept largely in the position of subjects. 
 
Generally, in the struggle for resources and the search for social justice, house seekers 
become ‘active’ citizens who d emand new rights and articulate new agenda for citizenship 
(Holston 1998:39). This results in what Wilson and Lowery (2003:48-50) describe as the 
“building of community, voice, connection and power through their organisation ... the 
building of deep democracy.” In deep democracy,8 citizenship is conferred by personal 
engagement and not just through the usual expressions of choice through elections, but 
through exercising the democratic arts of participation. The process is based on public 
conversation, hinges on tolerance, and is thus a product of social learning. Deep democracy 
“culminates in the enfranchisement of the self in daily life, transforming one’s self identity 
into one of inclusion in, and responsibility for, an expanding circle of community.”  
(ibid:50). The actions of people in the distinct housing communities studied here must be 
viewed as a legitimate expression of active citizenship as well as the essence of democracy 
itself (Shaw and Martin 2004:410). 
 
Lalloo (1998:2) criticizes South Africa’s  housing policy for perpetuating the unequal forms 
of citizenship inherited from the apartheid era. Its reproduction through a people oriented 
discourse legitimizes this continuity. However, he acknowledges that it is important to 
stress that many other factors can be blamed for this amongst them the bad timing of the 
negotiations; the manipulation by the apartheid state and the failure to connect housing 
policy with critical issues of citizenship, property and space. 
 
Holston (1998:39) points out that urban spaces and the experiences of those who live in 
them ‘become both the context and the substance of emergent forms of citizenship’. He 
defines this as ‘insurgent citizenship’  that depicts claims for inclusion and recognition that 
challenge the state’s tradition al position as the only legitimate source of citizenship rights, 
meanings and practices. The locus of this insurgency is as Holston (1998) argues, in 
organized grassroots mobilization that are driven by experience and everyday practices that 
radically empower, parody, derail or subvert state agendas signifying the tensions inherent 
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in clamouring for citizenship. The alternative planning forms of urban housing embarked 
on by the poor question the whole notion of national governments’ capacity to organize 
public spaces as containing pre-defined identities. These new ‘insurgent settlements’ 
introduced for Cape Town, racial and radical new identities that threatened the very 
essence of what Afrikaners had sought to preserve for generations. In Zimbabwe, mutant 
forms of citizenship were a result of the hegemonic project of the ruling party. 
 
The regimes in this study can be viewed as having a 'liberationist conception of 
citizenship'. This refers to the selective nature of resource allocation that constructs 
citizenship by party affiliation- that is, one becomes more of a citizen when they toe the 
party line. Citizenship in liberation war societies is thus both part and parcel of the struggle 
as it was a claim for rights. And through (liberation) political citizenship, space was 
created for the poor to claim social citizenship by fighting for inclusion into the urban 
space. 
 
Conclusion 
The comparison in this chapter has illuminated the similarities and differences in the two 
housing regimes as well as in the operational mechanisms of the “liberation culture” . The 
convergences and divergences indicate that different factors work differently and follow 
varying processes in dissimilar environments to produce similar outcomes- particularistic 
behaviour in resource allocation that has implications for the mobilization of party support. 
Though there are many similarities, it is important to highlight that the “liberation culture”  
functions in different modes in the two regimes. For South Africa, it functions according to 
a revolutionary logic as evidenced by the strategies and tactics of the different actors, and 
for Zimbabwe, the hegemonic consolidation mode is prevalent.  This revelation implies 
that South Africa, being the new comer to majority rule, will to some extent, follow the 
Zimbabwean trajectory.  
 
However, we have to exercise caution in interpreting the power demonstrated by the poor 
in this study. Though they may have organized successfully, Chambers (cited in Craig et al 
2000:331) warned on being realistic since the poor can be taught to analyse their situation 
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but this does not guarantee that they will be recognized just because they can generate new 
insights on the socio-economic fabric of their communities. Zimbabwe has simply turned 
them into part of the party agenda. 
 
Hoggett and Miller (2000:358-359) also warn against perceiving groups as the answer to 
development problems. This, they argue, is because groups often tend respond to 
uncertainty by generating emotional cultures one of which is the Messianic deliverer and 
this can send wrong signals to parties with hegemonic tendencies. On the other side, 
community development members tend to develop deep reservations about the issues they 
organize around and they anticipate the reactions of those in authority to their problems.9 
The collective expressions of their angst, struggles and ambitions are crucial for them to 
establish their sense of self. Hence being a collective aides in the creation of new 
sentiments that are likely to be sustainable and this positions them as a crucial vehicle for 
participatory development. 
 
Endnotes
                                                 
1 Raboroko Pule, a member of the Kanana Residents Committee, used his own initiative to allocate idle land 
he identified near the township of Sebokeng in Gauteng. His explanation was simple, “You just can’t wait for 
something. You have to do something. Land in South Africa is not a problem. The problem is getting that 
land to the people.”  See “Homeless but not Helpless”, People and the Planet, vol.5 no.2, 1996, p3 
2 Citizenship is a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, 
human rights and public interest. Its analytic value, is further enhanced by Will Kymlicka’s argument that 
‘most liberal theorist have recognized that citizenship is not just a legal status, defined by a set of rights and 
responsibilities, but also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community’. See 
Kymlicka Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
3 The three layers of administrative governmental units are: the central government and a central legislature; 
a provincial government for each of the 9 provinces and a provincial legislature and a local government level. 
4 Even though administration is decentralised, beyond this veil there is a party with centralising tendencies, 
the ANC. 
5 Efforts to locate this housing policy document were futile even though bureaucrats insisted that it existed 
and even though, they were yet to see it in 2000 when the interviews for this study were conducted! 
6 See Edmund Morgan (1988) Inventing the People, Norton, New York. 
7 Many studies distinguish amongst three traditional conceptions of citizenship; liberal, libertarian and 
republican (as originally defined by Miller). The liberal conception views citizenship as asset of rights that 
must be enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question and these Marshall classified as civil 
rights, political rights and social rights. Everyone is to enjoy entitlements which stand apart from and to some 
extent conflict with the outcomes of a market economy driven by considerations of efficiency. Here the 
equalising tendencies of citizenship are stressed even though there are limits. Rights are inherent in the 
individual and are guaranteed with minimal obligations to the community (Ndegwa 1997). The libertarian 
conception (which is not discussed here) views the citizen as a rational consumer who through contract and 
choice can gain access to a range of public goods. It hinges on the fact that citizenship at its core concerns 
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common rights and goods enjoyed in common. The republican conception sees the citizen as someone who 
plays an active role in shaping his society through public discussion. Rights are thus acquired through civic 
practice that upholds obligations to the community. It adds to the liberal conception of citizenship as a set of 
rights, that a citizen must be one who thinks and behaves in a certain way by identifying with the political 
community to which he belongs and is committed to promoting its common good through active participation 
in its political life. See Ndegwa, S. (1997) “ Citizenship and Ethnicity : An Examination of Two Tradition 
Moments in Kenyan Politics” , The American Political Science Review, vol.91 no.3, September, pp599-616. 
Homogeneity is assumed and it becomes a possible goal in this conception and non-participation has 
exclusionary repercussions. Here there is more tolerance or diversity as citizens simply have to justify the 
positions they take on issues without giving up their other identities.  
8  Wilson and Lowery (2003) point out a number of concepts that frame deep democracy at the applied level. 
These are social capital, non-violent dialogue, listening, negotiation, conflict resolution, community 
participation, appreciative inquiry, communitarian thought and it also borrows from the literature on learning 
organisations. Appadurai (cited in Wilson and Lowery 2003)  has used the term to refer to the ‘efforts to 
reconstitute citizenship’ and he outlines three ways of doing so; the first is when the poor take the initiative 
and the responsibility to direct and mange their own development through active dialogue, a transparent and 
inclusionary process; the second way is when the poor directly engage the key and relevant state authorities 
and lastly, when the poor recognize the value in solidarity and become horizontally networked. See Wilson, 
P.A. and Lowery, C. (2003) “ Building Deep Democracy” , Planning Forum, p51. 
9 There are many ways of feeling collective sentiments and not all are positive. For instance, racism is an 
organised constellation of feelings that include fear, hatred and contempt. See Hoggett, P. and Miller, C. 
(2000) “Working With Emotions in Community Organisations”, Community Development Journal, vol.35 
no.2. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion: Revisiting the “Liberation culture” 
 
Introduction 
This study has, through a historical analytic approach, explored the politics of housing 
delivery dynamics in the post liberation war countries. The focus of this comparative study 
has been both theoretical and empirical in the attempts to analyse the impact of the 
“liberation culture”  on housing delivery in the post liberation cities of Harare in Zimbabwe 
and Cape Town in South Africa. The aim of this concluding chapter is firstly to summarise 
the major findings, and secondly, to revisit some of the significant theoretical and 
empirical findings and how they relate to the issues raised in the second chapter as well as 
in the rest of the study. 
 
This thesis has also attempted to isolate and demonstrate the importance of capturing the 
variation in neo-patrimonial bureaucratic cultures through the development and application 
of the “liberation culture”  theory in explaining housing distribution in post liberation war 
bureaucracies. The study was based on several assumptions, amongst them that the values 
and norms harboured by post liberation war bureaucracies, the “liberation culture”, orient s 
service delivery in favour of party loyalists resulting in the creation of exclusionary 
distributional systems that discriminate on the basis of political criteria. Another 
assumption was that the exclusivist orientation of the “liberation culture”  in housing 
resource allocation encouraged the formation of new political identities thereby 
constructing a new conception of citizenship.  In addition to the four main causal factors, 
‘liberation logistics’ , state autonomy, Africanisation and civic organisation, the “liberation 
culture’ s”  intensity is influenced by the effect of the strength of other political and 
environmental forces such as the country’s historical trajectory, liberation struggle 
experiences and the general administrative milieu. As a result, varying intensities of the 
“liberation culture”  produce similar outcomes through different processes and varying 
combinations of the causal factors. 
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Through a comparative approach, I tested this theory empirically through an investigation 
of housing delivery to low-income groups in the CMTC in Cape Town, South Africa, and 
Harare Municipality in Harare, Zimbabwe. Through comparing and contrasting housing 
delivery to these housing cooperatives, it became possible to tease out the differences in 
the intensities of the “liberation culture”  as well as identify the variations in the 
mechanisms utilised to access housing resources by the poor in the different regimes. The 
“liberation culture”  was identified as manifesting itself in the following ways: 
(a) the open circumvention of laid down criteria for allocative decisions in favour 
of party loyalists, 
(b) the interpretation of universal legal codes in a particularistic manner; 
(c) when individuals organise as groups to access services under party guidance or 
party steering and 
(d) when there is evidence of a willingness to be compliant to party dictates. 
 
The major findings confirmed these manifestations in both cases even though there were 
different processes and mechanism that had outcomes qualifying to be regarded as 
instances of the same thing (Ragin 1987). 
 
Both cases show the particularistic interpretation of legal codes in allocating housing 
resources to exclusive groups. In South Africa, the SAHPF was prioritised in first, 
receiving funding (10 million rands) for supporting the housing efforts, secondly, in the 
awarding of state subsidies directly to the Victoria Mxenge housing scheme as well as to 
the Utshani fund or the SAHPF, and thirdly in getting 20 percent of any land reserved for 
them in all low-income housing schemes. In Zimbabwe, the network of beneficiaries of 
this party reward is broader. To begin with, the HPZ gets frequent donations of land for 
developing their housing packages which they then sell to low-income groups. Secondly, 
the war veterans, under the War Veteran Association, have 20 percent of land distribution 
schemes reserved for them. Thirdly, many of the cooperatives outside the ZHPF were 
prioritised in housing land allocations even if they did not meet the criteria as illustrated in 
chapter five.  Even those that were in the federation can become prioritised too if they 
align themselves to the party. 
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To demonstrate the open circumvention of laid down criteria for allocative decisions in 
favour of party loyalists in South Africa, Minister Joe Slovo demonstrated the power of the 
socialist ideology by sanctioning that Kanana housing cooperative be granted tenure even 
though the group had settled itself illegally. A new law, passed by the ANC led 
government, was applied retrospectively to the group that had subsequently joined the 
federation to legitimise its position as qualifying for housing resources under its auspices. 
Likewise, the president of Zimbabwe allocated housing land to Kugarika Kushinga 
according to his fancy without cognisance of town development plans. 
 
In both cases, access to housing resources is acquired through groups deliberately 
organising to appoint patrons with enough political clout to realise the group’s goals . The 
SAHPF appointed the second minister of housing in the ANC government, Sankie 
Mthembi Mahanyele as its patron. Party penetration of the society is evidenced by the fact 
that many of the community based organisations are led by appointed ANC cadres and this 
can be attributed to the fact that many still belong to the generation that participated in the 
struggle and they are very much aware of the tasks confronting the party and the obstacles 
it faces. Both Patricia Matolongwe and Mandisa Dhlangwa belong to the ANC women’s 
league. In Zimbabwe, the extensive power of party penetration is revealed in that the HPZ, 
a technical NGO, was only able to make gigantic strides in delivery housing through the 
deliberate cultivation of patronage links with the ruling party’s land issuing auth orities in 
the country.  Other cooperatives that had chosen the independent route quickly realised 
their errors in that they were denied access and humiliated by having to endure long 
waiting periods. Access was determined by open alignment with the ruling party in 
Zimbabwe and for South Africa, by conniving and strategising clandestinely to beat the 
system. The ANC was looked up to as the last resort or the highest court of appeal by the 
homeless poor. Though these are different processes, the important issue is that priority 
was determined by party intervention. 
 
The Janus faced attitudes of Mavambo cooperative in Harare show a willingness to be 
compliant to party dictates and yet the members are equally aware of the patron-client trap 
they are in. Members do talk of embracing and developing a healthy democratic political 
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culture when they identify with the opposition, but at the same time they are realistic 
enough to know that only open alignment with ZANU-PF opens access to resources. As 
for cooperatives in Cape Town, the reality of the situation requires tacit knowledge that 
unfortunately mostly resides in the ANC cadres across civic groups in the political arena. 
The cadres facilitate access under the ANC banner which underscores the importance of 
the party for the poor home seekers. 
 
Finally, the regimes in this study were viewed as having a liberationist conception of 
citizenship. This refers to the selective nature of resource allocation that constructed 
citizenship by party affiliation. Demonstrating party loyalty became essential in organising 
to access state resources even though the processes differed between the home-seekers in 
the two countries. 
 
Impact of the Findings on Studying Service Delivery 
Without being blinded by pessimism, the general findings indicate that since the advent of 
majority rule, these countries have utilised ad-hoc and reactive resource allocation models 
that have mobilisation implications as they distribute housing resources in favour of party 
loyalists. Whereas Africans had largely been a homogenous group to the colonial housing 
officials, the ‘poor’ Africans have evolved as a homogenous group in the new 
dispensation. Deference to political officials has been complicated by the extant deference 
to bureaucrats carried over from the colonial era. Political affiliation has supplanted ethnic 
criterion in terms of organizing for housing resources. Reasons of expediency can possibly 
lead to the advantages of homogenizing behaviour and yet the underlying tensions might 
be radically different. The literature on neo-patrimonialism has dwelt on the craftiness of 
politicians and the elite and largely painted the ‘clients’ as passive recipients of resources. 
The power of these subjects in orienting the behaviour of the leadership is thus ignored. 
Collective action and the organisation mechanism these groups rely on has been 
demonstrated as having a significant impact in this regard implying that the same energy 
can be channelled to both the consolidation of democracy (in South Africa) and re-
democratisation (in Zimbabwe) of these countries. 
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This study has also examined the relationship between the empirical findings and the 
liberation culture and at a theoretical level, how the findings relate to the neo-patrimonial 
theory. Insights into the relationship between the party and the citizens in house seeking 
communities emphasize the differences and how these can be further used to critique the 
neo-patrimonial theory. Collective action models do appear to challenge many of the tenets 
of the neo-patrimonial theory and public goods that are organized for collectively but that 
are ultimately consumed at the individual level, tend to stretch the theory as they demand 
more rigorous and intense explanations that call for new theories to capture the variances. 
They also do not take into account the power groups have even though the groups may 
defer to party authority to some extent in the end. Again, at some stage in the service 
seeking process, the neo-patrimonial theory falls short of recognizing the role of the party. 
It also fails to point out the implications of the impact of re-education on the regeneration 
of professional and ethical values in the bureaucracies. The “liberation culture”  theory can 
thus make a significant contribution to the analysis of resource allocation models in post 
liberation war countries even though the universe of such countries is small. That is, it 
points out the source of the values and norms and this gives it a vantage point for analysing 
organizational cultures. 
 
A question that emerges from this study is: Is the party patrimonialised? The question can 
be answered through a critical analysis of the formal party rules and norms versus the 
housing delivery institutions’ rules and norms as has been done in chapters four and seven. 
But when we ask: Is Zimbabwe a party state? These two cases and the “liberation culture”  
shed some light on how we can begin to make the distinction between personal rule and 
party rule. Party rule broadens the network of beneficiaries even though it is still an 
exclusionary system whereas personal rule centres everything around the president. 
Zimbabwe is closer to this model even though the party gets the credit and beneficiaries 
extend gratitude to both the party and the president. What is then the place of the political 
party? As in much of Southern Africa, the party tends to reign supreme, but with the new 
winds of change blowing, contestation is increasingly emanating within the dominant 
parties as has happened to some extent in, Zimbabwe (though nascent) and in the ANC 
alliance. 
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An interesting observation is that the current political leadership in both countries may 
have led in the struggle and set the pace for transformation, but political savvy and 
maturity appears to reside more and more in the trade unions which might offer a 
countervailing influence to the “liberation culture” . This also points to the need for an 
effective opposition to keep the dominant party in check. As illustrated in the study, real 
vibrant democracy took place in Cape Town where political contestation was heavy. This 
however does not imply ignoring the intrusion of formal institutions as they are the 
crucibles in which the “liberation culture”  manifests itself.  
 
The incorporation of contending forces by dominant parties does not augur well for 
democracy and both the ANC and ZANU-PF are culprits. Co-optative measures have 
become inextricably linked to strategies of containment that minimize opposition through a 
form of social management (Reed 1979). Potentially antagonistic forces are thus 
channelled into a system of centralized management. And becoming part of the system 
implies being part of the regulating system hence any excessive disruptive patterns are 
prevented. Liberation movements have been instrumental in this kind of domination and 
there is a need to do further research related to a reconstruction of colonial conquest and 
resistance in order to inform on how to break these patterns of social dominance. 
 
The “liberation culture”  introduces a set of dominant actors, the leaders of the struggle, 
who also have other identities. In addition to their usual official and political roles, they 
also are keenly aware of the need to keep the spirit of the struggle alive as this is their main 
basis for legitimacy. Both their legitimacy and integrity are viewed as being intertwined 
with a skewed conceptualization of the whole notion of liberation and transformation and 
this representation of the people conceals the hegemonic pursuits which keep the distance 
between the leaders and the led (ibid). Documented failures in terms of good governance 
and equitable, effective and efficient service delivery, all work against them hence tight 
control and centralized decision making provides an opportunity for clinging onto power. 
 
This study also casts doubts on the models Africa has chosen to achieve representative 
bureaucracies. Does the affirmative action model -Africanisation- provide an adequate 
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answer? Is pigmentational representivity worth the sacrifice of professionalism? Though 
this might have been essential to legitimize the democratic institutions, it is clear that a 
new model that emphasizes merit ought to replace the now obsolete Africanisation model. 
Though Zimbabwe’s Africanisation was not as disastrous as in many other countries due to 
a realiable pool of relatively highly educated people, the political appointments stifled 
initiative and innovative capabilities have to be generated. South Africa has a bigger hurdle 
as it needs to generally develop the requisite manpower that is balanced across the races 
and this takes time. Even though, the exercise can be thwarted by the previous regime’s 
officers who can deliberately withhold important information to frustrate change. Astute 
people with the right professional ethos and values are therefore essential for any 
tremendous change to occur and emphasis should be on an equity oriented approach.  It is 
therefore the role of further research to point out these alternatives. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Liberation culture” Theory 
Does the “liberation culture”  theory contribute to an adequate explanation of housing 
distribution? Firstly, given that it has its own set of values and norms that are imbedded in 
distinct institutions, and transmitted by specific value carriers, the theory adds value in 
explaining the process by which different bureaucracies acquire certain characteristics and 
how these relate to other sub-cultures. Prospects for its professionalisation are also implied 
in all these processes. Its sustenance beyond a generation might be likely, but the real 
challenge is to analyse what will replace it as particularism can easily become ingrained in 
the mind of the public and can be nurtured differently. The “liberation culture ’s”  strength 
lies in its ability to explain housing distribution that occurs under the activist or support 
approach that targets the majority of the citizens in these post liberation war countries who 
are  in the low-income bracket. The approach draws on high publicity stunts that attract the 
political leadership, the bureaucrats and the public’s attent ion. The setback is that whilst it 
can explain delivery to collectives, it requires a more tedious approach in the attempt to 
apply it to the explanation of  individual beneficiaries who get government loans to buy 
houses on the market and as well as those singled out as qualifying for housing welfare. 
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On whether the liberation culture has got universal, relative, specific or comparative 
power, the answer is that all theories attempting to explain organisational culture in post 
colonial states emphasize different issues. For instance, the economy of affection stresses 
the impact of familiarity that is bred through ethnical ties and prebendalism’s emphasis is 
on the abuse of resources for personal gain. The “liberation culture”  emphasises the 
historical significance of the specificities of exile liberation war experiences. The complex 
mixture of those that we call neo-patrimonialism therefore risk becoming a melting pot of 
the specifics that analysts do not bother to tease out and yet puzzles to the African anti-
developmental spectre may often lie within these non nuanced distinctions. This implies a 
further need for research to capture the variations that often tend to present themselves as 
obvious in African bureaucracies. 
 
What then are the strengths and weaknesses of the “liberation culture”  theory? Much of the 
relevance of the findings has to do with the democratization process in post liberation war 
transitioning societies. That the party is the main vehicle for the enculturation of the 
“liberation cultur e”  creates room for professionalizing the culture as new generations will 
eventually take over and neutralise the loyalty demands of the liberation war since many 
would not have had the exile experience. In this sense then, there are prospects for 
redemocratisation of the party. The implication being that even one dominant party states 
stand a better chance of moving closer to democratic forms of governance than the many 
‘neo-patrimonial’ African states that experience personal rule. In so far as the theory is 
party based, it is thus useful for providing insights into democratic theory on the ways in 
which civic groups manouvre and trigger room for active participation by ordinary citizens 
in the political space. And contrary to the neo-patrimonial strong man arguments, there are 
clear prospects for democracy building as the poor increasingly demonstrate capacity to 
manouvre for inclusion. 
 
Concluding this discussion requires an answer to the question: What are the 
methodological implications of using this framework? To begin with, the analytical 
framework has a historical basis and contributes to explaining contemporary resource 
allocation processes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The conceptual clarification 
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made it possible to understand the nature of service delivery and the role of agency in the 
struggle for resource allocation in post liberation war regimes. Above all, it allowed the 
results to generate insights of general application and flexibility was maintained 
throughout the study as the concepts became amenable to modification when new and 
more knowledge came up (Ragin 2000:31). The study showed the advantages of focusing 
on unique historical circumstances to enrich grand theories as well as expose their 
omissions which are not necessarily deliberate. Even though, it is essential to explore 
whether the “liberation culture”  theory can be validated in countries that experienced 
relatively peaceful liberation struggles.  And this is a task for another research project. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
List of Interviewees in Cape Town 
 
 
Patricia Matolengwe South Africa’s Homeless People’s Federation - National 
Convener, Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme- Initiator 
 
Rose Maso   Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme 
 
Tholiswa Mbeki  Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme 
 
Nokhangelani Roji   Victoria Mxenge Housing Scheme 
 
Cameron Dugmore  ANC Provincial Spokesperson on Housing 
 
Councillor Sidina Provincial Regional Executive Member of the ANC, 
Councillor for Gugulethu, former 
 
Bheki Nkonyane  ANC Parliamentary Housing Committee 
 
Charles Croeser  CTMC Housing Department - Project Manager 
 
Paul le Roax  CTMC Housing Department - Manager of New Housing, 
ISLP 
 
Jens Khun   CTMC Housing Department – Research Manager 
 
Belinda Fortune  Provincial Housing Department- 
 
Moven Bregman  Cape Town Housing Company-Chief Executive Officer 
 
Michael Hoffman  People’s Dialogue -Director 
 
Warren Smit   Development Action Group- 
 
Mandisa Dlanjwa Silver City Housing Project Coordinator, Phakamani 
Women’s Community Develo pment Project Group Member 
 
Thembile Bulana Silver City Housing Project Management Team Member 
 
Zanoxolo Lupuzi Silver City Housing Project Management Team Member 
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Appendix 2 
 
Harare Interviewees 
 
Mr. Machenjedze  Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department 
 
Mr.Mutambanenyoka  Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department 
 
Mr. Sphuma   Harare Municipality- Cooperatives Department 
 
Machipisa Funny  District Administrator, Harare City Council 
 
Barbara Kohlo  Director, Housing People of Zimbabwe 
 
Mugove Hamadziripi  Director, Housing People of Zimbabwe 
 
Betsheba Biti   Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation 
 
Godwin Matiyenga  Zororo Housing Cooperative Member 
 
Mai Mashamba   Treasurer of Mavambo 
 
Mai Chisakarira   Founding member of Mavambo 
 
Mai Khumalo   Founding member of Mavambo 
 
Mai Manjeni   Founding member of Mavambo 
 
Mai Chakaza   Founding member of Mavambo 
 
Mai Bwanali   Founding member of Mavambo 
 
Viola Chizengwe  Member of Mavamvo 
 
Davious Muvindi National Cordinator of ZIHPF, Chairperson of Ruzivo 
Housing Saving Scheme, Hatcliffe Extension 
 
Sekai Chiremba National Coordinator of ZIHPF, Nhamo Yapera Housing 
Scheme 
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Appendix 3 
 
Types of Subsidies 
 
Project linked subsidies 
The project-linked subsidy is obtained in order to implement a whole project. It provides 
for individual ownership of what is termed by the government “housing opportunities”. As 
with all subsidies, the application and approval is currently carried out by the PHDB. A 
significant number of documents must accompany the application and in addition, the 
department sets out more criteria for assessing the viability of the project 
 
Individual subsidies 
These give individual access to a housing subsidy to acquire ownership or upgrade an 
existing property that is not the product of a PHDB subsidy. It also allows one to purchase 
a serviced site and construct own top structure. It can be used in two ways: on a non-credit 
linked basis-where only the subsidy is used, or on a credit-linked basis, where a formal 
home loan is obtained to purchase a property. 
 
Institutional subsidies 
These are obtained by an institution as opposed to an individual. The subsidy is available 
to institutions such as housing associations or cooperatives that have to be established in 
accordance with legislation such as the Companies Act, Share Blocks Control Act or Co-
operatives Act. Unlike the other subsidies, the amount does not work on a sliding scale, 
and the full R16 000 applies. The subsidy guidelines allow for sale of the individual unit to 
the tenant after a holding time by the institution of four years. 
 
Consolidation subsidies 
These are available to individuals who have received housing assistance either directly 
from the state or through the IDT in the form of a serviced site under the previous 
government. The subsidy provides up to 8 000 rands to households with incomes of R1 
500 or less for the provision or upgrade of a top structure. It can be acquired through the 
project linked or individual route. 
 
Source: Department of Housing (1995) Implementation Manual - Housing Subsidy 
Scheme, Ministry of Housing, South Africa, April. 
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Appendix 4 
 
24 Point Plan to Secure (Invade) Land 
 
Land to be identified (plus at least one alternative) 
Negotiations, security, legal, construction, uTshani teams to be set up 
Land owner to be identified 
Negotiations for land to be started 
Report back meeting on negotiations 
Complete list of families to secure land by purchase or occupation to be compiled 
R100 contribution for expenses to be incurred to be deposited in HSL 
Layout completed, sites allocated 
Identity documents issued 
House modelling and costing completed 
Land registry compiled 
Subsidy applications completed 
Local officials invited to negotiate with HSL 
uTshani Loans completed 
Video teams ready 
Materials purchased 
uTshani loans released 
Final preparatory meeting minutes. Report back on negotiations and development of 
systems 
Media, officials and ministries informed 
Transport ready 
uTshani loans used to purchase building materials 
Subsidy applications submitted 
Agreement to purchase or secure land finalised. In case of negotiations failure or          
deadlock, planned occupation proceeds 
House construction starts 
 
Source: Biti, B., A. Hansen, D. Mitlin (1998) Evaluation of People’s Dialogue and South 
Africa Homeless People’s Federation , International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), July. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Project Assessment criteria 
 
Inclusiveness of social compact-the degree to which all relevant stakeholders are included 
n the compact underlying the project proposal and the significance and impact of the 
exclusion of any stakeholders 
 
Housing needs-the extent to which the project satisfies the housing needs of an identified 
target market and the relative urgency of such needs 
 
Location-extent to which location of the project facilitates access to employment 
opportunities, infrastructural services and transport 
 
Holistic development-the degree to which the provides for the variety of community needs 
in a balanced and integrated manner 
 
Community Self management-extent to which project can generate knowledge for its 
sustenance 
 
Sustainability-the degree to which the project promotes the sustained physical and social 
development and vitality of the community 
 
Employment potential-extent to which project creates employment 
 
Norms and standards on health and safety of authorities and acceptability to client 
community 
 
Planning and design-extent to which this will contribute to a wholesome living 
environment that will instill pride and a sense of belonging amongst prospective residents 
 
Affordability-extent to which new community can afford residential property costs 
 
Compatibility and environmental impact-on the surrounding development 
 
Technical feasibility-effectiveness of construction methods in relation to geo-technical and 
topographical characteristics of project site 
 
Replicability-extent to which methods are replicable and contributing to a sustainable 
housing delivery process 
 
Accountability and gearing of public resources-extent to which project utilizes state 
financial support effectively and efficiently by providing value for money 
 
Local authority capacity-the capacity of the relevant local authority to delver and perform 
effectively and productively 
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Socio-economic multiplier effects-project’s co ntribution to optimising the longer term 
social and economic benefits of the project to the target community 
 
Choice-extent to which a project affords beneficiaries a choice in satisfying their housing 
needs 
 
Stakeholders-degree to which these support the project and extent to which they have 
agreed to cooperate in its implementation 
 
Value for money-to be received by beneficiaries in terms of the pricing of products to be 
offered 
 
Source: Summarized from the Department of Housing, Implementation Manual - Housing 
Subsidy Scheme, South Africa, April 1995, p36-40. 
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